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Abstract 
 
Knowledge plays an important role in economic growth. The role of 
technological knowledge significantly increased after the Industrial Revolution. 
Firms internalised technological knowledge in their R&D laboratories and placed 
knowledge creation in a central position in their business strategies. Both the stock 
and flow of technological knowledge and the tight interaction among science and 
engineering became indispensable to the competitive advantage of industry, as well 
as modern economic growth. 
 Directing its attention to knowledge creation and spillover, this thesis 
scrutinises the development of semiconductor lasers from 1960 to 1990. The 
semiconductor laser became one of the most important developments in the 
optoelectronics industry underlying the drastic changes that took place during the 
last half of the twentieth century in information technology, and it has become the 
most widely used laser since the 1980s.  
Reviewing the optoelectronics industry in the U.S. and Japan, the Japan 
Technology Evaluation Center (JTEC) found that “Japan clearly led in consumer 
optoelectronics, that both countries were competitive in communications and 
networks, and that the United States held a clear lead in custom optoelectronics.” 
“Japan’s lead in high-volume consumer optoelectronics and related technologies 
gave it a dominant share of the overall global optoelectronics market.” This thesis 
explores how the patterns of comparative advantages emerged, which were indicated 
by the JTEC report. How did Japanese firms gain technological competitiveness in 
high volume product markets? How did the U.S. firms come to be competitive in 
niche markets? 
Through scrutinizing patent data, it examines the engineers’ network, 
mobility, and the pattern of technological choice in R&D competition. Introducing 
the two different types of knowledge--current technological domain specific 
knowledge and lateral utilization knowledge--it showed how different patterns of 
knowledge spillover emerged and resulted in the different paths of technological 
development in the U.S. and Japan. Based on the high star-engineers’ mobility and 
the well developed research network, the U.S. firms tended to spin off from their 
parent firms and targeted niche markets. Therefore, knowledge spillover emerged in 
the areas where semiconductor laser technology was applied and exploited to fill 
untapped markets. In contrast, the pattern of competition of Japanese firms induced 
knowledge spillovers to enhance the development of core semiconductor laser 
technology instead of exploiting niche product markets.  
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1. Introduction 
 
 
Following from Albert Einstein’s 1905 theoretical conception of the 
photoelectric effect, an American physicist, Gordon Gould, invented Laser (Light 
Amplification by Stimulated Emission of Radiation) in 1958. It was called “the 
greatest invention of the century.”  
A laser is an optical source that emits a narrow beam of coherent light. The 
power in a continuous beam ranges from a fraction of a milliwatt to more than a 
mega watt. The range of laser application is broad in scope ranging from 
commercial uses to special military applications. 
The semiconductor laser became one of the most important technologies 
underlying the dramatic changes that took place during the last half of the 20th 
century in information technology, and it has become the most widely used laser 
since the 1980s. It is mainly used for information storage such as the compact disc 
and digital videodisc system, which can store a 30-volume encyclopaedia set of 
information on a disc and can access an arbitrary element of information in equal 
time. It is also employed for fibre-optic communication, which permits digital data 
transmission over long distances and at higher data rates than electronic 
communication. 
Reviewing the optoelectronics industry in the U.S. and Japan in 1996, the 
Japan Technology Evaluation Center (JTEC) estimated that “Japan now dominates 
some 90% of the world optoelectronics markets and can be expected to continue its 
dominance for a number of years.”1 It also indicated,  “Japan clearly led in consumer 
optoelectronics, that both countries were competitive in communications and 
networks, and that the United States held a clear lead in custom optoelectronics.” 
“Japan’s lead in high-volume consumer optoelectronics and related technologies 
                                                 
1 Forrest et al., JTEC Panel on Optoelectronics in Japan and the United States Final Report,. 
p.xv. 
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gave it a dominant share of the overall global optoelectronics market.”2 
Scrutinizing the development of semiconductor laser technology from 1960 
to 1990, this thesis explores how the patterns of comparative advantages indicated 
by the JTEC report emerged. How did Japanese firms gain technological 
competitiveness in high volume product markets? How did the U.S. firms come to 
be competitive in niche markets? 
 This chapter contains four sections. The first section aims to present key 
issues of this study and to induce the research questions by overviewing the previous 
theoretical literature about competition, knowledge spillover, and technological 
change in technology-intensive industries. The second and third section introduces 
semiconductor laser and its epitaxy technology, which is the most important 
semiconductor laser technology. The last section presents this thesis’s approach to 
these research questions. It introduces the research design, perspectives, and 
measurement methodology. It also presents the sources and an outline of the 
argument of the study. 
 
                                                 
2 Ibid., p.xv. 
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1.1. Knowledge, Knowledge Spillover and Technological Change
3
 
 
Technology and technological knowledge played an important role in 
economic growth. The British Industrial Revolution (1760-1830) was the first event 
of modern times in which technological changes reshaped society and accelerated 
innovation. Indicating that the growth of the stock of knowledge played a important 
role in modern economic growth, Kuznets incorporated knowledge in the framework 
of economic analysis.4  He argued, “indeed, one might define modern economic 
growth as the spread of a system of production, in the widest sense of the term, 
based upon the increased application of science, that is an organized system of tested 
knowledge.”5 However, Mokyr noted that Kuznets’s theory did not attract much 
attention.6 One of the reasons was that economic historians found that the role of 
scientific knowledge in the British Industrial Revolution was quite modest.7 
The role of technological knowledge, however, significantly increased after 
the Industrial Revolution.8 Pharmaceutical and chemical firms (e.g., Du Pont) were 
probably the first to allocate an enormous amount of resources to R&D.9 Examining 
three dominant technologies--the internal combustion engine, chemicals, and electric 
power--in the U.S., Mowery and Rosenberg described how funding, institutional 
                                                 
3 The second chapter, Literature Review: Technological Development in Post-war Japan,   
will more broadly review the previous studies of technological change in post-war Japan to 
show how this study aims to contribute to the broader line of previous arguments. This 
section focuses on the studies arguing the relationship between knowledge spillover and 
competition, which is the focus of this study.  
4 Kuznets, Economic Growth and Structure. 
5 Ibid, p.84. 
6 Mokyr, "Innovation in an Historical Perspective: Tales of Technology and Evolution", p. 
25. 
7  On recent discussions on the role of scientific revolution in the British Industrial 
Revolution, see Allen, "The British Industrial Revolution in Global Perspective: How 
Commerce Created the Industrial Revolution and Modern Economic Growth"; Khan and 
Sokoloff, "The Evolution of Useful Knowledge: Great Inventors, Science and Technology in 
British Economic Development, 1750-1930." 
8 Mokyr, "Innovation in an Historical Perspective: Tales of Technology and Evolution." 
9 On the business history of DuPont, see Hounshell and Smith, Science and Corporate 
Strategy: Du Pont R&D, 1920-1980. 
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settings (e.g., patent law), and R&D systems interacted to shape the path of 
innovation.10 Examining the consumer electronics and computer industry, Chandler 
et al. revealed that the firms internalised technological knowledge into their R&D 
laboratories and placed knowledge creation in a central position in their business 
strategies.11 It is generally accepted that both the stock and flow of technological 
knowledge and the tight interaction among science and engineering became 
indispensable to the competitive advantage of industry and firms, as well as modern 
economic growth.12 
 
Knowledge Spillover 
Regarding knowledge, technology, and human capital as exogenous factors, 
neo-classical economics used to view labour and capital as the only two factors of 
production important for manufacturing. However, the new growth theory contends 
that both knowledge and technology play significant roles in long-term economic 
growth.13 New knowledge is a source of innovation and contributes to productivity 
growth. Knowledge spillovers also play crucial roles in various economic contexts. 
Much of the current literature in both economics and economic history agrees that 
knowledge creation and spillover are important factors leading to economic growth. 
Reviewing the previous literature, this section discusses the two standpoints on 
competition and technological spillover, which induce the research questions. 
 Maintaining that technological knowledge is inherently a public good, 
Kenneth Arrow focused on non-rivalness and non-excludability.14 First, an unlimited 
                                                 
10 Mowery and Rosenberg, Paths of Innovation: Technological Change in 20th-Century 
America. 
11  Chandler et al., Inventing the Electronic Century: The Epic Story of the Consumer 
Electronics and Computer Industries. 
12  Regarding the relationship between science and industry, see Rosenberg, "How 
Exogenous Is Science?" 
13 For example, Grossman and Helpman, Innovation and Growth in the Global Economy; 
Grossman and Helpman, "Endogenous Innovation in the Theory of Growth"; Romer, 
"Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth"; Romer, "Endogenous Technological Change." 
14 Arrow also emphasised that knowledge is characterised by a greater degree of uncertainty, 
indivisibility, and asymmetry than are other types of economic goods. These issues will be 
introduced in the following discussion. Regarding non-excludability and externality of 
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number of agents can use the same technological knowledge at the same time. 
Second, once a firm has publicly released technological knowledge, it is difficult for 
the firm to keep other firms from using that knowledge. These characteristics of 
technological knowledge play an important role in knowledge spillovers. 
 While no formal definition of knowledge spillovers exists, Griliches’s 
definition has been most straightforward. He has defined knowledge spillovers as 
“ideas borrowed by research teams of industry i from the research results of industry 
j.”15 Following Griliches’s definition, this thesis defines technological knowledge 
spillover as learning or knowledge externalities from another firm’s R&D. 
Spillovers occur because new knowledge created by an organisation cannot 
be kept perfectly secret in the organisation. Technological knowledge emerges in 
numerous ways. Technological knowledge leaks out through patents, academic 
papers, and academic presentations.16 It is also transferred when knowledge-bearing 
employees change firms. Additionally, knowledge spillovers arise through informal 
personal relationships. 
 Knowledge spillovers play significant roles in various economic and 
business contexts. Following Schumpeter and Solow, recent economic growth 
literature maintains the importance of knowledge spillovers in sustainable economic 
growth. For instance, assuming that knowledge input in production increases 
marginal productivity, Romer presented a model of long-run economic growth based 
on the new growth theory.17 Developing economic growth models, Grossman and 
Helpman proposed that technology spillovers, which bring about increasing returns, 
are the engine of endogenous economic growth.18 In their model, the innovative 
                                                                                                                                         
technological information, see Arrow, "Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources 
for Invention." 
15 Griliches, "The Search for R&D Spillovers", p.13. 
16 Appleyard has suggested that there are many different ways of knowledge sharing and 
technological knowledge leaking. Appleyard, "How Does Knowledge Flow? Interfirm 
Patterns in the Semiconductor Industry", pp.139-140. 
17 Romer, "Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth"; Romer, "Endogenous Technological 
Change." 
18 Grossman and Helpman, Innovation and Growth in the Global Economy. Grossman and 
Helpman, "Endogenous Innovation in the Theory of Growth."  
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activities of firms not only lead to the introduction of new products and the 
improvement of product quality, but they also contribute to a general stock of 
knowledge on which subsequent innovators can build. This knowledge base grows 
over time, allowing innovation without the continual increase of R&D resources. 
Taking the discussion of technological knowledge spillover one step down from the 
national economy to corporate R&D, Griliches argued that technological spillover is 
a source of increasing returns in R&D and enhances technological development.19 
Bernstein and Nadiri calculated social and private rates of return and estimated the 
effects of R&D spillovers.20 Their estimation found that R&D spillovers brought 
important positive returns to both society and a firm and that the social return 
exceeded the private return, even though there is significant variation across 
industries in the differential between the social and private rate of return. 
New knowledge in an R&D project affects the productivity of other R&D 
projects. Therefore, R&D spillovers have been conceptualised as a positive 
externality from the body of knowledge that other firms created. The previous 
literature has attempted to gauge the broad importance of the spillover phenomenon 
by looking at the average effect that other firms’ R&D has on the productivity of a 
firm’s own R&D.21  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19 Griliches, "The Search for R&D Spillovers", p.1. Grossman and Helpman also pointed out 
that technology-entailed spillovers was the engine of economic endogenous economic 
growth. Grossman and Helpman, "Comparative Advantage and Long-Run Growth"; 
Grossman and Helpman, "Endogenous Innovation in the Theory of Growth."  
20  Bernstein and Nadiri, "Research and Development and Intraindustry Spillovers: An 
Empirical Application of Dynamic Duality." 
21  Griliches, "Issues in Assessing the Contribution of Research and Development to 
Productivity Growth"; Jaffe, "Technological Opportunity and Spillovers of R&D: Evidence 
from Firms' Patents, Profits, and Market Value." 
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Entrepreneurial Ventures and Spin off Engineers 
 One important issue--the effect of spillover--has received considerable 
attention since the 1970s, when many information technology business ventures 
spilled over from the 1960s in the area called Silicon Valley, California, in the U.S.22 
Inventing the solid-state transistor in 1947 at Bell Telephone Laboratory with John 
Bardeen and Walter H. Brattain, American physicist William B. Shockley 
established Shockley Semiconductor Laboratory in Mountain View, California, in 
1955 in order to commercialise his new transistor design. Spilling over from 
Shockley Semiconductor Laboratory, many engineers began to establish new 
ventures in the Stanford University area. For instance, eight engineers who had 
worked with Shockley left Shockley Semiconductor Laboratory and established 
Fairchild Semiconductor in 1956. In the 1960s, engineers spilled over from Fairchild 
and established new ventures. Robert Noyce and Gordon E. Moore established Intel 
Corporation in 1968. Shockley Semiconductor Laboratory and Fairchild 
Semiconductor became the intellectual hubs for many semiconductor-related 
business ventures. Supplying risk money to entrepreneurs, venture capitalists 
supported these startups. Due to the ample supply of advanced engineers from 
universities such as Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and Harvard 
University, similar entrepreneurial spillovers emerged in the area of Route 128 in 
Boston, Massachusetts, in the U.S. in the 1970s.23 
Spilling over from intellectual hub organisations such as Fairchild 
Semiconductor and MIT, numerous engineers began to establish technology-
intensive businesses. As a result of flexible labour mobility and risk money supplied 
by venture capitalists, technological spillovers arose through knowledge-bearing 
engineers and spun off from the intellectual hubs; new ventures were established. 
                                                 
22 On technology-intensive firms in Silicon Valley, see Freiberger and Swaine, Fire in the 
Valley: The Making of the Personal Computer; Lécuyer, Making Silicon Valley: Innovation 
and the Growth of High Tech, 1930-1970, Inside Technology; Lee, The Silicon Valley Edge: 
A Habitat for Innovation and Entrepreneurship; Zhang, High-Tech Start-Ups and Industry 
Dynamics in Silicon Valley.  
23 On the comparison of Silicon Valley with Route 128, see Saxenian, Regional Advantage: 
Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley and Route 128.  
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Entrepreneurship in this pattern of startups and knowledge spillovers is considered 
an engine of economic and technological development. Pointing out the importance 
of industrial clusters, Alfred Marshall suggested that knowledge spillovers facilitate 
innovation within an industrial cluster.24 Jaffe also perceived knowledge spillovers 
as a major cause of spatial industrial clustering. 25  These reports have directed 
attention to the construction of regional industrial clusters such as Silicon Valley and 
Route 128, in which innovative firms spilled over from intellectual hubs.26  
While the previous literature argued that technology-intensive ventures 
played an important role in knowledge spillovers in technology-intensive industries 
of the U.S. after the 1970s, many reports on the economic and business history of 
post-war Japan agreed that this pattern of technological spillover was seldom 
observed in post-war Japan. Compared to the U.S. and European countries, post-war 
Japan experienced an under-developed labour market and low labour mobility.27 It 
has been argued that employees did not have a strong incentive to leave their firms 
in the middle of their careers under the lifetime employment system and seniority-
based wages.28 It has also been pointed out that the entrepreneurial and technology-
intensive spillovers were more limited in post-war Japan than in the U.S. These 
arguments imply an important point to this study: technology-intensive startups 
spinning off from the intellectual hub played an important role in knowledge 
spillovers in the U.S., while they were fairly limited in post-war Japan. 
 
 
 
                                                 
24 Marshall, Principles of Economics, pp.267-277. 
25  Jaffe, "Real Effects of Academic Research"; Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson, 
"Geographic Localization of Knowledge Spillovers as Evidenced by Patent Citations." 
26  For instance, Koepp, Clusters of Creativity: Enduring Lessons on Innovation and 
Entrepreneurship from Silicon Valley and Europe's Silicon Fen; Porter, "Clusters and the 
New Economics of Competition."  
27 Hazama, The History of Labour Management in Japan. 
28 For instance, see Ariga, Ohkusa, and Brunello, Internal Labor Markets in Japan. pp.13-34.  
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Technological Proximity 
A second issue is related to competition, technological proximity, and 
knowledge spillovers. Examining the conditions in which research consortia work, 
Katz maintained that technological proximity plays an important role in inducing 
technological spillover.29 It is necessary to have a certain technological similarity to 
induce spillover effects. Griliches and Jaffe also contended that more technological 
spillovers emerged if the firms that adopted similar technology and targeted similar 
markets conducted R&D in the same technological areas. 30   In other words, 
technological spillovers are enhanced with increased technological proximity among 
research engineers or organisations.  
The Agency of Industrial Science and Technology of Japan (AIST) surveyed 
key industrial technologies in 1983 and concluded that semiconductor laser 
technology was one of the most competitive key industrial technologies. Based on 
the questionnaire, this survey reported that a number of firms were competing in the 
same sort of product market, thus stimulating technological change and industrial 
development. 31  This pattern of competitive strategy has been discussed in the 
existing literature on the competitive strategy of Japanese firms.32 It has been argued 
that Japanese firms tended to make similar technological choices and compete in 
similar product markets. Much of the existing literature on the competitive strategy 
of firms has taken a negative view of this pattern of competition. Technology-
intensive startups in the U.S. tended to target unexploited product markets and 
establish a unique position with a different product mix and technological choice 
from competitors; in contrast, Japanese firms tended to compete in the same product 
                                                 
29 Katz, "An Analysis of Cooperative Research and Development"; Katz, et al., "R and D 
Cooperation and Competition."  
30 Griliches, "The Search for R&D Spillovers",p.14; Jaffe, "Technological Opportunity and 
Spillovers of R&D: Evidence from Firms' Patents, Profits, and Market Value", pp.994-995. 
31  Kōgyō Gijutsuin Sōmubu Gijutsu Chōsaka (Agency of Industrial Science and 
Technology), Wagakuni Sangyō Gijutsu no Taishitsu to Kadai, (Survey of Japanese 
Industrial Technology), pp.276-277. 
32 For example, Asaba, Nihon Kigyō no Kyōsō Genri: Dōshitsuteki Kōdō no Jisshō Bunseki, 
(Competitive Theory of Japanese Firms: Empirical Study of Isomorphic Behaviour of the 
Firm); Shintaku, Nihon Kigyō no Kyōsō Senryaku (Competitive Strategy of Japanese Firms). 
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mix with the same technological choices as competitors. Kim and Mauborgne 
indicated the need for firms to exist apart from markets in which many competitors 
intensively compete and to find untapped product markets, called “blue oceans.”33 
Introducing the industrial organisation framework into a firm’s competitive strategy, 
Michael Porter argued that it is essential for firms to take unique positioning in the 
product market in order to hold sustainable competitive advantages.34 In Porter’s 
account, strategy rests on choosing a unique position by offering a different mix of 
value than competitors. Directing his attention to Japanese firms, he also pointed out, 
“instead of choosing distinctive ways of competing, tailoring activities, and making 
trade-offs, Japanese companies tend to proliferate products and features, serve all 
market segments, sell through multiple channels, and emulate one another’s 
production approaches.”35 Porter maintained that this strategy without significant 
differences in activities is the classic strategic mistake. 
While business studies take a negative view of this pattern of competition in 
Japan, the previous literature about technological proximity and knowledge 
spillovers implied that this pattern of competition might have played an important 
role in inducing spillover effects. Putting this another way, the competing pattern of 
Japanese firms might have played an important role in inducing technological 
spillovers because this competition pattern assumes high technological proximity. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
33 Kim and Mauborgne, Blue Ocean Strategy: How to Create Uncontested Market Space 
and Make the Competition Irrelevant.  
34 Porter, Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing Industries and Competitors; Porter, 
Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance; Porter, "What Is 
Strategy?"  
35 Porter et al., Can Japan Compete?, p.91. 
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Different Knowledge Travels Differently 
 These two points regarding spin off and technological proximity provide an 
important basis for this thesis. It was regarded that entrepreneurial venture business 
and spin off engineers play an important role in knowledge spillover in a technology 
intensive industry on the one hand. On the other hand, the economists supposed that 
a higher level of technological proximity would induce more spillovers. 
Combining these two points, this thesis aims to scrutinize the technological 
development of the semiconductor laser in an effort to show how firms’ competition 
shaped the nature of knowledge spillovers and induced the different types of 
knowledge spillovers.  
The history of science and technology and economic history have explored 
the concept of knowledge for more years than economists. Historians have revealed 
the complex nature of knowledge and indicated that there were many different types 
of knowledge. The most familiar categorization of knowledge is pure science and 
applied science. Theoretical knowledge and practical knowledge is also one of the 
most familiar categorisations. Michael Polanyi introduced two types of knowledge: 
tacit knowledge and formal knowledge. 36  The former relates to knowledge 
inarticulately rooted in an individual’s experience and observation. The latter relates 
to theoretically based knowledge that may be rationally justified. Economic 
historians have also categorized knowledge into several types. For example, pointing 
out that the growth of human knowledge is one of the deepest and most elusive 
elements in economic history, Joel Mokyr introduced two types of knowledge: 
propositional and prescriptive. 37  The former category, labelled Ω-knowledge, 
consists of the stock of beliefs about natural phenomena and regularities. The latter 
(λ-knowledge) includes the set of instructions or techniques for applying 
propositional knowledge in economic production. Scholars in business management 
                                                 
36 Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension. Following from Polanyi’s categorization, Nonaka and 
Takeuchi examined how new knowledge was created in firms. Nonaka and Takeuchi, The 
Knowledge-Creating Company: How Japanese Companies Create the Dynamics of 
Innovation. 
37 Mokyr, The Gifts of Athena: Historical Origins of the Knowledge Economy, pp.1-27. 
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studies also have examined different types of knowledge. Pointing out that the 
traditional categorisation of innovation as either incremental or radical is incomplete 
and potentially misleading, Henderson and Clark introduced two distinctive types of 
knowledge: component knowledge and architectural knowledge. 38  The first is 
“knowledge about each of the core design concepts and the way in which they are 
implemented in a particular component.”39  The second is “knowledge about the 
ways in which the components are integrate and linked together into a coherent 
whole.”40 Examining organisational capability to utilise certain knowledge, Teece 
classified knowledge into two depending on inter-organisational transferability: one 
is contractually non-separable from the firm possessing it and the other is 
contractually separable.41 
This thesis assumes that depending on types of spillover knowledge from 
other firms, the nature of knowledge spillovers may vary. This section classifies 
knowledge into two categories; current technological domain specific knowledge 
and lateral utilization knowledge, and it introduces two types of knowledge 
spillovers. Current technological domain-specific knowledge (domain-specific 
knowledge) relates to knowledge about a technology that one is currently 
developing for a certain target. Lateral utilization knowledge relates to knowledge 
about how one would use technology for a new target.  
Take carbon fibre technology, for example. Carbon fibre is a highly durable 
and flexible carbon filament thread, which is stronger and much lighter than steel. It 
is widely used in airplane parts, high-performance vehicles, sporting equipment, 
wind generator blades, and other demanding mechanical applications.  
If one is currently developing carbon fibre for the wing of an airplane, all 
technological knowledge created from R&D in this domain is classified as domain-
specific knowledge. For instance, knowledge about the material composition of 
                                                 
38 Henderson and Clark, "Architectural Innovation: The Reconfiguration of Existing Product 
Technologies and the Failure of Established Firms", p.11. 
39 Ibid., p.11. 
40 Ibid., p.11. 
41 Teece, "Towards an Economic Theory of the Multiproduct Firm." 
1. Introduction 
 21 
carbon fibre for wings is classified into domain-specific knowledge. Knowledge 
about the manufacturing process of carbon fibre for wings is also classified in this 
category. In other words, all knowledge created in this domain is classified into 
domain-specific knowledge. On the other hand, knowledge about how to apply the 
carbon fibre, which one is currently developing for the wing, to a different target, is 
lateral utilization knowledge. For instance, one may want to apply the carbon fibre 
to a tennis racket. In this case, knowledge concerning how one uses the carbon fibre 
in a tennis racket is classified into lateral utilization knowledge. 
This thesis presumes that the conditions in which knowledge spillover occurs 
vary depending on the types of knowledge spillovers. The previous literature in 
economics on knowledge spillover indicated that technological proximity plays an 
important role in inducing spillover effects. For instance, Griliches contended that 
more technological spillovers emerged if the firms that adopted similar technology 
and targeted similar markets conducted R&D in the same technological areas.42  
While the previous literature assumed that higher technological proximity 
would induce more technological spillover effects, this thesis argues that higher 
technological proximity induces a higher level of domain-specific knowledge 
spillover but reduces the possibility of lateral utilization knowledge spillover.  
One can easily learn from others who have conducted R&D in a similar 
technological domain. In this spillover, what one can learn from the others is 
domain-specific knowledge. In other words, one can learn domain-specific 
knowledge more from others who are researching in a similar domain with a similar 
technological choice than others who are researching in a different area with a 
different technological choice.  
On the other hand, a higher technological proximity does not necessarily 
bring about lateral utilization knowledge spillover. Furthermore, it reduces the 
possibility of lateral utilization knowledge spillover. It is necessary to have a certain 
complementary knowledge to obtain knowledge about how to apply current 
                                                 
42  On the overview of relationship between spillover and technological proximity, see 
Griliches, "The Search for R&D Spillovers."  
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technology for a different domain. If the carbon fibre manufacturer tries to begin to 
apply carbon fibre to make tennis rackets, it needs to learn from those who have 
researched this field and accumulated complementary knowledge. If everyone 
conducts R&D in the same technological domain, it reduces the possibility that one 
can access complementary knowledge and learn how to apply technology in a 
different field. It must be noted that it is difficult to induce any knowledge spillover 
from others, if their research area and technological choice are completely different. 
However, it is reasonable to assume that high technological proximity would 
increase domain-specific knowledge spillover and reduce the possibility of lateral 
utilization knowledge spillover. 
 
Research Question 
There are two important governmental reports on the optoelectronics 
industry and the semiconductor laser: the JTEC report and the AIST report. As 
showed above, examining the world optoelectronics industry, JTEC reported that 
Japanese firms were competitive in high volume consumer product markets, while 
U.S. firms were competitive in the custom market. The simple but fundamental 
question underlying this study is how the patterns of competitive advantages 
reported by the JTEC emerged in the U.S. and Japan. In other words, the 
fundamental research questions are the following. 
 
 Research Question 1: How did Japanese firms come to be 
competitive in the high volume market?  
 
 Research Question 2: How did the U.S. firms come to be 
competitive in the niche markets? 
 
Surveying key industrial technologies in 1983, AIST designated 
semiconductor laser technology as one of the most competitive key industrial 
technologies in optoelectronics. Based on a questionnaire survey, this report 
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indicated that the firms’ fierce competition in the same semiconductor laser market 
played an important role in technological development. 43  The JTEC survey 
combined with the AIST’s survey revealed that Japanese firms competed in the 
consumer electronics market with the same technological choices, whereas U.S. 
firms assumed competitive advantages in niche markets. 44  These points lead to 
questions concerning how Japanese firms came to have a similar strategy in the 
same market, and how the U.S. firms came to be competitive in niche markets. 
These research questions are broken down into sub research questions. They will be 
examined in detail in each chapter starting from the third chapter, Human Capital 
and Research Networks.  
Scrutinizing the development of semiconductor lasers based on the research 
questions, this thesis shows that Japanese firms and the U.S. firms obtained different 
types of knowledge spillovers in R&D competition. More concretely, while the U.S. 
firms acquired lateral utilization knowledge spillover, Japanese firms obtained 
domain-specific knowledge spillover more than lateral utilization knowledge. It 
proposes two points:  
 
 The U.S. firms tended to bring knowledge spillovers which 
enriched and exploited potential and untapped product markets by 
utilizing the fundamental technology of the semiconductor laser.  
 The pattern of competition of Japanese firms induced spillovers 
enhancing the development of the fundamental technology of the 
semiconductor laser instead of exploiting niche product markets. 
 
This paper draws a somewhat ironic conclusion from the case of 
                                                 
43  Kōgyō Gijutsuin Sōmubu Gijutsu Chōsaka (Agency of Industrial Science and 
Technology), Wagakuni Sangyō Gijutsu no Taishitsu to Kadai, (Survey of Japanese 
Industrial Technology). pp.276-277. 
44 Forrest et al., JTEC Panel on Optoelectronics in Japan and the United States Final Report, 
p.xv; Kōgyō Gijutsuin Sōmubu Gijutsu Chōsaka (Agency of Industrial Science and 
Technology), Wagakuni Sangyō Gijutsu no Taishitsu to Kadai, (Survey of Japanese 
Industrial Technology). pp.276-277. 
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semiconductor laser technology in the U.S and Japan. Since the U.S. firms were in a 
better position to learn how to apply the semiconductor laser for untapped markets, 
they differentiated their R&D and targeted niche markets. The more that firms 
differentiated their R&D for untapped markets, the more lateral utilization 
knowledge was spilt over in the industry through developed inter-organisational 
networks and the high mobility of engineers in the U.S. As a result, because the 
firms differentiated their R&D for small niche markets, the development of 
fundamental semiconductor laser technology for mass markets was retarded in the 
U.S. The highest volume market was eventually taken by Japanese firms, which had 
difficulty in accessing lateral utilization knowledge. Many Japanese firms were 
competing to develop epitaxy technology, which was the most economically and 
strategically important semiconductor laser technology. The pattern of competition 
of Japanese firms induced knowledge spillovers to enhance the development of 
fundamental semiconductor laser technology instead of exploiting niche product 
markets. 
 
1. Introduction 
 25 
1.2. Semiconductor Laser
45
 
  
The semiconductor laser, which is also called “Laser Diode”, is a tiny 
electronics device mainly used in optical communication and optical information 
storage. Figure 1-1 depicts an actual sized semiconductor laser. Its height is around 
one centimetre. The diameter of the packaged semiconductor laser is around five 
millimetres.  
 
Figure 1-1: Semiconductor Laser 
 
Copyright (C) 1998, Matsushita Electronics Corporation. 
 
Laser stands for light amplification by stimulated emission or radiation. It is 
an optical source of artificial light, which is typically near-monochromatic, single 
wavelength and emitted in a narrow beam. Theodore H. Mainman succeeded in 
radiating a laser beam by using a solid body pink ruby in 1960 in the U.S. It was the 
first laser emission in the world. The semiconductor laser was invented in 1962. 
Now there are many varieties of lasers; CO2 laser, YAG laser, He-Ne laser, ruby 
laser, semiconductor laser, and so on. The power in a continuous beam ranges from a 
fraction of a milliwatt to more than a mega watt. The range of laser application is 
broad from commercial uses to special military uses. 
 
Examples of applications46 
• Materials working 
• Measurement and inspection 
                                                 
45 On the mechanisms of semiconductor laser, see Appendix VI. 
46 Hecht, The Laser Guidebook. pp. 7-8. 
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• Reading, writing, and recording of information 
• Displays 
• Communications 
• Holography 
• Spectroscopy and analytical chemistry 
• Remote sensing 
• Surveying, marking, and alignment 
• Laser weaponry 
• Laser-induced nuclear fusion 
• Isotope enrichment 
• Spectroscopy and atomic physics 
• Measurement  
• Plasma diagnostics 
 
There are four reasons for taking semiconductor laser technology as a case 
study. The first reason is the fact that the semiconductor laser is quite technology 
intensive. Table 1-1 shows the R&D intensity of technology intensive industry in 
Japan measured by R&D expense divided by sales. It illustrates that the 
Communication, Electronics, and Electric Measurement industry in which the 
semiconductor laser is classified, come to the second highest R&D intensity industry 
next to the pharmaceutical industry. Moreover, laser technology was regarded as one 
of the greatest inventions of 20th century. It became the symbol of “high tech” of the 
century.   
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Table 1-1: R&D Intensity in Japan 
 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Total 1.54 1.67 1.84 2.03 1.99 2.31 2.57 2.59 2.6 2.72 2.78 
Total Manufacturing Sector 1.74 1.92 2.15 2.31 2.34 2.69 3.03 3.14 3.15 3.29 3.36 
Pharmaceutical 5.45 5.85 5.56 6.59 6.49 7.04 6.89 6.96 6.94 7.5 8.02 
Communication, Electronics and Electric 
Measurement 3.94 4.21 4.72 4.85 4.6 5.25 5.63 5.78 5.66 6.1 6.12 
Electric Machine and Instrument 3.35 3.8 4.17 4.4 4.45 5.1 5.5 5.61 5.53 5.89 5.36 
Precision Machine 3.02 3.47 3.97 4.02 4.08 4.49 4.59 4.91 4.85 5.16 5.94 
Grease and Paint 2.48 2.56 2.66 2.83 3.09 3.14 3.42 3.85 3.74 3.93 3.9 
General Chemicals and Chemical Textile 1.85 2.01 2.17 2.32 2.47 2.8 3.56 3.76 3.92 4.09 4.01 
Automobile 2.38 2.82 3.02 2.89 2.9 2.96 3.2 3.17 3.31 3.48 3.65 
Source: Monbu Kagaku Shō, (Ministry of Education Culture Sports Science and Technology). Kagaku Gijutsu Shihyō 2004 Ban, (Science and 
Technology Report), p.526.  
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The second is related to the presence of laser technology. The laser was 
invented in the late 1950s. Now the laser is widely used both in daily life and on 
battlefields. The application areas of laser light are highly diversified, and include 
measurement, information processing, alignment and construction, optical 
communications, medical work, and instrumentation, printers, material processing, 
pointers, radar, and also bombs. Table 1-2 demonstrates the presence of 
optoelectronics production in GDP in Japan. It shows that the optoelectronics 
presence in GDP steadily increased from 1983 and reached 1.08 percent of GDP in 
1997. Optoelectronics was the basis of competitiveness of various industries such as 
the consumer electronics industry and the computer industry. Optoelectronics is one 
of the best representatives of the development of technology intensive industries in 
Japan. 
 
Table 1-2: Optoelectronics Production and Presence in GDP (Billion Yen) 
 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Optoelectronics  466 642 847 1,042 1,690 2,086 2,614 
The Presence in Real GDP (%) 0.15 0.19 0.25 0.29 0.45 0.53 0.63 
 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
3,169 3,467 3,682 3,727 4,060 4,309 4,767 5,272 
0.73 0.77 0.82 0.82 0.89 0.92 0.97 1.08 
Source: Keizai Kikaku Chō, (the Economic Planning Agency Government of Japan). 
Kokumin Keizai Keisan Nenpō, (Annual Report on National Accounts), 2000. Denpa 
Shinbun Sha, Denshi Kōgyō Nenkan (Annual Report on the Electronics Industries), 1983-
1998. Current Price. 
 
Semiconductor laser technology is the key technology of optoelectronics production. 
In the optoelectronics market, the semiconductor laser has the biggest share in sales 
among various types of lasers. Table 1-3 shows laser sales in Japan from 1980. 
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Table 1-3: Laser Sales in Japan (Million Yen)  
 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Semiconductor Laser 925 2,290 4,569 15,894 20,550 40,797 39,459 34,528 
Gas Laser 2,080 2,188 2,382 4,999 6,658 8,027 7,614 7,282 
Solid body Laser 300 1,564 827 1,282 3,883 3,663 2,920 2,229 
 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
29,411 33,641 40,200 38,067 42,965 44,479 54,624 71,102 
8,512 12,546 15,595 16,114 12,004 10,747 14,915 19,681 
2,976 3,310 636 4,094 3,683 3,300 4,900 5,283 
Source: Denpa Shinbun Sha, Denshi Kōgyō Nenkan (Annual Report on the Electronics 
Industries), 1980-1995. Current Price. 
 
Even though there is no statistical data allowing us to investigate in the 1970s, it is 
assumed that the gas laser had the biggest share before 1981.47 The gas laser was the 
dominant form until 1981. Table 1-3 shows that the semiconductor laser occupied 
the biggest market share from the beginning of the 1980s and steadily increased its 
sales. In other words, the semiconductor laser became dominant in the 
optoelectronics market from the beginning of the 1980s. In spite of the presence and 
significance of semiconductor laser technology and the optoelectronics industry, 
however, the literature about it is very limited. 
The third reason is related to its competitiveness. The industrialisation of 
laser technology started in the 1970s. There have been no systematically recorded 
statistics indicating the size of the optoelectronics market and its national share.  
However, the Optoelectronics Industry Development Association (OIDA) and the 
                                                 
47 Suematsu Yasuharu, a professor of Tokyo Institute of Technology, noted, “Research and 
development in semiconductor lasers began in 1962. However, few researchers paid 
attention to the semiconductor laser. The research on the gas laser was dominant in the 
1960s. When we talked about the academic society of quantum electronics, it meant the 
academic society of the gas laser.” Suematsu, Handōtai Rēzā ga Tsūshin o Kaeru, 
(Semiconductor Laser Will Change Communication), p.13.  
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Optoelectronics Industry and Technology Development Association (OITDA)’s 
1993 survey allow us to estimate the size of the market and the market share of 
Japan. 48  OIDA estimated that the world optoelectronics market totalled 
approximately $70 billion in 1993.49  OITDA’s statistics indicated that Japanese 
firms’ optoelectronics production was around $35 billion.50 From these statistics, it 
is possible to estimate that Japanese firms had approximately a 50% share in the 
world optoelectronics market. Japan Technology Evaluation Centre (JTEC) in the 
U.S. provided a more aggressive estimation in 1996. It indicated, “Japan now 
dominates some 90% of the world optoelectronics markets and can be expected to 
continue its dominance for a number of years.” 51  The most widely circulated 
electronics journal in Japan said,  
 
“Much of Japanese industrial technology was based on technological 
import from the western countries. Based on high level production 
technology, skilled labour, high quality control, and high flexibility to 
environmental change, Japan improved the imported technologies and 
exported them to the western countries. This is true in the automobile, 
TV, and semiconductor industry.” “Optoelectronics, however, is the 
technology that is made in Japan and can contribute to the world.”52   
 
                                                 
48 OIDA is the U.S. industry association representing 50 members, including both large and 
small companies. It was established to promote optoelectronics worldwide and advance the 
competitiveness of its members in July 1991. OITDA is an industry association of Japan’s 
optoelectronics industry. It was established in 1980. Saxonhouse estimated the size of 
market with OIDA and OITDA surveys. Saxonhouse, "Optoelectronics in Japan: Some 
Economic Considerations."  
49  Optoelectronics Industry Development Association, "Optoelectronic Technology 
Roadmap; Conclusions and Recommendations." 
50 Hikari Sangyō Gijutsu Shinkōkai (Optoelectronics Industry and Technology Development 
Association), Hikari Sangyō no Dōkō, (Trends in Optoelectronics Industry).  
51 Forrest et al., JTEC Panel on Optoelectronics in Japan and the United States Final Report, 
p.xv. 
52  Hikari Sangyō Kondankai (Optoelectronics Industry Conference), "Hikari Gijutsu no 
Ayumi to Hikari Sangyō no Genjō, (History of Optoelectronics Technology and Present 
State of the Optoelectronics Industry)", pp.34-51. 
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In 1986, Fortune indicated that Japanese firms developed the most advanced 
technological competence among technology leading countries in the 
optoelectronics field (Table 1-4). Fortune asked ten scholars, business executives, 
government officials, and foundation leaders in each field to rank the state of 
research and development in the U.S., Japan, Western Europe, and the USSR on a 
scale of 1 to 10. Table 1-4 shows the average points that the U.S., Japan, Western 
Europe, and the USSR received in each technical field. 
 
Table 1-4: Competitive Advantage of the Nations in Technical Field 
Technical Field United States Japan West Europe USSR 
Computer 9.9 7.3 4.4 1.5 
Biochemical 8.9 5.7 4.9 1.3 
New Materials 7.7 6.3 6 3.8 
Optoelectronics 7.8 9.5 5.7 3.6 
Source: Bylinsky, "Where the U.S. Stands", pp.18-36.  Average of ten experts’ rankings. 
 
It must be noted that this Fortune’s survey seemed not to follow a systematic method 
to carry out questionnaire survey. For example, how Fortune selected scholars, 
business executives, government officials, and foundation leaders were not 
presented in the article. The instructions and questionnaires were not shown either. 
However, it is important to note that the competitive advantage of Japan in 
optoelectronics was presented in such a well-circulated non-academic journal. 
The number of patents in semiconductor laser technology sheds light on the 
technological competitiveness of the optoelectronics industry of Japan. Figure 1-2 
shows the number of patents in semiconductor technology both in the world and in 
Japan. It shows that Japanese firms, research institutions, and individual inventors 
began to get patents from the 1970s and became active in getting patents in 
semiconductor lasers from the 1980s.   
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Figure 1-2: World Patents and Japan Patents (Accumulative) 
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Source: Derwent Innovations Index.  Calculated by the number of semiconductor laser 
patents in developed countries, which the Derwent Innovations Index covers, this graph 
sorted the patents by whether the patent is from a Japan base institution or not, not by the 
place where each patent assignee is located.   
 
It also indicates that Japan’s annual number of semiconductor laser patents exceeded 
that of patents excluding Japan’s in 1977 for the first time. Japan’s total cumulative 
number of semiconductor laser patents has exceeded that of cumulative patents 
excluding Japan’s from 1981 onwards. This graph indicates that the turning point 
was 1981. Until 1981 the slope of both total patents excluding Japan’s and Japan’s 
patents were quite similar. The slopes, however, diverged from 1981. Japan’s 
accumulated patents exceeded those of the world from 1981, and the trends highly 
diverged. Based on these data, it is possible to suppose, Japanese firms gained 
technological competitiveness in semiconductor laser technology from the beginning 
of the 1980s. Showing the top twenty organisations obtaining patents in 
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semiconductor laser from 1970-2000, the following table lists organisations playing 
important roles in the technological development of semiconductor lasers in Japan. 
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Table 1-5: Top Twenty Firms in Japan 
 1970s 1980s 1990s 
 Firm Number of Patens 
Share 
(%) Firm Number of Patens 
Share 
(%) Firm Number of Patens 
Share 
(%) 
1 Hitachi 52 17.8082 NEC 1468 15.9721 NEC 1644 9.7752 
2 NEC 42 14.3836 Matsushita Elec Ind 1009 10.9781 Mitsubishi Electric 1257 7.4741 
3 NTT 42 14.3836 Fujitsu 883 9.6072 Matsushita Elec Ind 998 5.9341 
4 Matsushita Elec Ind 35 11.9863 Mitsubishi Electric 811 8.8238 Hitachi 907 5.393 
5 Fujitsu 27 9.2466 Hitachi 785 8.541 Fujitsu 857 5.0957 
6 Mitsubishi Electric 23 7.767 Toshiba 544 5.9188 Toshiba 835 4.9649 
7 Sharp 13 4.521 Sharp 454 4.9396 Sony 826 4.9114 
8 Canon 12 4.096 Canon 430 4.6785 Canon 776 4.6141 
9 Toshiba 9 3.822 NTT 309 3.362 Sharp 602 3.5795 
10 Agency of Industry 8 2.397 Ricoh 263 2.8615 NTT 602 3.5795 
11 Sony 7 2.973 Oki Electric Ind 179 1.9476 Ricoh 464 2.7589 
12 Sumitomo Electric Ind 3 1.274 Sony 173 1.8823 Sanyo 411 2.4438 
13 Sanyo 2 0.6849 Seiko Epson 156 1.6973 Fuji Photo Film 321 1.9087 
14 KDD 1 0.3425 Agency of Industry 149 1.6212 Nikon 284 1.6887 
15    Sanyo 128 1.3927 Oki Electric Ind 283 1.6827 
16    Fuji Photo Film 104 1.1315 Furukawa Electric 257 1.5281 
17    Sumitomo Electric Ind 96 1.0445 Seiko Epson 240 1.427 
18    Omron Tateishi 88 0.9575 Sumitomo Electric Ind 240 1.427 
19    Konica 87 0.9466 Olympus 206 1.2249 
20    Fuji Electric Mfg 83 0.9031 Semiconductor Energy Lab 166 0.987 
Total   94.5205   89.2068   72.3986 
Source: Derwent Innovations Index. It counts the number of patents obtained by the firms with the Derwent Innovation Index. The share is 
calculated from the total number of patents obtained by Japanese organisations in each period and the number of patents obtained by each firm. 
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This table indicates that the main actors were big electronics enterprises through 
these periods. The main actors such as NEC, Hitachi, Fujitsu, Toshiba, Mitsubishi, 
and Matsushita, were highly ranked through 1970s to 1990s. This study explores 
how these firms were competing and came to be competitive from the 1980s.  
 The fourth reason is related to research ability and commercial sensitivity. 
Research that examines the micro activities of a firm such as corporate R&D activity, 
human resource management, and cost structure may confront a commercial 
sensitivity problem. The commercial sensitivity may affect data availability. 
Commercial sensitivity in this industry, however, is not critical for this study for two 
reasons. Japan’s patent policy was a ‘first to file system’ and ‘automatic publication 
policy.’ Under this patent system, firms had a strong incentive to apply for a patent 
first. As a result, patent data can show much of the firms’ R&D activities. Of course, 
patent is not the R&D activity itself but the outcome of R&D activities. Yet, it still 
reveals the technological areas in which firms competed. This patent system reduces 
the commercial sensitivity problem. In addition, the firms competed to publish their 
R&D results in their corporate technical journals and in academic journals. These 
publications also allow investigating the firms’ R&D activities. Of course, the firms 
published only the successful R&D results. However, it still shows the areas in 
which the firms focused their R&D and competed with each other. Second, more 
than 20 years have passed since many of the epoch-making technological 
innovations in semiconductor lasers emerged. Although semiconductor laser 
technology is still key for optoelectronics, many of the technologies developed from 
the 1960s to 1980s, which is the main focus of this study, have already become 
“classic.” Many of the corporate engineers have already retired from their business.  
Some of them have got positions at a university and started their second career as an 
academician. They were willing to speak about their experiences in R&D to develop 
such “classical technologies.” Twenty years old technologies are already “classical” 
in this industry, even though some of them are still alive. Of course, it may be 
difficult to touch current on-going important R&D activities and the amount of R&D 
investment on a certain specific project. This sensitivity is not limited to this study. 
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Although the sensitivity remains in certain areas, it is not crucial for data availability 
for this study.   
Semiconductor lasers are being used in various application areas such as 
medical use, light for high-speed cameras, material processing, optical sensors, laser 
pointers, measurement, optical disks, printers, barcode readers, and optical fibre. 
The two biggest application areas have been optical communication and optical 
information storage. Long wavelength semiconductor lasers (1.3µm - 1.55µm) are 
used for optical communication appliances such as optical fibres. 53  Short 
wavelength semiconductor lasers (0.47µm – 0.85µm) are used for optical information 
storage and processing such as optical discs and laser printers. The following table 
shows the production of optical communication and information storage / processing. 
The parenthesis shows the share in total optoelectronics production and denotes that 
these two areas were the main market of semiconductor lasers. 
 
Table 1-6: Two Main Markets of Semiconductor Lasers (Million yen) 
 1985 1990 
Optical Communication 252,714 (30%) 556,993 (18%) 
Optical Information Storage/ Processing 514,722 (61%) 2,464815 (78%) 
Source: Tsūshō Sangyō Shō, (Ministry of International Trade and Technology), Denshi 
Kōgyō Nenkan (Annual Report on the Electronic Industry), 1993, p.615. 
 
These two semiconductor laser markets are different, although 
semiconductor lasers are the key devices in both markets. The long wavelength 
semiconductor lasers were used in important social infrastructure such as long-
distance telecommunication and high broadband networks. Many industrialised 
countries had their own telecommunication firms. Because the state-owned 
telegraph and telecommunication company developed optical communication 
system and used domestic firms for telecommunication-related manufacturing for its 
social infrastructural appliances, the political economy of relations between the 
government, the telecom company and the suppliers played a role in these markets. 
The short wavelength semiconductor lasers, which were for optical information 
                                                 
53 Regarding wavelength, see Appendix VI. 
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storage, laser printers, barcode readers, medical use, pointers, and laser sensors, 
were more consumer and industrial appliances in which governmental intervention 
did not play an important role. Since it goes far beyond the scope of this study to 
offer an exhaustive description of the development of semiconductor lasers, this 
study mainly focuses on the development of semiconductor lasers for consumer and 
industrial appliances, not for appliances for social infrastructure. 
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1.3. Epitaxy Technology  
 
Since the semiconductor laser is composed of many sub technologies, this 
thesis focuses on the development of epitaxy technology. The Optoelectronics 
Handbook indicated, “The most important process technology in semiconductor 
lasers is epitaxy technology, which determines most of the quality of semiconductor 
laser.”54 The Japan Patent Office classified semiconductor laser technology into five 
categories: device, material, manufacturing, drive, and system technologies. 55 
According to the Japan Patent Office’s classification, epitaxy technology is 
classified as a manufacturing technology. Surveying industrial technologies, the 
AIST reported that Japanese firms were competitive in semiconductor laser 
technology and in epitaxy technology in particular.56  
Semiconductor laser manufacturing is categorized into three processes. The 
first, the epitaxy process, involves making a semiconductor wafer by depositing a 
very thin layer of single crystal materials over a substratum (Figure.1-3). This 
process is the most important process in semiconductor laser manufacturing, since 
the semiconductor layers seriously affect the quality and longevity of the 
semiconductor laser. This process varies with combinations of semiconductors used 
for the semiconductor laser. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
54 Ōyō Hikair Electronics Handbook Henshū Iinkai (Applied Optoelectronics Handbook 
Editorial Committee), Ōyō Hikari Electronics Handbook (Applied Optoelectronics 
Handbook), p.105. 
55 Tokkyochō (Japan Patent Office), Korede Wakaru Handōtai Rēzā: Motto Tsukaō Motto 
Ikasō Konna Gijutsu (Handbook of Semiconductor Laser). 
56  Kōgyō Gijutsuin Sōmubu Gijutsu Chōsaka (Agency of Industrial Science and 
Technology), Wagakuni Sangyō Gijutsu no Taishitsu to Kadai, (Survey of Japanese 
Industrial Technology),  pp.276-277. 
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Figure 1-3: Epitaxy Process 
 
 In the second process, the semiconductor wafer with layers is cleaved into 
bars with a diamond cutter. Then the bars are diced into semiconductor laser chips. 
 
Figure 1-4: Separation Process 
 
 
Through these first two steps, a semiconductor laser chip is manufactured.  
The last process is a packaging process so that the semiconductor laser chip can be 
used as an electronic device. Leads are attached to the semiconductor tip, and the tip 
is sealed in the package. After packaging, the final performance testing of optical 
and electrical functions is conducted.     
 
(1) Epitaxy Process 
1：Wafer Process（washing / etching） 
2：Epitaxy（growth of semiconductor structure） 
3：Zinc Diffusion 
 
From Above 
 Side View 
Semiconductor 
Layers 
(2) Separation Process 
1：Cleave wafer into bars 
2：Coat and test them 
3：Dice them into chips 
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Figure 1-5: Packaging Process 
 
 The optoelectronics handbook noted, “Epitaxy technology is the most 
important semiconductor laser manufacturing technology because the performances 
of the semiconductor laser are highly dependent on epitaxy technology.”57  This 
epitaxy process is important for two specific reasons.58 First, it determines the basic 
performance of a semiconductor laser (e.g., longevity and reliability). The 
semiconductor laser amplifies the laser beam with a thin layer (0.5 to 20 microns) of 
different semiconductor materials. The quality of the layer, therefore, is important to 
basic performances. Second, this process is necessary for achieving high economies 
of scale to increase the size of the wafer, thus determining how many semiconductor 
laser chips can be produced in a single manufacturing process. Since it was believed 
that the semiconductor laser would be one of the most important devices in the 
optoelectronics industry, it was indispensable to produce a long-life and highly 
reliable semiconductor laser at a reasonable price. Furthermore, since the sunk costs 
in the technology-intensive industry are high, firms have an incentive to produce on 
a large scale, in order to achieve high economies of scale. Epitaxy technology was 
                                                 
57 Ibid., p.105. 
58 On epitaxy technology, see Hirata, Wakaru Handōtai Rēzā No Kiso to Ōyō, (Handbook of 
Semiconductor Laser, Basics and Application), pp.113-119. 
 
Copyright (C) 1998, Matsushita Electronics Corporation. 
 (3) Palletize/ Mount/ Test 
 1：Bar Cleavage/ Edge Coating 
2：Palletizing 
3：Wire Connecting 
4：Cap Sealing 
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the key technology for the production of the semiconductor laser on a large scale. 
Therefore, epitaxy technology was economically and strategically important to 
competing firms.  
The three epitaxy technologies, LPE, MBE, and MOCVD, were competing 
by the mid 1980s. Each epitaxy technology had advantages and disadvantages. Table 
1-7 briefly summarises the technological features and status of these three 
technologies in the late 1970s. 
 
Table 1-7: Three Epitaxy Technologies: LPE, MBE, and MOCVD 
Epitaxy Technology Description Status in the late 1970s 
LPE (liquid-phase epitaxy) Material precipitates from a 
molten solution to a film on 
the wafer 
LPE-grown semiconductor laser 
demonstrated by RCA in 1963.  Status 
quo technology for the last ten years. 
Equipment was relatively cheap. 
MBE (molecular beam epitaxy) Materials are evaporated from 
multiple sources and 
deposited on a wafer in a 
high-vacuum chamber. 
MBE-grown semiconductor laser 
demonstrated by Bell Labs in 1975.  
Excellent control of deposition process 
was the main advantage.  Expensive 
equipment and long set-up times were 
main concerns.  
MOCVD (metal-organic chemical 
vapour-phase deposition) 
Source gases react and deposit 
material in a film on the 
wafer. 
MOCVD-grown semiconductor laser 
demonstrated by Rockwell in 1977.  
Potential advantages were high 
throughput and good control of 
deposition process.  Hazardous gases 
were a concern. 
Source: Adopted and modified from Wood and Brown, "Commercializing Nascent 
Technology: The Case of Laser Diodes at Sony." Table 3. p.174. 
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1.4. Approach and Contribution 
 
How does the thesis approach the questions? The remainder of this chapter 
firstly, shows research design, perspectives, and methodology. Then, it presents 
sources, contributions to the previous studies, and an outline of the arguments. 
 
Research Design 
First, this study does not aim at establishing a theoretical predictive model of 
technological change, even though the dominant goal of empirical economics 
studies is to establish a predictive model. The reason is the difficulty in the analysis 
of technological change. Theoretical predictive model analysis does not fit with the 
study of technological change. The predictive model is built on the assumption that 
the economic actor maximises his/her utility function under constraints. 59 
Technological changes, however, are the result of the attempts that actors make to 
overcome constraints. 60  The predictive model that assumes constrained 
maximisation or satisfaction does not suit well to the analysis of technological 
change. This thesis assumes that actors try to overcome constraints rather than just 
accept them and try to maximise their utility function under the constraints. Of 
course, it does not mean that actors always can successfully overcome the 
constraints. Sometimes they may fail to overcome them. Sometimes they may not 
try to challenge them. It, however, assumes that the actors do not accept their 
constraint as given and as something that they cannot change. They try to create a 
favourable environment for themselves rather than accept the environment as given. 
Second, this study takes an historical approach. Innovations do not emerge in 
a vacuum. Technological trajectories depend on the specific knowledge of the 
                                                 
59  On the rationality of organisation, see Simon, Administrative Behavior: A Study of 
Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organisation. 3rd ed. 
60 Schumpeter distinguished managerial functions from entrepreneurial functions. On the 
one hand, managers maximise subject to constraints. On the other hand, entrepreneurs try to 
overcome constraints. Schumpeter, "The Creative Response in Economic History."  
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society and particular constellations of institutional constraints that vary radically 
both through time and in cross-section in various economies. 61  It is, therefore, 
necessary to understand the specific knowledge and institutions within which 
specific innovations emerged. An historical approach also enables us to study the 
dynamic process of technological change. Also, this study takes a case study as a 
research design for two reasons. First, a case study is better for making a detailed 
contextual analysis of a complex issue. Yin indicated that the case study method was 
an empirical inquiry that allowed us to investigate an historical phenomenon, when 
the boundaries between phenomenon and context were not evident.62 Furthermore, 
one of the prime advantages of a case study is that it can be used for the heuristic 
purpose of inductively identifying additional variables and generating hypotheses. A 
case study allows us to investigate how firms came to compete in the same product 
market with the same technological choice from the very complex interaction among 
various actors. A case study permits us to disentangle the complex strategic decision 
making process. Of course, since the case study is not an almighty methodology, it 
                                                 
61 Douglas North articulated that institutions play a significant role in the economy. See 
Gomulka, The Theory of Technological Change and Economic Growth; North and Thomas,  
The Rise of the Western World; a New Economic History; North, Institutions, Institutional 
Change, and Economic Performance, The Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions. 
His perspective is called New Institutional Economics (NIE). This perspective is new 
because there is an older school of institutionalism in economics. The old intuitionalism 
originated in the work of Thorstein Veblen, John R. Commons, Clarence Wendell and Allen 
Gruchy. On NIE and OIE see Harriss et al., The New Institutional Economics and Third 
World Development.  
Sociologists also pay great attention to the impact of social context on economic behaviour. 
For instance, Granovetter and Swedberg, The Sociology of Economic Life; Smelser and 
Swedberg, The Handbook of Economic Sociology. This sociological perspective is rooted in 
Max Weber. On the one hand, many economic historians pay close attention to institutions 
that shape transaction costs in an economy. On the other hand, there are various different 
perspectives in sociology. For example, on the one hand, James Coleman took rational 
behaviour theory and discussed how macro phenomena emerge from an aggregation of 
individual actions which are taken in a certain social context. Coleman, Foundations of 
Social Theory. On the other hand, Berger and Luckmann argued that actors’ interactions 
inter-subjectively create actors’ rationality. Berger and Luckmann, The Social Construction 
of Reality; a Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge. 
In spite of the fact that their perspectives are not monolithic, all of these writers indicated 
that it is necessary to examine the social context to understand how economic actors behave 
and how macro economic phenomena emerge.  
62 Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods, pp.4-9. 
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has limitations. One of the limitations is that this thesis has a limited ability to 
induce a general law or proposition because it examines a single case. The other 
major limitation is that since a case study cannot control for extraneous variables, 
numerous plausible hypotheses are generally present. Therefore, it is difficult to 
induce a general law or proposition. Despite these limitations, this study takes the 
case study method because the main purpose of this study lies not in inducing a 
general law or proposition but in examining how a certain social phenomenon 
emerged from complex social interaction. 
 
Perspectives 
R&D is one of the most important processes in a technology intensive 
industry. The output of R&D is technological knowledge, which has unique 
characteristics. This section reviews three points that are important bases of this 
study. They are sunk costs and economies of scale, the spillover effect and 
uncertainty, and competition through time. 
 The first point is sunk costs and economies of scale. R&D in a technology 
intensive industry requires a large amount of investment. R&D assets such as 
research facilities and research engineers are immobile. R&D investments, once 
made, tend to be largely irreversible. Once a firm invests in R&D, it, therefore, 
becomes a sunk cost.63 Sutton showed the two-stage game in which the present 
study captures sunk costs. At the first stage, firms incur fixed outlays, which are 
associated with acquiring a single plant of minimum efficient scale (setup costs), 
and developing and establishing a product line. These fixed outlays incurred at the 
first stage of the game are treated as sunk costs in analysing the behaviour of firms 
at the second stage of the game. Because many R&D investments are sunk costs, 
economies of scale are an important factor determining the competitiveness of a firm. 
                                                 
63  On sunk costs, see Sutton, Sunk Costs and Market Structure: Price Competition, 
Advertising, and the Evolution of Concentration.  
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Efficiency gains can only be achieved at a higher level of minimum efficient scale.64  
As a result, a technology intensive industry becomes capital intensive. Because of 
the high level of sunk costs, a technology intensive industry tends to be oligopolistic. 
Competition among firms tends to be “Schumpeterian” competition.  The important 
point is summarised as follows; R&D in a technology intensive industry incurs sunk 
costs. As a result, competition in the industry tends to be oligopolistic. 
The second point is technological spillover and uncertainty. The output of 
corporate R&D inherently includes technological knowledge. Arrow indicated that 
technological knowledge is inherently a public good.65 He directed his attention to 
the nature of technological knowledge, which was the main output of R&D, and 
indicated two important points: non-rivalness and non-excludability. First, an 
unlimited number of agents can use the same technological knowledge at the same 
time. Second, once a firm has released technological knowledge in public, it is 
difficult for the firm to exclude other firms from using the knowledge. The patent 
system provides an inventor with a set of exclusive rights to make or sell his/her 
invention for a fixed period of time. One of the other aims of the patent system is to 
publicise important inventions. Therefore, once an invention is patented, it becomes 
a source of spillover. When there are technologically related research efforts of other 
firms, a given firm may take advantage of knowledge produced by other firms and 
achieve R&D results with less research effort than otherwise. Griliches argued that 
technological spillover plays an important part in technological development.66 He 
argued that technological spillover is one of the sources of increasing returns in 
R&D.  
While technological spillover plays an important role in R&D, R&D in a 
                                                 
64 Chandler, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business. 
65 Arrow also emphasised that knowledge is characterised by a greater degree of uncertainty, 
indivisibility, and asymmetry than are other types of economic goods. They will be 
introduced in the following discussion. On non-excludability and externality of 
technological information, see Arrow, "Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources 
for Invention." 
66 Griliches, "The Search for R&D Spillovers"; Griliches, R&D, Patents, and Productivity, A 
National Bureau of Economic Research Conference Report. 
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technology intensive industry is highly uncertain. 67  The uncertainties can be 
classified into three. The first is that it is uncertain how much R&D investment 
would be needed to attain a desirable R&D result.68 The second is that it is uncertain 
whether a desirable R&D result would be attained or not and when it would be 
attained. The third is that it is uncertain whether the firm can reach a desirable R&D 
result quicker than its rivals do. The third point depends on the strategy of rival 
firms. On the one hand, given the amount of R&D investment of rivals, an 
individual firm can increase the level of R&D investment and increase the 
probability that it reaches the desirable R&D result quicker than its rivals do, even 
though the probability does not rise linearly in proportion to the increase in R&D 
investment. On the other hand, if rival firms increase the level of R&D, the 
probability that an individual firm can reach the desirable R&D result decreases. The 
inherent uncertainties in R&D means that R&D investment is somewhat of a gamble 
because outcomes are not always perfectly predictable. Because of these 
uncertainties, not only big business but also small venture businesses are involved in 
R&D competition. Moreover, because of these uncertainties in R&D, learning by 
researching has significance. The learning curve effect plays an important role in 
R&D. Therefore, it is important for a firm to rush into promising R&D to shift onto 
a new learning curve.   
 The third point is competition through time. The way in which firms compete 
in R&D is different from the pattern of price competition. The main reason why 
firms invest in R&D is to gain monopoly rents. Suppose that there is a business 
opportunity that will provide successful R&D with certain monopoly rents (V ). The 
timing of a firm’s conduct of R&D for the opportunity determines the amount of 
rents that the firm can gain. If a firm conducts R&D after t , the monopoly rent will 
be discounted by the current value whose discount rate is r , and will yield 
)()( VeVtb rt−= . If a firm does not conduct R&D right away, the gain will be 
                                                 
67 On uncertainty in R&D, see Kamien and Schwartz, Market Structure and Innovation, 
Cambridge Surveys of Economic Literature.  
68 On uncertainty and innovation, see Freeman and Soete, The Economics of Industrial 
Innovation, pp.242-264. 
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decreased because t  becomes bigger.  In sum, late R&D decreases the amount of 
gain that the firm can get. On the other hand, the R&D costs may be decreased if the 
firm starts R&D later because it can take advantage of the technological 
development exogenously produced in a society. In other words, R&D costs 
deducted by current value, )(tc , is gradually diminished as t  increases. Therefore, 
the timing of R&D is important for firms. Firms have an incentive to postpone R&D 
until technology is developed in a society on the one hand.  On the other hand, if a 
firm starts R&D later than rival firms do, the possibility that the firm can get 
monopolistic rents will be decreased. Barzel modelled this dilemma as shown in  
Figure 1-6.69 This model aimed to show that R&D competition caused excessive 
investment in R&D, which was beyond the level of socially desirable R&D 
investment. His model shows the nature of R&D competition well.  Barzel assumed 
that the total profit )(ta that a firm gains from R&D started in t  as 
)()()( tcVtbta −= . Figure 1-6 describes that a firm gets the highest total profit 
)(sa if it starts R&D in )(st . If a firm starts its R&D when technology is not well 
developed in a society )(ct , the profit that a firm gets will be small because R&D 
costs are immense. However, if a firm starts its R&D later )(st , profit will be 
diminished.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
69  Barzel, "Optimal Timing of Innovations." Dasgupta and Stiglitz also modelled 
competition through time and examined the speed of R&D. Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 
"Industrial Structure and the Nature of Innovative Activity."  
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Figure 1-6: Timing of R&D and Profit 
)(ct )(st t
)(ta
)(sa
)()()( tCVtbta −−
0
 
Suppose that two firms, A and B, start their R&D in the same technology area.  Firm 
A starts its R&D in )(st and firm B starts a little bit before )(st . In this case, firm B 
can pre-empt monopolistic rents that firm A could have if only firm A conducts 
R&D in this area. A firm can pre-empt monopolistic rents if it starts its R&D before 
rivals start their R&D. Firms rush to invent for monopolistic rents unless 
)(ta reaches zero at )(ct . Scholars of business management also suggest that 
competition through time is one of the most important characteristics of the 
technology intensive industry.70 As described above, both economies of scale and the 
learning curve effect play an important role in R&D competition. As a result, firms 
have an incentive to jumpstart R&D to achieve economies of scale and to reach a 
superior learning curve.  Both economies of scale and the learning curve effect can 
                                                 
70 The importance of timing issues in high technology competition is manifested not only in 
product innovation races but also in decisions about the optimal timing of investments in 
new plant and equipment. Utterback, Mastering the Dynamics of Innovation: How 
Companies Can Seize Opportunities in the Face of Technological Change.  
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reduce R&D costs. In other aspects, competition through time occurs because the 
first mover advantage is significant in technology intensive industry.71  
 
 
How to Measure Technological Innovation 
How does this study measure technological change? In spite of the fact that 
technology is one of the indispensable factors for sustainable growth, how to 
measure technological innovation continues to be debated. There are four major 
ways of measuring technological innovation.72 There is, however, no single indicator 
for measuring technological change. It is, therefore, important to note that each 
measurement can only shed light on certain aspects of technological change. 
First, the Solowian tradition has regarded technological change as residual 
factors, which were not explained by its growth model.73  However, it does not 
capture changes in the technology of the production function. Moreover, the residual 
is not equal to technological innovation. For instance, when capital and labour are 
used more intensively at times, the residual can vary even if the technology does not 
change. Moreover, technological innovation is not the only source affecting the 
residual. Organisational innovation and managerial innovation may affect the 
residual.74 In other words, the residual does not necessarily indicate technological 
innovation. This measurement is widely used to analyse macro economic 
phenomena in particular. Total factor productivity (TFP), which addresses any 
effects in total output not caused by inputs or productivity, is commonly used to 
assess technological change in national accounting. However, it is not possible to 
use this measure to distinguish a certain technological change from other because it 
                                                 
71 On first mover advantages, see Lieberman and Montgomery, "First-Mover Advantages."  
72 There are some other ways of measuring such as scientific papers citations and patent 
citations. On their advantages and disadvantages, see Patel and Pavitt, "Patterns of 
Technological Activity: Their Measurement and Interpretation", p.51.  
73 Solow, "A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth."  
74  On organisational innovation, see Chandler, Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the 
History of the Industrial Enterprise. 
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measures aggregate technological change. 
 The second way is to measure the amount of R&D input. This is a widely 
used indicator to measure technological innovation in science-based industries such 
as the chemicals industry. Mowery and Rosenberg indicated that science based R&D 
grew in importance as sources of technological change.75 It allows the investigation 
of certain technological changes in a certain sector. It is, however, the input that this 
method measures as a proxy. It is not the measurement of the output of R&D 
activities. Only if technological innovation is randomly given and is a function of 
the amount of input, will this method be adequate to measure technological 
innovation. In addition, this method is not good at measuring technological 
innovation in non-R&D based industries.  Moreover, it underestimates production 
technology, which emerged not in R&D but in production facilities. This study does 
not take this method to measure technological change because it does not assume 
that technological innovation is randomly given and that technological innovation is 
a function of the amount of input. 
 The third method is to measure productivity growth, which is closely related 
to the Solowian tradition. By definition, innovation brings about productivity growth. 
Therefore, productivity growth is used as a proxy to measure technological 
innovation. Technological innovation, however, is not the only source contributing 
to productivity growth. Organisational innovation is another source of productivity 
growth of the firm. For example, Chandler scrutinised the history of four big 
enterprises in the U.S. and indicated that innovation in organisational structure 
contributed to the increase in productivity growth of the firm. 76  Managerial 
innovation can be also a source of productivity growth. U.S. manufacturing firms 
began to introduce PERT (Programme Evaluation and Review Technique), which 
was originally developed in 1958 by the U.S. Department of Defence’s US Navy 
Special Projects Office in 1958 for the Polaris submarine ballistic missile production 
project, for their production management. PERT is a production management 
                                                 
75 Mowery and Rosenberg, Paths of Innovation: Technological Change in 20th-Century 
America.  
76 Chandler, Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of the Industrial Enterprise. 
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method intended to identify a critical path in the production process and to increase 
the productivity of a large-scale and complex production process. Innovation in 
human resource management may also increase productivity growth. For instance, 
the introduction of scientific management in the shop floor increased productivity.77 
Since productivity growth captures all innovations such as technological innovation, 
organisational innovation, and managerial innovation, it would be a good 
measurement of innovation if it intends to capture innovation of the firm as a whole. 
Because this study focuses on technological change, it does not use the productivity 
growth of the firm as a measurement of technological innovation. The productivity 
growth of the firm captures too many other types of innovation for this study. In 
addition, if a firm produces various products, productivity growth is not better at 
identifying a certain specific technological change. It is difficult to identify which 
technological innovation contributed to the productivity growth if the firms produce 
various products with various technologies. 
The fourth measuring method is patents. 78  This study uses patents to 
measure technological change. A patent is an exclusive right granted by an 
authorised governmental agency to a person or an institution for a fixed period in 
exchange for the regulated, public disclosure of certain details of a technological 
invention or a useful new artifact. After an examination of the novelty and potential 
utility of the claimed invention, the grant is given to the inventors. 
Patents have been widely used to examine technological change in a certain 
area of technology or industry because patents provide important information such 
as the names of inventors, the name and address of the assignee, technological 
classification, and application date.79 Since patent documentation is systematically 
                                                 
77 On scientific management, see Taylor, The Principles of Scientific Management; Taylor, 
Scientific Management, Comprising Shop Management, the Principles of Scientific 
Management. 
78 Regarding patents as indicator of inventive activity, see Griliches, "Patent Statistics as 
Economic Indicators: A Survey"; Basberg, "Patents and the Measurement of Technological 
Change: A Survey of the Literature"; Pakes and Griliches, "Patents and R&D at the Firm 
Level: A First Look." 
79 On the argument, see Griliches, "Patent Statistics as Economic Indicators: A Survey"; 
Griliches, "R&D and Productivity: Econometric Results and Measurement Issues."  
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kept by a governmental agency, it allows the construction of complete time series 
analysis. It is possible to assume that the patent system and attitudes as to the use of 
the patent system remain substantially constant during the period of analysis, 1970-
1990. Moreover, because this study focuses on technological change in a certain area, 
technological changes in the semiconductor laser area, patents, which are classified 
by technological area, are a useful and practical measure of technological change.  
As mentioned above, there is no single method to measure technological 
change. Every method has advantages and disadvantages. Patent measurement has 
several disadvantages too. 80   The first disadvantage is related to institutional 
differences. There are two different types of institutional differences: difference in 
the patenting system and in the importance of patenting. The first difference relates 
to the patenting system itself.81 For instance, the U.S. takes a first to invent system 
and publication-after grant policy on the one hand. On the other hand, Japan and 
many other OECD countries take a first to file system and automatic publication 
policy. This difference may affect the patenting decision making of firms. The 
second institutional differences stems from inter-industry difference. There is a 
difference in the relative importance of patenting among industries even in the same 
country. For example, patenting is less important in the leather craft industry than in 
the biochemical industry. These two institutional differences make comparative 
analysis difficult. Even though the main aim of this study is not to compare 
technological change in different industries or different countries, it must be noted 
that patent data should be carefully investigated when it examines cross-national 
patent data.    
The next disadvantage is that not all technologies can be patented. For 
instance, basic science is for the most part unpatentable yet this was likely to have 
been important in the industry. Patent data may underestimate any production 
technology that cannot be patented. This thesis, therefore, examines the state of 
                                                 
80  On patent data, see Patel and Pavitt. "Patterns of Technological Activity: Their 
Measurement and Interpretation."  
81 On the institutional difference of the patent system between the U.S. and Japan, see 
Kotabe, "A Comparative Study of U.S. And Japanese Patent Systems."  
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scientific advancement and knowledge accumulation in basic research in 
semiconductor laser technology, which are the fundamental bases of technological 
development, by investigating the number of Ph.D and academic papers in 
semiconductor laser technology and the inter-organisational research networks. This 
thesis examines the opinion of technical experts such as scientists, engineers, and 
corporate managers as well. There are many experts’ surveys to identify 
technological innovations in many industries. Even though this method is qualitative 
more than quantitative, it is useful to identify technological innovations that had a 
strong impact. It is, however, costly to carry out this method.  Usually the agents 
carrying out this survey are government, industrial organisations, or journalists. 
Unfortunately, no experts’ survey has been done in laser technology in Japan. There 
are, however, many publications pointing out major technological innovations. 
Scientists, engineers, and corporate majors frequently pointed out major 
technological innovations in corporate reports, academic journals, and newspapers. 
Their identification of technological innovations is consistent with each other. 
Therefore, it is possible to use these data to complement patent data to identify 
technological innovations in laser technology in Japan. 
 Another disadvantage is that firms do not necessarily patent all of their 
inventions. They may strategically keep their invention secret. If it is easy for 
competitors to imitate and invent a new technology based on a published patent, the 
firm may keep its invention secret. However, this problem does not create serious 
problems in this study. This disadvantage will be critical in any cross industrial 
comparative analysis because the possibility of imitation based on patent varies with 
the technological area. Since this thesis focuses on a specific technological area, 
which is semiconductor laser technology, the possibility of imitation can be assumed 
constant. The qualitative sources mentioned above allow identifying technological 
innovations that were strategically kept secret.   
The last disadvantage of patent data is that some patents do not have any 
economic impact. Therefore, this study examines not only the number of patents but 
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also the citation of patents, which allows an examination of the quality of patent.82 A 
patent document contains citation to previous patents. A patent examiner cites 
previous patents to limit and to validate the scope of novelty of invention. Patent 
citations are supposed to indicate previous work on which the current invention 
builds or relies, or which embodies results that are related to those of the current 
invention. Because a government authority performs a citation, the patent citation is 
not contaminated by unnecessary citations to friends, colleagues, or a famous 
authority, which could happen sometimes in a bibliographic citation. The above 
arguments about patent citation data conclude that it is possible to assume that a 
highly cited patent is an important technology. 
One new thing in this study is that it mainly uses patent citation data. 
Because of the lack of a patent citation database in the Japan Patent Office, there 
have not been studies about technological change in Japan using patent citation data. 
The Japan Patent Office provides the Industrial Property Database that allows the 
investigation of patent application and registration in Japan. However, it does not 
provide a database that allows investigating a patent citation. This study is the first 
attempt in the line of arguments about technological change in Japan to use patent 
citation data in the analysis. It uses the Derwent Innovations Index to investigate  
patent citation in Japan. This is a database of citations appearing in patents from six 
major patenting authorities. It provides details of citations, both patent and literature, 
reviewed by the examiner during the examination of a patent application.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
82 On the relationship between patent citation and important technology, see Trajtenberg, "A 
Penny for Your Quotes: Patent Citations and the Value of Innovations"; Schankerman and 
Pakes, "Estimates of the Value of Patent Rights in European Countries During the Post-1950 
Period"; Narin et al., "Patents as Indicators of Corporate Technological Strength"; Carpenter 
and Narin, "Validation Study: Patent Citation as Indicators of Science and Foreign 
Dependence"; Carpenter et al., "Citation Rates to Technologically Important Patents." 
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Sources 
This research is based on six different groups of sources. Since each source 
has its own advantages and disadvantages, these sources are selected to cover the 
disadvantages and to shed light on the technological development from various 
aspects. 
The first group is governmental and industrial association reports on 
technology and industry. This thesis uses some governmental reports on the 
optoelectronics industry and semiconductor laser technology. Both the U.S. and 
Japanese government and industrial associations investigated the technology 
intensive industries and released reports on optoelectronics and semiconductor laser 
technology since the 1980s when the optoelectronics industry became one of the 
most important technology intensive industries and semiconductor laser technology 
was regarded as the fundamental technology in the industry. There are two reports 
that provide extensive research and important insights on the optoelectronics 
industry and semiconductor laser technology. One was provided in 1996 by the U.S. 
research association, the Japan Technology Evaluation Centre (JTEC). The other 
was produced in 1983 by the Japanese Agency of Industrial Science and Technology 
(AIST). Because these reports were supported by government funds, they might be 
biased to the government or a certain group of people. For instance, as Gotō pointed 
out, U.S. governmental reports tended to claim that the government should launch 
government-funded research projects. 83  However, because the budget of 
governmental research is usually sufficiently substantial to conduct large sample 
questionnaires, interviews and site visiting, their fact-finding provides an important 
basis of this study. In addition to these reports, this thesis makes use of monthly 
reports published by banks. Banks published monthly reports, in which the research 
and planning department analysed both macro economic and industrial trends. They 
also picked up either some industries or some firms and analysed them. The banks 
published the reports not only for their customers but also for business purposes. 
The banks made their business decisions based on the research done by their 
                                                 
83 Gotō, Inobēshon to Nihon Keizai, (Innovation and Japanese Economy),pp.14-15. 
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research and planning department. The reports enable us to examine how business 
communities saw laser technologies. 
The second group is data for analysing the inside of the firms. Corporate 
technological journals and annual reports are the two main sources in this group. 
Many of the Japanese manufacturing firms publish their own periodical 
technological journals. The main objective of publishing these technological 
journals is to release R&D outcomes and to place advertisements for the latest 
technologies. The directors of the R&D division announced their R&D goals in the 
journals. The engineers released their research and development results in them. 
Corporate technical journals thus allow us to study the R&D activities of individual 
firms. Corporate technical journals show the R&D focuses, the engineers’ main 
concerns, and the ways in which engineers tried to solve their technological 
problems. It must be noted that the corporate technical journals do not cover all the 
R&D activities of firms. Because the main purpose of a corporate technical journal 
is to advertise the R&D achievements of firms, the published articles might be 
biased toward the successful R&D results. However, the journals provide an 
important clue on the R&D focus of firms by looking at the featured articles 
published in the journals. Corporate annual reports allow analysing the inside of 
individual firms from a different perspective. The annual reports of the listed 
company are all available to the public. They describe financial conditions (a 
balance sheet and a statement of balance and losses), corporate governance, business 
schemes, organisational structures, and lists of corporate executives. It is important 
to know both the financial conditions and the state of the related business in a firm 
in particular because all of the laser manufacturers internalised many varieties of 
related businesses. The laser R&D plans were closely connected with other related 
business in the firms. In sum, the corporate annual reports are useful data to analyse 
the internal resources and setting of the firms. There is one more source in this group 
of data. It is books, journals, and corporate history books in which engineers and top 
business managers look back on their achievements. Since they are a secondary 
source, it is important to inquire carefully into their reliability. They, however, 
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permit us to examine how engineers and top managers saw their R&D and laser 
business.  
The third group of sources is for analysing not only the inside of the firms 
but also the communities in which the engineers were involved. There are two 
sources in this group. The first source is academic journals such as the Journal of 
Applied Physics (JAP) and Journal of Applied Physic Letters (JAPL). The corporate 
engineers published their R&D results not only in their corporate technical journals 
but also in academic journals. In addition, the engineers presented their work at both 
academic workshops and annual meetings. Many scientists also participated in 
technological development competitions in laser technology. The academic journals 
permit scrutiny of R&D goals and activities in the communities. While the corporate 
technological journals allow an analysis of R&D concerns and activities in 
individual firms, the academic journals can show the communities’ concern. This 
study also uses A Bibliography of Doctoral Theses on Semiconductor Lasers to 
examine the research community of the semiconductor laser. This bibliography 
includes all doctoral theses on semiconductor lasers all over the world and describes 
them in quantitative terms of the development of specific knowledge of 
semiconductor laser in universities and research institutions in the world from 1963 
to 2005. The entry items are (1) the author name, (2) the name of awarding 
university or institution, (3) the awarding year, (4) the title of each thesis, and (5) the 
name of research institution or company for which the doctor degree holder was 
working. The third chapter uses this bibliography to estimate the human capital 
accumulation in developed countries. 
The fourth source of this study is, as noted earlier, patents.84 This study uses 
mainly two different sources of patent. The first is the patent application database of 
the Japan Patent Office and the patent database of the European Patent Office. Both 
patent databases provide all patent applications in semiconductor laser technology 
from 1976. It is a good source for corporate R&D activity because patent application 
                                                 
84 On the patent system in Japan, see Okada and Asaba,  "The Patent System and R&D in 
Japan"; Kotabe, "A Comparative Study of U.S. And Japanese Patent Systems."  
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data is a relatively straight forward measurement of corporate R&D output. However, 
it does not capture the quality of technological invention. This study uses the 
Derwent Innovations Index to capture the quality of a patent. The Derwent 
Innovations Index is a patent database provided by Thompson Wila-Derwent, which 
is a supplier of information services that support the management of intellectual 
property right as they pertain to patents, trademarks and industrial designs. The 
Derwent Innovations Index comprises eleven million inventions from forty patent-
issuing authorities85 and covers all laser related patents issued in Japan. It allows the 
investigation of the content, publication date, priority application, inventor, patent 
assignee, patent title, cited articles, cited patent, and citing patent. Because the Japan 
Patent Office does not provide patent citation data, the Derwent Innovations Index is 
a valuable source to examine the quality of patents obtained in Japan.  
The fifth group of sources is quantitative data. The data consists of two 
different groups. The first group of quantitative data is macro economic statistics 
and general social trends. This group of data provides the general background in 
which laser technology was developed. Statistical data recorded by MITI includes 
the general macro economic data. The statistics recorded by the Ministry of 
Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology provide the number of 
graduates in physics and the trends of the physics department in both private and 
national universities. The second group is about the outcomes of behaviours of the 
firms. The data in this group are the number of patents, the number of certain 
technological articles both in the firms’ technological journals and in the academic 
journals, production scale, and corporate financial data. The Patent Office of Japan 
provides several important patent data such as the number of patents in a certain 
technology, the number of patent applications, the number of patents for each firm 
and for each technology. Statistics recorded by the Japan Patent Office and Ministry 
                                                 
85 The followings are the coverage of Derwent Innovations Index. Argentina, Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Czech Republic, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, 
European Patents, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, South 
Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Portugal, 
Romania, the Russian Federation, Singapore, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Taiwan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
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of Economy, Trade and Industry and yearbooks published by the industry 
associations provide consistent quantitative data such as production scale, 
cumulative production, prices, and specification of products. This thesis uses 
ICARUS, which is a database of U.S. and Canadian firms, to examine business 
domain and financial data of American firms. This study also uses the Japan 
Company Handbook to show Japanese firms’ business domain. The thesis uses these 
statistical data for a mainly descriptive purpose to analyse laser technology 
development. 
The last group is interview data.86 The author interviewed nineteen Japanese 
corporate engineers and managers, and government officials with direct knowledge 
of the manufacturing and engineering process in semiconductor laser technology in 
Japan between September 2004 and February 2006. The interview data allows the 
investigation of R&D in the firms. Many of the actors who participated in the 
technological competition over laser technology are still working. Even though this 
research uses the interview data for a supplementary purpose, it allows the 
examination of the strategic thinking behind their behaviours and their expectations 
of other actors’ behaviours. This qualitative data also helps analyse two insights for 
the analysis. Firstly, it gives important insights about how corporate engineers saw 
rival firms’ R&D and how they learnt from their rivals. Secondly, it helps analyse 
the consensus-making process through competition. Firms developed their strategic 
technological choices taking the rival firms’ strategies into account. The interviews 
can show how firms saw their rivals and how this cross-reference shaped their 
strategy. Furthermore, technology intensive firms undertook several R&D projects. 
Large firms such as IBM, Xerox, Bell, Hitachi, and Toshiba, usually undertake 
numerous R&D projects at the same time. Even the small-specialized firms such as 
TRG and Microtron ran several R&D projects. It is not easy to access firm-specific 
R&D records. For instance, it is difficult to access data on how much money and 
resources were allocated into a specific R&D project in the firm. Research that aims 
to scrutinize corporate R&D projects tends to confront this difficulty of accessing 
                                                 
86 On the interview, see Appendix III: List of Interviewees. 
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specific R&D project data. This thesis tries to fill this gap by interviewing corporate 
engineers, even though the interviews could not fully reveal the specific R&D 
project of the firms. The corporate technical journals are also an important source to 
access specific R&D projects of firms, as the technical journals sometimes did a 
special feature on a certain R&D project to which the firm gave particularly high 
propriety. By interviewing corporate engineers and scrutinizing the corporate 
technical journals, this thesis tries to reveal firms’ semiconductor laser R&D projects. 
 
 
Contribution 
How do the research questions of this study fit in to previous debates?  How 
can the thesis contribute to the debates?87 Firstly, there has a few studies examining 
the development of the optoelectronics industry. The optoelectronics industry 
became one of the most important sectors in the national economy of Japan from the 
1980s. The semiconductor laser was the most important electric device in the 
optoelectronics industry. By examining the development of semiconductor laser 
technology, this thesis aims to provide a better understanding about how Japanese 
technological intensive industry came to be competitive from the 1970s.  
Saxonhouse and Miyazaki’s studies are two of the first studies on the optoelectronics 
industry. Saxonhouse surveyed the optoelectronics industry in Japan and provided 
the first important outline of the industry.88 Paying attention to the argument of core 
competence89 , Miyazaki attempted to measure ex ante firm’s technological core 
competence in the optoelectronics industry. Exploring how technological 
competences were built in firms, she showed several factors influencing core 
competence building such as the importance of top management, and path 
dependency. While her argument focused on the competence building process in a 
                                                 
87 The second chapter reviews the previous arguments more broadly to indicate how this 
study fits in the broader line of previous debates on Japanese Economic History. 
88 Saxonhouse, "Optoelectronics in Japan: Some Economic Consideration." 
89 On the core competence of firms, see Hamel and Heene, Competence-Based Competition. 
1. Introduction 
 61 
firm, this study is primarily concerned with interactions of firms’ strategic 
technological choice. 
 Secondly, this thesis directs its attention to the relationship between 
competition and technological innovation. There is a good deal of discussion in the 
literature on the organisational setting of Japanese firms under the framework of the 
“Japanese management system”, which will be reviewed in the second chapter, 
Literature Review: Technological Development in Post-war Japan. However, the 
amount of work on the relation between competition, spillover, and technological 
change has been limited, even though competition is an important factor for 
technological innovation. The organisational setting is an important supply side 
mechanism pushing technological change to a certain pattern. It is, however, 
important to examine the dynamic process in which supply side mechanisms 
evolved and interacted with each other through competition. This thesis contributes 
to these studies by examining how competition became fierce in a certain market 
and how fierce competition contributed to technological innovation in technology 
intensive industry in Japan.   
 The third point is related to the relationship between the theoretical research 
on the economics of a technology intensive industry and technological change and 
previous research on technological change in post-war Japan.  Technology intensive 
industries became important from the 1960s. Economists have begun to study the 
industry and to provide useful perspectives. The interaction between the theoretical 
research and the previous research about technological change in post-war Japan, 
however, has been quite limited.90 One of the possible reasons lies in the fact that 
much of the previous literature about technological change in Japan directed their 
attentions to outlining the unique feature of the “Japanese management system.” 
This study aims to bridge the theoretical research about the economics of a 
technology intensive industry and the empirical research about the competitiveness 
                                                 
90 Of course, there are some exceptions. For example Aoki, Information, Incentives, and 
Bargaining in the Japanese Economy; Aoki and Dore, The Japanese Firm: The Sources of 
Competitive Strength. However, the English-language work on competition and 
technological change based on the theoretical framework has been limited.  
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of a technology intensive industry in Japan.   
 The last point lies in the sources used in the thesis. As will be shown in the 
following section, some of the most important data for this study is patent data. The 
number of studies employing patent data has been recently growining. There are 
many studies examining industrial and technological development in Japan with 
patent data.91 However, many of them employ U.S. patent data provided by the 
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) to examine Japanese firms.92 Since 
the Japan Patent Office does not provide citation information, the previous studies 
have faced difficulty of accessing Japanese patent citation data. As discussed above, 
both patent data and patent citation data can allow systematic and consistent 
investigation of the timing of technological change and its impact.  This thesis is one 
of the first attempts to examine technological change in Japan by using patent and 
Japanese patent citation data. 
 
 
Structure of the Argument 
This thesis consists of six chapters. The first chapter, Introduction, has 
introduced why this study scrutinises semiconductor laser and presented the 
methodology. 
The second chapter, Literature Review: Technological Development in Post-
war Japan, reviews previous arguments about technological development in post-
war Japan. Through the literature review, it aims to show how the research questions 
of the thesis fit in the line of the previous arguments and how this study contributes 
to the arguments. 
                                                 
91 For example, Nagaoka, "Asessing the R&D Management of a Firm in terms of Speed and 
Science Linkage: Evidence from the US Patents"; Branstetter and Sakakibara, "Japanese 
Research Consortia: A Microeconometric Analysis of Industrial Policy"; Branstetter and 
Sakakibara, "When Do Research Consortia Work Well and Why? Evidence from Japanese 
Panel Data."  
92 On the NBER patent data, see Hall, Jaffe, and Tratjenberg, "The NBER Patent Citation 
Data File: Lessons, Insights and Methdological Tools." 
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 As Griliches indicated, the R&D output of firms mainly depends on the three 
factors, the state of aggregate knowledge in the industry, the level of conventional 
inputs of the firm and the specific knowledge capital of the firm.93  The third chapter, 
Human Capital and Research Networks, accordingly examines the first factor, which 
is the state of aggregate knowledge in the industry. Physicists began to research 
semiconductor lasers from the late 1950s. Based on the journal citation and the 
bibliography of doctoral theses on semiconductor lasers, this chapter shows  
 
 [3-1] The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. were the two leading countries in human capital 
accumulation in semiconductor laser technology.   
 [3-2] Although Japan accelerated its human capital accumulation from the 
1970s, it was not the leading country in human capital accumulation in 
semiconductor laser technology. 
 [3-3] Inter-organisational collaboration in semiconductor laser technology was 
more developed in the U.S. than in Japan and Europe. 
 
These findings also suggest that Japan attained technological development in 
semiconductor lasers and gained a significant market share in semiconductor lasers 
and their application areas from the beginning of the 1980s in spite of the fact that 
the human capital accumulation and the research network in semiconductor laser 
were not specially advanced in Japan compared to those in The U.S. and Europe. 
The fourth chapter, Semiconductor Laser Research Consortium: OMCS 
Project, examines the research consortium launched in 1977. As will be reviewed in 
the second chapter, the government-led growth view maintained that the 
governmental research consortia played important roles in the technological 
development of the technology intensive industry. Examining the research 
consortium launched in 1979 with patent citation data, this chapter shows:  
 
 [4-1] Important technology was not produced in the consortium, compared to 
                                                 
93 Griliches, "The Search for R&D Spillovers", pp.9-10. 
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the in-house R&D of the participating firms. 
 [4-2] The consortium stimulated corporate private R&D in areas where the 
participating firms undertook joint R&D.   
 
The fourth chapter argues that the consortium provided an important path 
dependency for technological development and industrial development. However, 
the consortium does not provide a full explanation for the technological 
development and the competitiveness of the industry. The fifth chapter, Competition, 
Knowledge Spillover, and Innovation examines how the firms competed under the 
conditions which the research consortium and industrial association provided and 
how technological change emerged in competition by scrutinising an important 
technological change, which was semiconductor epitaxy technology, LPE, MBE, 
and MOCVD. First, this chapter presents the following points: 
 
 [5-1] Most Japanese firms simultaneously engaged in R&D competition in both 
MBE and MOCVD, while some American firms adopted neither MBE nor 
MOCVD. 
 [5-2] Japanese firms competed in MBE and MOCVD areas over relatively 
longer periods than the U.S. firms did.   
 
Based on these findings, this chapter introduces two different types of 
knowledge and shows how the R&D strategies of the firms and the patterns of 
competition in the U.S. and Japan affected the nature of knowledge spillovers and 
how the different trajectories of technological development emerged through 
different patterns of R&D competition and different institutional settings. 
The last chapter, Conclusions and Implications, first summarises the 
arguments and presents discussions and implications of the arguments. Concretely, it 
presents the implications of the findings for arguments relating to vertical integration, 
competition and technological change. Then it shows some points for further 
research. 
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2. Literature Review: Technological Development in 
Post-war Japan 
 
This chapter reviews the previous literature on technological development in 
postwar Japan.1 In particular, it focuses on the literature on technological 
development in technology-intensive industry after 1973.2 This chapter aims to show 
how the research questions of the thesis fit in the line of previous arguments and 
how the thesis will contribute to these arguments. 
This literature survey takes three steps. The first involves a review of basic 
studies about economic growth and the development of technology-intensive 
industry after 1973. It provides the basic background regarding Japanese 
technology-intensive industries’ attainment of high competitiveness and the 
characteristics of technological innovation during this period. The second step 
(starting at 2.2. Four Perspectives on Technological Change and Economic Growth) 
reviews the four categories of the previous arguments on technological development 
in Japan’s technology-intensive industries. The third step (starting at 2.3. Previous 
Studies and Research Questions) reveals how this thesis aims to contribute to these 
previous arguments.  
 
                                                 
1 For an overview of postwar Japanese economic history, see Nakamura, The Postwar 
Japanese Economy: Its Development and Structure; Tolliday, The Economic Development of 
Modern Japan, 1945-1995; Katz, Japan, the System That Soured: the Rise and Fall of the 
Japanese Economic Miracle. 
2 On technological development in prewar period, Westney analyzed social institutional 
change such as the educational system, the transportation system, and the information 
system in Meiji Japan. Westney, Imitation and Innovation: The Transfer of Western 
Organisational Patterns to Meiji Japan. Morris-Suzuki reviewed the technological 
development of Japan from the 17th to the 21st century. Morris-Suzuki, The Technological 
Transformation of Japan: From the Seventeenth to the Twenty-First Century. Odagiri also 
concretely summarised technological development after the Meiji Restoration and used case 
studies to describe technological developments in the textile, iron and steel, electrical and 
communications equipment, and automobile industries. Odagiri and Gotō, Technology and 
Industrial Development in Japan: Building Capabilities by Learning, Innovation, and 
Public Policy, Japan Business and Economics Series. 
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2.1. Economic Growth and Two Exogenous Shocks  
 
Angus Maddison showed that Japan’s GDP per capita in 1990 was $1.135 
(1990 international dollars), which was only about one-fourth that of the U.K. or the 
U.S. and on a par with the Philippines and Mexico.3 However, Japan attained high 
economic growth, becoming the second largest economic power after the U.S. after 
World War II. As early as 1961, Reischauer described Japan as a “model for 
underdeveloped countries that wished to modernise.”4 However, two incidents--the 
cancellation of the Bretton Woods Agreements and the oil crises--shocked Japan’s 
economy. 
 
Two Shocks and Rise of Technology Intensive Industries 
During the Vietnam War, the U.S. economy faced chronic inflation and an 
accumulated deficit in the international balance of payments. The U.S. balance of 
trade with Japan went into the red in the late 1960s, with an accumulated deficit of 
two billion dollars. President Richard Nixon announced his comprehensive 
macroeconomic policy in 1971. The following year, the Smithsonian Agreement 
brought about a re-evaluation of the Japanese yen, with an appreciation of 16.88%. 
This was the first shock for the Japanese economy. The second shock came the 
following year, when the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
carried out a major oil boycott during the Arab-Israeli war, refusing to sell oil to 
countries that supported Israel. The price of oil quadrupled from 1973 to 1975. With 
no oil reserve in Japan, Japanese firms were unable to avert the rising price of oil. 
The rising oil prices and the re-evaluation of the yen had three important 
consequences. First, many studies indicate that these two shocks changed the 
industrial organisation of the Japanese economy. Prior to the cancellation of the 
                                                 
3 Maddison, Monitoring the World Economy, 1820-1992, Development Centre Studies, Table 
1-3, p. 24. 
4 Nakayama and Reischauer, "Nihon Kindaika No Rekishiteki Hyōka (History of Japanese 
Modernisation)", p. 89. 
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Bretton Woods Agreements, the competitive advantage of Japanese firms in the 
international market was low prices due to an abundant supply of cheap labour.5 
These two shocks, however, made it difficult for Japanese firms to compete in the 
international market. Hashimoto pointed out that energy-consuming and labour-
intensive industries (e.g., petrochemicals, metal-working, ceramic, textile, and paper 
and pulp industries) decreased their profit rate in 1973.6 All of these industries had 
been key industries in the high economic growth since the mid-1950s. The 
strengthening of the yen decreased exports and boosted domestic demand. Changes 
in the exchange rate impacted cash flow. Strong yen, trade surplus, low bank rate 
policy, and capital market liberalisation induced cash flow into the Japanese capital 
market. It became easy for firms to raise money from the capital market, stimulating 
investment in plants and equipment. Second, firms began focusing on the quality of 
their products. It became difficult for them to pursue cost leadership strategies 
because of the strong yen. Thus, they shifted their product mix from low-priced 
labour-intensive products that competed with NIEs to high-quality technology-
intensive products. Gotō contended that Japanese firms developed many incremental 
energy-saving technologies in an effort to reduce rising energy costs and maintain a 
competitive advantage in pricing.7 The government also set up two major 
collaborative projects in support of firms’ R&D in energy-saving technology. The 
Sunshine Project, set up in 1974, aimed to develop alternative sources of energy. The 
Moonlight Project was launched in 1978 in an effort to develop energy-saving 
technology.8 Third, firms engaged in direct foreign investment to shift their 
production base overseas. They transferred their labour-intensive production 
facilities to the U.S. and Southeast Asia, and shifted their domestic R&D and 
                                                 
5 For example, Nakamura, The Postwar Japanese Economy: Its Development and Structure, 
pp. 205-227. 
6 Hashimoto, Hasegawa, and Miyajima, eds. Gendai Nihon Keizai, (Contemporary Japanese 
Economy), p.171. For the changes in comparative advantage in post oil crisis Japan, see 
Komiya and Itoh, "Japan’s International Trade and Trade Policy, 1955-1984", pp.200-201. 
7 Gotō, Inobēshon to Nihon Keizai (Innovation and Japanese Economy), pp. 104-108. 
8 Regarding to these national projects, see Shimamoto, Nashonarupurojekuto no Seido 
Sekkei: Sanshain Keikaku to Taiyōkō Hatsuden Sangyō no Seisei (Institutional Design of 
National Project: Sunshine Project and Development of Solar Power Generation Industry). 
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production from labour-intensive to technology-intensive.9 
Despite the shock from the cancellation of the Bretton Woods Agreement 
and the oil crises, the Japanese economy sustained its growth even though the 
growth rate slowed. Because of the shift in their product mix from low-priced to 
high-quality products, Japanese firms became competitive in various areas with the 
U.S. and the advanced European countries from the 1970s to the 1990s. Japanese 
automobile, consumer electronics, robotics, and semiconductor industries began 
exporting their products to the U.S. market in the 1980s. 
U.S. economists began to analyse the competitiveness of U.S. industries to 
regain competitiveness against Japanese products. For instance, Ezra Vogel’s 1979 
book, Japan as Number One: Lessons for America, received widespread attention 
both in the U.S. and in Japan.10 Former U.S. Commerce Department bureaucrat 
Clyde Prestowitz explained how the U.S. had allowed Japan to take the lead.11 
Noting that “the profit-maximizing firms of the United States have faced off against 
the empire-building firms of Japan,” Lester Thurow warned of the upcoming battle 
involving Japan, Europe, and America.12 U.S. President Ronald Reagan set up the 
Commission on Industrial Competitiveness to analyse U.S. industrial 
competitiveness.13 In 1985, this commission published a report indicating that Japan 
was the biggest rival of U.S. technology-intensive industries.14 MIT conducted a 
project, funded by U.S. automobile firms, to examine the technological competence 
of the automobile industry. The main goal was to examine why the U.S. automobile 
                                                 
9 It was pointed out in the second half of the 1980s that the yen’s continuing strong 
appreciation would decrease domestic employment and weaken the manufacturing sector, 
because manufacturing industry would shift facilities overseas. On the hollowing out 
problem in Japan, see Nakamura and Shibuya, "The Hollowing Out Phenomenon in the 
Japanese Industry." 
10 Vogel, Japan as Number One: Lessons for America. 
11 Prestowitz, Trading Places: How We Allowed Japan to Take the Lead. 
12 Thurow, Head to Head: The Coming Economic Battle among Japan, Europe, and 
America, p. 151. 
13 United States President's Commission on Industrial Competitiveness, Global 
Competition: The New Reality: The Report of the President's Commission on Industrial 
Competitiveness. 
14 Ibid. 
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industry was losing competitiveness and how the Japanese automobile industry was 
gaining competitiveness.15 In 1995, the U.S. Council on Competitiveness released its 
report, The New Challenge to America’s Prosperity: Findings from the Innovation 
Index.16 The report predicted that Japan would become the leading country in 
technological innovation, even though it had been struggling from the long 
depression.  
 
Incremental Innovation 
 A vast amount of literature has analysed technological development in 
Japan’s technology-intensive industries. Change within Japanese companies tended 
to be directed toward incremental technological change. For example, examining the 
Japanese automobile industry, Cusumano pointed out that the technology originally 
invented in Western nations was improved by Total Quality Control (TQC) at the 
shop floor level in Japan.17 In their comparative statistical research, Kagono et al. 
analysed the technological change of U.S. firms and Japanese firms, revealing that 
U.S. firms tended to focus on product change, whereas Japanese firms focused on 
process change, which was usually more incremental than product change.18 They 
also asserted that Japanese firms focused on process innovations more than product 
                                                 
15 Abernathy, Clark, and Kantrow, Industrial Renaissance: Producing a Competitive Future 
for America; Clark and Fujimoto, Product Development Performance: Strategy, 
Organisation, and Management in the World Auto Industry; Finan, Matching Japan in 
Quality: How the Leading U.S. Semiconductor Firms Caught up with the Best in Japan; 
Cusumano, The Japanese Automobile Industry: Technology and Management at Nissan and 
Toyota. 
16 Porter, Stern, and Council on Competitiveness, The New Challenge to America's 
Prosperity: Findings from the Innovation Index. 
17 For the first TQC movement in Japan, Cusumano, The Japanese Automobile Industry: 
Technology and Management at Nissan and Toyota, pp.324-327. It is believed that Edward 
Deming also contributed to incremental innovation and high productivity growth within 
Japanese manufacturing sectors. Deming was first invited to Japan to give a lecture on 
quality management in 1950. He contributed to the Japanese manufacturing by introducing 
statistical quality control method. On Deming’s method, see Walton, The Deming 
Management Method. 
18 Kagono et al., Strategic vs. Evolutionary Management: A U.S.-Japan Comparison of 
Strategy and Organisation, pp. 90-96. 
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innovations. Some of the literature uses the terms “process innovation” and 
“incremental innovation” interchangeably, although they are two distinct concepts. 
Regarding innovation as creative destruction, Schumpeter classified 
innovation into (1) the introduction of a new product, (2) the introduction of a new 
production method, (3) the finding of a new market, (4) the introduction of new 
material, and (5) the introduction of a new organisation, or a mix of one or more of 
these.19 He regarded innovation as the transfer to a new technological production 
frontier. Kirzner developed a counterargument to Schumpeter’s definition and 
expanded the notion of innovation.20 Although he did not clearly define innovation, 
he contended that limiting innovation to creative destruction ignores small 
incremental technological changes that also contribute to economic growth. Big 
technological change impacts the current production frontier, but small changes 
increase efficiency and thus help move production to the existing production frontier. 
While Schumpeter emphasised innovation’s destruction of the current equilibrium, 
Kirzner maintained that small technological changes move production to the 
equilibrium, thus playing an important role in economic growth (Figure 2-1). 
  
Figure 2-1: Technological Innovation and Production Frontier 
                                                 
19 Schumpeter, Business Cycles: A Theoretical, Historical, and Statistical Analysis of the 
Capitalist Process, pp. 62-77. 
20 Kirzner, Competition and Entrepreneurship, pp.125-131. 
 
New Equilibrium 
Propinquity to the frontier 
Existing Equilibrium 
Change the equilibrium 
2. Literature Review: Technological Development in Post-war Japan 
 71 
Developing a theory similar to that of Kirzner, Joel Mokyr claimed that 
technological progress was crucial for high and sustainable growth.21 He established 
the concept of micro- and macro-inventions. Micro-inventions are small incremental 
steps that improve, adapt, and streamline existing techniques or products already in 
use; they reduce costs, while increasing durability and function. Macro-inventions 
are radical new ideas that emerge ab nihilo. No pattern in their progression can be 
recognised, but luck and genius play important roles. Once a macro-invention has 
occurred, it inevitably sets the ground for micro-inventions. For Mokyr, micro- and 
macro-inventions are the two complementary elements through which technology 
progresses in an evolutionary fashion. He classified technological change in terms of 
(1) improvement of existing techniques or products or (2) production of something 
new.22 Nelson and Winter also payed attention to incremental innovation, which is 
relatively minor changes to the existing product, and argued that interplay between 
major and incremental innovation over the course of product and technological 
change was important.23 
 Based on these conceptualisations, the previous research about technological 
change in Japan indicated that Japanese firms tended to produce incremental 
innovation more than radical innovation.24 In other words, technological innovations 
in Japan tended to be incremental and evolutionary, while those in the U.S. tended to 
be radical and revolutionary. 
 
                                                 
21 Mokyr, The Lever of Riches: Technological Creativity and Economic Progress, p. 55. 
22 Many works in business management studies have developed different categorisation of 
innovation. For example, Abernathy and Clark introduced four types of innovation 
depending on continuity of technology and current competitive adtanvage of firms; Niche 
Creation innovation, Architectural innovation, Regular innovation, and Revolutionary 
innovation. Abernathy and Clark, "Innovation: Mapping the Winds of Creative Destruction." 
23 Nelson and Winter, An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change. Tushman and Anderson 
put an emhasis on the interplay between radical and incremental innovation. Tushman and 
Anderson, "Technological Discontinuties and Organisational Environments." 
24 For example, Lynn, How Japan Innovates: A Comparison with the U.S. in the Case of 
Oxygen Steelmaking; Clark and Fujimoto, Product Development Performance: Strategy, 
Organisation, and Management in the World Auto Industry; Cusumano, The Japanese 
Automobile Industry: Technology and Management at Nissan and Toyota. 
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2.2. Four Perspectives on Technological Change and Economic 
Growth 
 
The following section reviews four main perspectives on technology 
development in Japan’s technology-intensive industries after the double exogenous 
shocks: (1) technology transfer, (2) government-led growth, (3) cultural issues, and 
(4) Japanese management. A review of these perspectives will clarify how this thesis 
contributes to previous arguments. 
 
Technology Transfer: Late Comer Advantage? 
The first perspective concerns technological transfer. World War II shut 
down the information flow regarding the latest technologies. Ōkawa et al. developed 
an important argument for the relationship between technological backwardness and 
economic growth.25 Technology transfer was the strategy that the Japanese firms and 
government took to catch up with Western countries.26 Based on the new knowledge 
acquired from the U.S. about advanced technology, Japanese firms planned to 
introduce advanced technology from overseas. Japanese automobile, electronics, and 
petrochemical industries bought advanced technologies from companies in various 
countries such as the U.S., Germany, Italy, and Austria. For example, Toshiba made 
a technology transfer agreement with General Electric (GE). Mitsubishi Electric also 
entered into a similar agreement with Westinghouse Electric, as Fuji Electric did 
with Siemens.27 In the automobile industry, agreements were made between Nissan 
and Austin, Hino and Renault, and Isuzu and Hillman.28 Japanese petrochemical 
                                                 
25 Ōkawa, Shinohara, and Meissner, Patterns of Japanese Economic Development: a 
Quantitative Appraisal. 
26 On technological importation in post-war Japan, see Wakasugi and Gotō, "Kyōdō Kenkyū 
Kaihatsu to Gijutsu Kakushin (Collaborative R&D and Technological Innovation)." 
Saxonhouse examined technology transfer in the cotton textile industry from the late 19th 
century to the early 20th century. Saxonhouse, "Mechanisms for Technology Transfer in 
Japanese Economic History." 
27 On the electronics industry and its technology transfer, see Chokki, "Denki (History of the 
Electric Industry)." 
28 The automobile firms transferred technology from European automobile manufacturers 
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firms introduced advanced technologies from Germany, the U.S., and Italy.29  
According to Gerschenkron’s framework, the latecomer can start 
industrialisation by using advanced technologies already developed by other 
countries.30 As a result, its industrialisation and economic growth occurs more 
quickly than that of early starters. Following this perspective, it is possible to 
assume that Japanese firms acquiring advanced technology from overseas could 
experience high growth.  
Much of the previous literature on technological transfer in post-World War 
II Japan seemed to confirm Gerschenkron’s theory. For instance, Lynn showed that 
Japanese iron and steel firms acquired the basic oxygen furnace (BOF) from Austria 
and made incremental modifications at the plant level, bringing about high 
productivity growth.31 Madeley analysed the technology transfer from Britain’s 
Wolseley Motors and Rootes Motors to Japan’s Ishikawajima Shipbuilding and 
Engineering Company and Isuzu Motors.32 A licensing agreement facilitated 
Ishikawajima’s entry into the automobile industry. Ishikawajima struggled to 
manufacture a Fiat automobile by reverse engineering, because the firm’s 
technological competence was not at a sufficient level to produce automobiles. The 
licensing agreement contained provisions for the direct transfer of Wolseley’s 
production facilities, technology, business management methods, and know-how to 
Ishikawajima. Madeley insisted that licensing agreements had a significant impact 
on the development of the automobile industry. Japanese automobile firms accessed 
advanced technology through licensing agreements and accumulated technological 
competence, even though the agreements did not provide satisfactory outcomes for 
the British firms that had planned to expand their market shares in Japan. Madeley 
                                                                                                                                         
because they believed that compact cars would be necessary for Japan’s narrow roads.  
Shimokawa, "Jidōsha (History of the Automobile Industry)." 
29 On the petrochemical firms and their technology transfers, see Kudō, "Sekiyu Kagaku 
(History of the Petrochemical Industry)." 
30 Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A Book of Essays. 
31 Lynn, How Japan Innovates: A Comparison with the U.S. In the Case of Oxygen 
Steelmaking. 
32 Madeley, "A Case Study of Anglo-Japanese Cooperation in the Motor Vehicle Industry 
Ishikawajima, Woosely, Isuzu and Rootes." 
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suggested that technology transfer provided opportunities not only for incumbent 
firms but also for new entrants in the automobile industry as well as in the 
petrochemicals industry.33 Introducing advanced petrochemicals technologies from 
overseas, new entrants could establish a comparative advantage against the 
incumbents if they bought in advanced technologies and successfully accumulated 
technological competence through licensing. Of course, the incumbent firms also 
planned to introduce advanced technology to update their existing technologies. As a 
result, firms competed to introduce the most advanced technology from overseas. 
Technology inflow from overseas to Japan was not limited to technology 
transfer. Scientific management such as production quality control, plant layout, and 
floor arrangement of the production facility were also introduced. TQC, which was 
introduced in 1962, had become popular with Japanese firms by the 1970s.34 Tsutsui 
made a similar point in Manufacturing Ideology: Scientific Management in 
Twentieth-Century Japan, regarding the selective adoption of Western scientific 
management.35 
These occurrences in Japan were compatible with Abernathy’s 
conceptualisation of dominant design and technological innovation.36 Abernathy 
perceived technological innovations as emerging with a certain pattern in historical 
dynamics. He defined two different types of innovation--process innovation and 
product innovation. The ratio of product innovation outnumbers that of process 
innovation before a certain dominant design appears. The dominant design is the 
product design with main components and mechanisms underlying fundamental 
characteristics that do not change from one model to another. Once a dominant 
design appears, the number of product innovations decline and that of process 
                                                 
33 On the technology transfer in the petrochemical industry, see Kudō, "Sekiyu Kagaku 
(History of the Petrochemical Industry)." 
34 On the history of Quality Control in Japan, see Ishikawa, TQC towa Nanika- Nihonteki 
Hinshitsu Kanri (What Is TQC? Japanese Quality Control). 
35 Tsutsui, Manufacturing Ideology: Scientific Management in Twentieth-Century Japan. 
36 Abernathy, The Productivity Dilemma: Roadblock to Innovation in the Automobile 
Industry. 
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innovations increase. (Figure 2-2)37 
 
Figure 2-2: Dominant Design, Product Innovation, and Process Innovation 
 
Abernathy, The Productivity Dilemma: Roadblock to Innovation in the Automobile Industry, 
p.72 
 
From Abernathy’s perspective, it is possible to assume that Japanese firms 
transferred many fixed dominant designs of technology from overseas; as a result, 
the number of incremental processes increased. In other words, by modifying 
transferred advanced technology, Japanese industries acquired incremental 
technology and experienced high economic growth. 
This technology transfer view, however, does not fully explain the 
technological change that occurred after the late 1970s, since technology transfers 
from overseas were declining. Japanese firms started introducing insignificant 
technology such as a ‘golf wear’ design in the 1960s.38 The total amount of 
technology exports exceeded that of technology imports in 1972. Since then, the 
                                                 
37 Examining the patterns of paradigm change in natural science, Kuhn developed similar 
arguments to Abernathy. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 
38 Gotō, Inobēshon to Nihon Keizai (Innovation and Japanese Economy), p. 80. 
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difference between imports and exports has increased. Moreover, the biggest 
importer of Japanese technology has been the U.S.--not the developing countries. 
Furthermore, Gotō and Wakasugi argued that the importance of technology transfer 
was exaggerated in the previous literature. They pointed out that the ratio of 
investment for technology transfer to total investment in plants and equipment was 
15% even in its peak in 1958.39  
 
Government Led Growth? 
The second perspective is the government intervention theory. Chalmers 
Johnson’s MITI and the Japanese Miracle kicked off the debate.40 Johnson asserted 
that the expert coordination of the economy by the Ministry of International Trade 
and Industry (MITI) bureaucrats had a strong impact on Japan’s economic growth.41 
MITI and the Japanese Miracle has attracted attention from various areas of studies 
such as political science, economics, and economic and business history. It also 
attracted politicians’ and bureaucrats’ attention in many countries. However, it must 
be noted that his argument has sometimes been oversimplified. In his analysis, he 
carefully constructed his argument and did not argue that Japan’s economic growth 
was entirely attributed to MITI’s industrial policy. 
MITI and the Japanese Miracle has drawn attention for two reasons. The 
first is Johnson’s portrayal of wartime Japan. He argued that the Japanese system 
originated during the interwar period, with important elements forming during the 
1930s and others during the years of total war. The final consolidation, ironically, 
                                                 
39 Gotō and Wakasugi, "Technology Policy", p. 184. 
40 Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975. 
41 Johnson, however, was not the first scholar to point out the importance of MITI’s 
industrial policy. For example, scrutinizing the petrochemicals industry and the importance 
of MITI’s industrial policy, Kawade and Bōno claimed, “The government played a 
significant role in the petrochemicals industry….  The government played as Almighty God 
when firms planned to industrialise petrochemical products. Due to the Foreign Exchange 
and Foreign Trade Control Law, gaining permission from the government was the top 
priority for firms.” Kawade and Bōno, Sekiyukagaku Kōgyō (the Petrochemical Industry of 
Japan), pp. 172-173. However, since Johnson’s argument was one of the first studies on 
MITI’s industrial policy written in English, it attracted a great deal of attention. 
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culminated in the occupation era, when civilian bureaucrats no longer had to bow to 
military priorities. Johnson suggested that mobilisation for war had aided rather than 
obstructed healthy post-war economic development. The second reason is his 
argument about the importance of MITI bureaucrats. He suggested that Japan’s 
economic growth was a model for developed countries because it provided 
important policy implications for governmental officials of developed countries to 
attain economic growth. 
Counterarguments to Johnson’s theory arose after the publication of his 
MITI and the Japanese Miracle in 1982. These counterarguments consist of three 
main points: the scope of MITI’s industrial policy, MITI’s capability of formulating 
industrial policy, and the effect of the industrial policy. 
Abe reviewed the debate on MITI and indicated that to what extent MITI’s 
industrial policy was successful should be assessed on a case-by-case basis.42 MITI’s 
policy was effective in some industries but it was not successful in others. He 
concluded that MITI’s industrial policy played an important role when it could 
create social consensus on a targeting industry.  Friedman argued that MITI’s 
industrial policy did not fully explain Japan’s economic growth because its scope 
was limited.43 He found Johnson’s theory misleading because it could be interpreted 
that MITI’s industrial policy brought about Japan’s economic growth. Friedman 
contended that the development of the machine tool industry, a leading industry in 
post-war Japan, was not solely attributable to MITI’s industrial policy. Komiya also 
noted that many new industries gained competitiveness in the international market 
and started exporting their products in the 1960s.44 He indicated that the government 
did not help in the development of new industries such as the sewing machine, 
camera, bicycle, motor bicycle, piano, fastener, transistor radio, colour television, 
tape recorder, magnetic tape, audio equipment, fishing equipment, watch, ceramics, 
                                                 
42 Abe, "The State as the ‘Third-Hand’: MITI and Japanese Industrial Development after 
1945." 
43 Friedman, The Misunderstood Miracle: Industrial Development and Political Change in 
Japan. 
44 Komiya, Okuno, and Suzumura, Industrial Policy of Japan, pp.7-8. 
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electronic calculator, electric wire, machine tool, numerical control machine tool, 
electronic communication tool, and robotic industries. These facts indicated that 
although technology transfer may explain incremental technological change until the 
1970s, it does not explain more recent technological change. Johnson’s argument 
became popular because it gave a simplistic impression that MITI’s industrial policy 
accounted for Japan’s economic growth in its entirety. However, Friedman pointed 
out that MITI targeted the steel and iron, shipbuilding, petrochemicals, and 
automobile industries. Other industries achieved competitiveness without the help of 
MITI’s industrial policy. 
The second point of the counterarguments against MITI and the Japanese 
Miracle concerns MITI’s capability of formulating industrial policy. Using the 
Japanese aluminium industry as an example, Samuels argued that since MITI had a 
limited number of researchers to examine individual industries, the officials 
depended heavily on trade associations and firms in formulating industrial policy.45 
Of course, the importance of trade associations in the policy planning process was 
not limited to Japan; for example, Lynn and McKeown indicated that trade 
associations provided U.K. policymakers with important information about 
industry.46 Trade associations in Japan as well as in the U.S. cooperated with their 
own government and helped with policymaking in the 1930s. And although trade 
associations in the U.K. and the U.S. were regarded as lobbyists for their own 
interests, Lynn and McKeown argued that Japanese trade associations were not just a 
lobbying group.47 Okimoto also pointed out that Japanese trade associations were an 
important connector between MITI and individual firms.48 Both Yonekura and 
Kikkawa developed similar counterarguments against Johnson’s theory.49 
Concluding that trade associations played an important role in the policymaking 
                                                 
45 Samuels, "The Industrial Destructuring of the Japanese Aluminum Industry." 
46 Lynn and McKeown, Organizing Business: Trade Associations in America and Japan. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Okimoto, Between MITI and the Market: Japanese Industrial Policy for High Technology: 
Studies in International Policy, pp.112-176. 
49 Yonekura, "The Functions of Industrial Associations"; Kikkawa, "Enterprise Groups, 
Industry Associations, and Government: The Case of the Petrochemical Industry in Japan." 
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process, they perceived information asymmetry between MITI’s officials and the 
industries. MITI’s officials were unable to comprehend and examine the situation of 
individual industries. The trade associations, organised by representatives of the 
firms, dissolved the asymmetric information problem. Yonekura and Kikkawa 
contended that the interests of individual firms were incorporated into the policy 
through industry associations. Indicating that MITI formulated its policy through 
interaction with the firms at the trade associations, their arguments provided a 
counterargument against the government-led growth theory. 
The last counterargument against the government-led view lies in the fact 
that government intervention became more indirect and weaker after the 1970s.50 
The government-led view asserts that economic growth was brought about by strong 
government intervention, but it does not explain the technological development that 
occurred after the 1970s. As Japanese industries gained more competitiveness in the 
international market, the U.S. government and industries started criticising MITI’s 
direct intervention in the market economy. After the 1970s, MITI changed its 
industrial policy from direct to indirect intervention, such as organizing government-
funded research consortia and providing subsidies to important R&D of the 
industry.51 The best-known cooperative R&D project in Japan is the Very Large 
Scale Integrated (VLSI) circuit project, which was launched in 1975 to help 
Japanese firms compete with their rivals.52  
The previous literature asserted that the impact of indirect industrial policy 
was limited in scale and scope, compared to the direct intervention of the 1950s and 
1960s. Callon conceded that MITI’s industrial policy was effective until the 1970s.53 
                                                 
50 Regarding to the industrial policy in technology intensive industries after the 1970s, see 
Patrick et al., Japan's High Technology Industries: Lessons and Limitations of Industrial 
Policy. 
51 On the changes in MITI’s industrial policy, see Komiya, Okuno, and Suzumura, Industrial 
Policy of Japan, Chapters 3 and 6. Regarding to the government financing and indirect 
policy in the technology intensive industries, see Okimoto, "Regime Characteristics of 
Japanese Industrial Policy", pp.60-66. 
52 On the VLSI project, see Sakakibara, "Soshiki to Inobēshon: Jirei Kenkyū Chō LSI 
Gijutsu Kenkyū Kumiai (Organisation and Innovation: Case Study, VLSI Consortium)." 
53 Callon, Divided Sun: MITI and the Breakdown of Japanese High-Tech Industrial Policy, 
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However, after examining the impact of four research consortia funded by MITI, he 
asserted that MITI’s industrial policy became less effective and the private sectors 
gained initiative in the national economy after the 1970s. Studying government-
funded collaborative research, Okimoto concluded that a causal connection between 
industrial policy and competitiveness in high technology was not clear, even though 
industrial policy facilitated the development of Japan’s high-technology industries.54 
 
Cultural Issues 
The third perspective involves Japanese culture’s effect on the pattern of 
technological change in Japan. Although this perspective is sometimes problematic, 
it is incredibly persistent and is quite strongly tied to the idea that Japanese 
capitalism is deviant.   
James C. Abegglen’s The Japanese Factory has been the most prevalent 
work that takes a comparative cultural approach, in which Japanese management is 
explained by the reference to traditional Japanese values.55 For example, Herbig’s 
Innovation Japanese Style: A Cultural and Historical Perspective emphasised the 
cultural differences between Japan and the Western countries.56 Herbig contended 
that Japanese creativity is different from that of the West: “Western creativity 
reflects frontier thinking and is based on the concept of individual freedom, which 
favours the discovery of new ideas and product breakthroughs… Japanese creativity 
is responsive, eclectic, focused, and practical.  Japanese creativity is like growing 
rice. Japanese rice farming is an arduous, time-consuming process of cultivation.”57 
He explained that the Japanese economic system is rooted in rice farming. “The 
continuation and success of an irrigated wet-rice growing culture has had a long-
term effect on the Japanese social system and lifestyle--patience, perseverance, 
                                                                                                                                         
1975-1993. 
54 Okimoto, Between MITI and the Market: Japanese Industrial Policy for High Technology, 
Studies in International Policy, p. 230. 
55 Abegglen, The Japanese Factory. 
56 Herbig, Innovation Japanese Style: A Cultural and Historical Perspective. 
57 Ibid., pp. 10-11. 
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diligence, cooperation, passivity, conservative, fatalism, energetic, courageous, self-
reliant, tenacious, patient, humble, and law-abiding--because this kind of farming 
required elaborate irrigation systems that could not be easily built and maintained or 
protected by single families; communities had to work together in large units in 
order to survive. Through centuries of agrarian experience, the Japanese developed 
customs of mutual help, collective coordination, risk sharing, and flexible adaptation 
to continual and incremental environmental change.”58  
Teramoto and Yamamoto also considered the cultural perspective as it 
applied to the technological strategies of Japanese firms.59 They indicated that 
Japanese firms did not develop a clear unique competitive strategy. Then they 
argued that the essence of business strategy originated in military strategy. Because 
the Japanese did not have much war experience compared to European countries and 
China, Teramoto and Yamamoto concluded that Japanese firms could not effectively 
develop business and technological strategies, since the Japanese love peace and 
avoid fighting.60   
This cultural perspective has four main problems. First, culture is an 
umbrella concept that covers many phenomena. Although difficult, defining culture 
is necessary in order to avoid the fallacy of circular reasoning.  
The second problem is that the cultural perspective is based on historical 
information that is not always completely factual. For instance, Teramoto and 
Yamamoto concluded that the Japanese loved peace, since Japan had not 
experienced war as much as European countries and China. However, in reality, 
Japan experienced many civil wars from the eighth century to the early seventeenth 
century. And although the Tokugawa period provided two hundred years of peace, 
Japan did go to war against major powers (e.g., the Sino-Japanese War in 1894-1895 
and the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-1905), until it was defeated in World War II.  A 
look at historical facts causes one to question the statement that Japan lacks war 
                                                 
58 Ibid., pp. 151-152. 
59 Teramoto and Yamamoto, Gijutsu Keiei no Chōsen (the Challenge of Management of 
Technology). 
60 Ibid., pp.113-118. 
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experience and the conclusion that its people love peace.  
The third problem is closely related to the second one, but from a different 
line of argument. Economic historians assert that the unique features of Japan’s 
economic system (which will be discussed later) originated in the wartime economy. 
Based on comparative institutional analysis, Aoki and Okuno examined the origins 
of the Japanese management system.61 Aoki stressed the importance of examining 
institutional settings, incentive systems, and complementarities of institutions. 
Okazaki and Okuno also emphasised path-dependence and strategic complimentarity 
of institutions.62 They argued that the Japanese management system was formed in 
the interwar period.63 For instance, the lifetime employment and seniority systems 
were established in the interwar period, when skilled labour was scarce. Noguchi 
also believed that the Japanese management system, which he called “the 1940 
system,” originated in the trans-war period.64 These arguments agree on three points: 
(1) the Japanese management system was the outcome of economic rational 
behaviour; (2) the wartime economy changed the strategic complementarities of 
institutions; and (3) the institution set in the wartime economy brought about high 
economic growth. These conclusions are not new. For example, Nakamura had 
already pointed out that many of the components of the Japanese management 
system originated in the wartime economy.65 From this viewpoint, the economic 
system radically changed during the war, and these changes were the outcome of 
economically rational strategies. 
The last problem is that the cultural perspective tends to regard culture as 
static. Herbig believed that rice-farming customs emphasising cooperation and 
                                                 
61 Aoki and Okuno, eds. Keizai Shisutemu no Hikaku Seido Bunseki (Comparative 
Institutional Analysis: A New Approach to Economic Systems). On comparative institutional 
analysis, see Aoki, Toward a Comparative Institutional Analysis, Comparative Institutional 
Analysis. 
62 Okazaki and Okuno, eds. The Japanese Economic System and Its Historical Origins, 
Japan Business and Economics Series. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Noguchi, 1940 Nen Taisei: Saraba "Senji Keizai" (1940 System: Good by “Wartime 
System”). 
65 Nakamura, The Postwar Japanese Economy: Its Development and Structure, pp. 15-21. 
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harmony in the community shaped economic behaviour. Of course, it is possible that 
some rice-farming customs could still survive in the twentieth century Japan and 
affect technological change. However, as Granovetter argued, a better understanding 
of economic phenomena requires acknowledgement that culture is dynamic.66 For 
instance, since the number of workers in farming has steadily decreased since 1950, 
it is safe to assume that change in the industrial structure minimized the relative 
importance of the “rice-farming culture.”  
 
 
Japanese Management 
The last perspective is Japanese management, which has attracted much 
attention. Economists, economic historians, and scholars in business management 
studies began to analyse how Japanese technology intensive industries (e.g., 
automobile, electronics, and semiconductor industry) gained competitive advantage 
in the international market from the 1970s. 67 The previous studies have argued that 
the organisational structure and managerial mechanism of Japanese firms played an 
important role in the development of technology intensive industries. Many of their 
arguments address the relationship between the Japanese management system and its 
technological competence.  
Since Japanese management has been massively studied, it is beyond the 
scope of this study to provide extensive review.68 Aspects of the Japanese 
management system are varied; however, two main characteristics--human resources 
management and long-term interfirm relationships--have been pointed out as 
important factors in the pattern of technological change in Japan. 
                                                 
66 Granovetter, "Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness." 
67 Abegglen’s the Japanese Factory is one of the first works on Japanese Management and 
its competitive advantage. Abegglen, The Japanese Factory: Aspects of its Social 
Organisation 
68 On the Japanese management system, see Imai et al., Business Enterprise in Japan: Views 
of Leading Japanese Economists; Aoki and Dore, The Japanese Firm: The Sources of 
Competitive Strength. 
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Human Resource Management 
One important aspect of human resources management is lifetime 
employment and the seniority system.69 The long-term employment relationships in 
Japan have been regarded as one of the important components of “the Japanese 
Management system.” Lifetime employment is the employers’ practice of recruiting 
employees directly from high school or university every spring and then retaining 
them until retirement between 55 and 60 years of age. The coverage varies from a 
low average of approximately 20% in the smaller enterprises with fewer than 50 
employees to a high average of approximately 70% in larger enterprises and 
government departments.70 Japanese organisations offered lifetime employment not 
as a legal guarantee, but as part of an informal, psychological contract with the 
expectation of employee dedication to the company in return. The original basis of 
the seniority system was the value placed on experience and skills. Hashimoto and 
Raisian pointed out that Japanese firms’ salaries were more correlated with seniority 
than those of firms in other countries.71 The long-term relationships have been quite 
often explained by the lack of competitive labour markets for mid-careers in Japan. 
Some have explained it in terms of traditional Japanese values stressing groupism 
and loyalty.72 
The literature has pointed out that lifetime employment and seniority 
systems enhanced incremental innovation for two reasons. First, under these systems, 
workers had a strong incentive to stay at their firms. The worker who quit a job had 
                                                 
69 On Japanese labour management, see Aoki, "The Ranking Hierarchy of the J-Firms as 
Incentive Scheme"; Koike, "Intellectual Skills and Long-Term Competition." On lifetime 
employment and seniority-based systems, see Aoki and Okuno, eds. Keizai Shisutemu no 
Hikaku Seido Bunseki (Comparative Institutional Analysis: A New Approach to Economic 
Systems), pp. 123-152; Itami, "The "Human-Capital-Ism" of the Japanese Firm as an 
Integrated System"; Sako and Sato eds, Japanese Labour and Management in Transition. 
Dore, British Factory, Japanese Factory: The Origins of National Diversity in Industrial 
Relations. 
70 Whitehill, Japanese Management: Tradition and Transition, pp.130-131. 
71 Hashimoto and Raisian, "Employment Tenure and Earnings Profiles in Japan and the 
United States." 
72 Itoh provided a counterargument to these explanations. He concluded that inactive labour 
market in Japan was the result of Japanese firms’ human resoure management strategy. Itoh, 
"Japanese Human Resource Management from the Viewpoint of Incentive Theory." 
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to start over again, from the point of view of seniority. Under this system, the 
individual worker’s salary depended greatly on the firm’s performance. Workers 
could gain by aiming to achieve the collective goals of their firms. In other words, 
lifetime employment and the seniority system facilitated cooperation among workers. 
Under the lifetime employment system, people working in the same firm knew one 
another well; their interaction reduced information asymmetry among different 
divisions and allowed smooth cooperation within a firm. Kusunoki and Numagami 
observed that the redeployment of engineers within a firm was undertaken flexibly 
and frequently.73 They concluded that such transfers enhanced smooth cooperative 
interaction among R&D and its related divisions. Aoki also concluded that Japanese 
firms tended to develop cooperative interaction between their R&D and production 
divisions, thus increasing the efficiency of R&D and production information flows 
among related divisions.74 Chokki pointed out that while the relationship between 
the R&D department and the production department became close in the 1960s, it 
later became much more intense.75 Kenny and Florida also pointed out that constant 
interaction between employees with different skills made it easier to solve 
collaborative problems.76 
The literature contains evidence that the skill formation pattern in Japanese 
firms played an important role in Japan’s technological development. According to 
Koike, labourers in Japanese firms acquired skills through on-the-job training.77 
Because lifetime employment and the seniority system reduced the risks of losing 
training investments, substantial amounts of formal and informal training were 
conducted in Japanese firms. As a result, many of the skills that the workers 
acquired were firm specific and tacit. The ongoing training and the seniority system 
provided the context for continuous improvement and quality control activities. 
                                                 
73 Kusunoki and Numagami, "Intrafirm Transfers of Engineers in Japan." 
74 Aoki, Information, Incentives, and Bargaining in the Japanese Economy. See pp. 69-86. 
75 Chokki, "Denki (History of the Electric Industry)", pp.32-34. 
76 Florida and Kenney, The Breakthrough Illusion: Corporate America's Failure to Move 
from Innovation to Mass Production, pp. 154-155. 
77 Koike, Understanding Industrial Relations in Modern Japan, pp. 273-274. For job 
training and learning in Japanese firms, see Koike, "Learning and Incentive Systems in 
Japanese Industry." 
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Since Japanese firms rarely hired workers midway through the year, the opportunity 
to exchange firm-specific knowledge was limited.  
Examining several different highly technology-intensive product R&D 
processes of Japanese firms, Takeuchi and Nonaka suggested that Japanese firms 
limited the size of their R&D projects to encourage intense interaction.78 The new 
product development process was composed of several different phases (e.g., design 
phase, prototype-testing phase, production phase, marketing phase). All phases were 
flexibly connected and coordinated in Japanese firms, based on the close 
relationship among divisions; interaction among the phases was more intense than 
that in the U.S. firms. Flexible coordination accelerated the R&D process. However, 
firms confronted a huge information flow that each unit had to process. Takeuchi 
and Nonaka pointed out that a new development project had to be small enough to 
maintain face-to-face interaction so that the flexible coordination of R&D processes 
could be achieved.79 They implied that the Japanese new product development 
process did not fit well with big projects that involved numerous people.  
 
Assembler-Supplier Long-Term Relation 
The second point involves long-term interfirm relationships.80 Close 
interfirm relationships between suppliers and assemblers have been addressed in 
much of the previous literature on technological development in post-war Japan. For 
instance, examining the relationship between automobile parts suppliers and 
assemblers, Asanuma showed that the long-term relationship was an important 
institutional mechanism for coordinating design and assuring timely supply.81 Clark 
and Fujimoto observed that automobile manufacturers such as Toyota and Nissan 
                                                 
78 Takeuchi and Nonaka, "Seihin Kaihatsu Purosesu no Manegimento (the Management of 
New Product Development)." 
79 Ibid. 
80 On long-term relationships, see Hashimoto, Sengo no Nihon Keizai (History of Post War 
Japanese Economy). 
81 Asanuma, "Manufacturer-Supplier Relationships in Japan and the Concept of Relation-
Specific Skill." 
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had long-term relationships with certain suppliers.82 Aoki indicated that relationships 
among assemblers and suppliers extended over a long period.83 Some long-term 
relationships were based on cross-share holdings.84 Others were based on assembler-
supplier relationships called “Keiretsu.” One type of Keiretsu is a large horizontally 
organised industrial conglomerate, called “Zaibatsu”, such as Mitsubishi, Mitsui, 
and Sumitomo, some of which originated in pre-war Japan.85 Another type is a 
vertically quasi-integrated firm, such as Toyota, Matsushita Electric, and Kajima. 
Both were a contentious issue in the trade negotiations between the U.S. and Japan. 
The U.S. government criticised that the firms in Keiretsu tended to conduct business 
exclusively within the same Keiretsu group. The U.S. government indicated that the 
strong ties in Keiretsu groups kept foreign firms out, even if the firms moved their 
production facilities or sales branches overseas. 
The literature has developed three points regarding the effects of long-term 
relationships on technological change. The first is that long-term interfirm 
relationships reduced the information asymmetry among firms and restrained 
opportunistic behaviour. Examining the interfirm relationship in the automobile 
industry, Nishiguchi found that assemblers such as Toyota, Nissan, and Honda 
maintained relationships with multiple parts suppliers simultaneously and ranked 
them according to their past performance.86 If suppliers engaged in opportunistic 
behaviour, the assembler would downgrade their ranking or sever the relationship. 
Highly ranked suppliers were allowed to become involved in assemblers’ R&D from 
the blueprint phase. Nishiguchi’s argument indicated that under the condition that 
                                                 
82 Clark and Fujimoto, Product Development Performance: Strategy, Organisation, and 
Management in the World Auto Industry, pp. 136-143. 
83 Aoki, Information, Incentives, and Bargaining in the Japanese Economy, pp.204-257. 
84 On cross-share holding, see Sheard, "Interlocking Shareholding and Corporate 
Governance in Japan." 
85 On Zaibatsu, see Morikawa, Zaibatsu: the Rise and Fall of Family Enterprise Groups in 
Japan. 
86 Nishiguchi, Strategic Industrial Sourcing: The Japanese Advantage, pp.116-119. Fujimoto 
also indicated the same point. Fujimoto, The Evolution of a Manufacturing System at Toyota, 
pp.133-135. On the Japanese automobile industry, see Shimokawa, The Japanese 
Automobile Industry: A Business History. 
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longer relationships resulted in more benefits for the supplier, the incentive to refrain 
from opportunistic behaviour increased. Imai, Nonaka, and Takeuchi argued that 
long-term relationships promoted information sharing and cooperation among firms. 
Assemblers shared their new product development plans from the blueprint stage 
with the top-ranked suppliers. Such actions were risky for the assemblers because 
their blueprints could potentially be disclosed to the public. However, the assemblers 
took that risk, since long-term relationships decreased the incentive to engage in 
opportunistic behaviour. Cooperation between assemblers and suppliers accelerated 
technological change and enhanced the flexibility of new technology development.87 
Aoki made a similar argument that the relationship among assemblers and suppliers 
was quasi-integration, which increased the efficiency of production and information 
diffusion.88   
The second point is that the interfirm relationships stimulated competition 
among suppliers. Examining the technological development of the automobile 
industry, much of the previous literature pointed out that the assemblers ranked their 
own suppliers based on past performance.89 The higher-ranked supplier received 
more benefits from its assembler than low-ranked suppliers did. Benefits included 
technological support, human resources, financial support, and a certain number of 
orders from the assembler. Low-ranked suppliers had to meet severe demands not 
only in price and quality but also in tightly appointed dates of delivery to raise their 
ranking, even if the order was not profitable. The result was fierce competition 
among the suppliers to raise their ranking. Additionally, the pace of innovation and 
new product development were accelerated. It was possible for assemblers to run 
several new product development projects simultaneously without internalising 
many resources because they had several suppliers working together.   
While long-term relationships facilitated technological innovation, they also 
                                                 
87 Imai, Nonaka, and Takeuchi, "Managing the New Product Development Process: How 
Japanese Companies Learn and Unlearn." 
88 Aoki, Information, Incentives, and Bargaining in the Japanese Economy, pp. 204-257. 
89 For instance, Nishiguchi, Strategic Industrial Sourcing: The Japanese Advantage, pp. 
116-119; Fujimoto, The Evolution of a Manufacturing System at Toyota, pp. 130-143. 
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disturbed the development of radical innovation. It was believed that long-term 
interfirm relationships were less flexible, and as a result Japanese firms were 
vulnerable to radical technological change.90 They could not flexibly change their 
business partners because of the long-term relationships they had established. Even 
though the assemblers had multiple parts suppliers, they did not frequently change 
their main supplier. As a result, it was difficult for Japanese firms to react flexibly to 
radical technological change and to produce radical innovation by changing their 
business partners. In contrast, since U.S. firms flexibly changed their business 
partners throughout the market, radical technological innovation by changing their 
business partners was relatively easy.  
 
 
                                                 
90 For example, Kagono et al., Strategic vs. Evolutionary Management: A U.S.-Japan 
Comparison of Strategy and Organisation; Cusumano, The Japanese Automobile Industry; 
Aoki, "Toward an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm." 
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2.3. Previous Studies and Research Questions 
 
As indicated in the first chapter, one contribution of this thesis lies in the 
sources that this research uses. This section, however, focuses on the relationship 
between the previous studies about technological change in Japan and the research 
question in this thesis.  
Firstly, as reviewed above, the technology intensive industries came to be 
competitive from the 1970s. Regarding the economic growth of post-war Japan, the 
government-led perspective remains strong, though many counterarguments exist. 
One reason is that the high economic growth period from 1955 to 1973 has received 
more attention than the period after the oil crises. However, previous arguments 
indicated that MITI’s intervention changed from direct to indirect, and its impact 
decreased after the 1970s. The optoelectronics industry also became an important 
sector of the national economy. This thesis examines the optoelectronics industry, 
which started industrialising and gained technological competitiveness after the oil 
crises. By examining the development of semiconductor laser technology, this thesis 
aims to provide a better understanding of how Japanese technology intensive 
industries have become competitive since the 1970s.  
Second, this study analyses relationships among competitors, the spillover 
effect, and technological innovation. Much discussion in the literature addresses the 
organisational setting of Japanese firms under the framework of “the Japanese 
management system.” The organisational settings are important supply side 
mechanisms pushing technological change to a certain pattern. Much of the previous 
literature has revealed how a certain set of organisational settings affected an 
individual Japanese firm’s R&D and led it toward a certain pattern such as 
incremental innovation. 
This thesis focuses on interactions among the competing firms by looking at 
spillover effects. It is important to examine the dynamic process in which the firms 
interacted through competition and to explore how a certain pattern of technological 
change emerged from their interactions. There is no literature discusssing the pattern 
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of technological development in post-war Japan in terms of the knowledge spillover 
effect in market competition.91 This thesis contributes to the studies by examining 
why competition was fierce, and how fierce competition contributed to technological 
innovation in Japanese industries.  
Additionally, this thesis pays strong attention to the fact that the firms chose 
similar strategies and fiercely competed in the same areas. The AIST surveyed key 
industrial technologies in 1983; their report concluded that firms’ competition in the 
same type of semiconductor laser contributed to technological development.92 
Certain externalities, which would not have existed with only one firm in the market, 
were induced through this competition. By examining this pattern of competition, 
the spillover effect, and its impact on technological development, this thesis aims to 
contribute to information about competition and technological innovation. This topic 
has not been addressed nearly as much as the organisational setting of Japanese 
firms, framed as the Japanese management system.  
 The third point involves the relationship between theoretical research on the 
economics of the technology-intensive industry and technological change, and 
previous research on technological change in post-war Japan. These industries 
became increasingly important after the 1960s, and economists began to study them 
and to provide useful perspectives. The interaction between the theoretical research 
and the previous research about technological change in post-war Japan, however, 
has been quite limited. One possible reason lies in the fact that much of the previous 
literature about technological change in Japan was limited to the unique features of 
the Japanese management system, to the exclusion of the possibility that new 
findings in the economics of technology-intensive industry could be enlightening. 
This study aims to bridge the gap between theoretical research about the economics 
                                                 
91 Examining the technological development of the pocket calculator industry, Numagami, 
Asaba, Shintaku, and Amikura studied the spillover effects among the competing firms. 
However, no English-language literature discusses spillover effects among the firms. 
Numagami et al., "Taiwa to Shite no Kyōsō (Competition in the Market as a Dialogue)." 
92 Kōgyō Gijutsuin Sōmubu Gijutsu Chōsaka (Agency of Industrial Science and 
Technology), Wagakuni Sangyō Gijutsu no Taishitsu to Kadai (Survey of Japanese 
Industrial Technology), p. 276. 
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of technology-intensive industries and empirical research about the competitiveness 
among those industries in Japan. Based on the important features of the 
technological industry described in the first chapter, this study examines how the 
semiconductor laser technology of Japanese firms became technologically 
competitive.   
 Lastly, the previous literature discussing research networks and technological 
change in post-war Japan has been limited. While there is much literature examining 
the government funded joint research projects, which the fourth chapter 
Semiconductor Laser Research Consortium will review, the literature on non-
governmental joint research and research networks in post-war Japan has been very 
limited. One of the possible reasons lies in the fact that Japanese engineers aquired 
important skills through OJT. It is reasonable to suppose that research networks did 
not play an important role in technological change in Japan. However, technology 
intensive industries rely substantially on the application of new science-based 
technologies to products or production processes. Therefore, this study aims to 
provide a better understanding of the relationship between research networks and 
technological change by examining the state of aggregate knowledge and research 
networks in the industry. 
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3. Human Capital and Research Networks 
 
 Science plays an important role in technology-intensive industry. As 
Griliches indicated, the R&D output of firms mainly depends on three factors, the 
state of aggregate knowledge in the industry, the level of conventional inputs of the 
firm and its specific knowledge capital of the firm.1  Scientific advancement and 
knowledge accumulation in basic research and development are the fundamental 
bases of technological development. This chapter discusses the research community 
and the state of aggregate knowledge in semiconductor laser technology.   
As the first chapter has shown, Japanese firms came to be competitive in 
semiconductor laser research and development in the early 1980s. One might 
speculate that the competitiveness of Japanese firms could be attributed to the 
Japanese research community’s superiority in certain ways over those of the U.S. 
and Europe. This chapter, however, shows that this assumption is incorrect. 
 This chapter consists of three sections. The first section describes the brief 
history of semiconductor laser research and examines the semiconductor laser 
research that physicists began in the 1950s in the U.S., Japan, the U.S.S.R., and 
Europe. The second section studies the human capital accumulation in 
semiconductor laser in the U.S., Japan, and Europe. Japan was still behind the U.S. 
and the U.S.S.R. in human capital accumulation in semiconductor laser technology, 
but began accelerating its accumulation in the 1970s. The third section investigates 
the collaborative research networks in those regions from 1963 through 1985. 
Previous literature in both history of science and technology and economics of 
                                                 
1 Griliches formulated the notion of externalities and productivity growth as follows.  
µγγ
aiii KKBXY
−= 1  
where iY is the output of the i th firm which depends on the level of conventional inputs iX , 
its specific knowledge capital iK , and on the state of aggregate knowledge in this industry 
aK . Note that constant returns are assumed in the firm’s own inputs, iX and iK .  
Griliches, "The Search for R&D Spillovers", pp.9-10. 
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technology has argued that inter-organisational collaborative networks are important 
institutions through which organisations can access complementary knowledge. This 
section shows that the inter-organisational research network in Japan was more 
limited in its scope and scale than those in the U.S. and Europe. Through the 
analyses of human capital accumulation and research networks in semiconductor 
laser technology, this chapter concludes that no evidence exists to show that Japan 
was more advanced or had a better research community than its counterparts. The 
findings in this chapter suggest that Japan attained technological development in 
semiconductor lasers and gained significant market share in the semiconductor laser 
and its application areas from the beginning of 1980s in spite of the fact that the 
human capital accumulation and the research network in semiconductor lasers were 
not specially advanced in Japan compared to those in the U.S. and Europe. 
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3.1. The Beginning of Semiconductor Laser Research 
 
The first theoretical conception of the laser originated with Albert Einstein, 
who presented the photoelectric effect in 1905, which became a fundamental 
theoretical backbone of the laser.2 Extending this theory, in 1917 Einstein predicted 
stimulated emission of radiation. This first theoretical finding, however, remained 
untouched until after World War II. 
Toward the end of the 1930s, German torpedoes began sinking U.S. ships. 
The U.S. government and military turned to the problem of how to protect their 
ships.3  The U.S. military began to mobilize physicists into the war and set clear 
research goals for them. It was the first time that governments used physics for their 
military strategic purposes on a large scale. The U.S. military set two goals for the 
physicists: (1) to develop the nuclear bomb and (2) to develop microwave radar. The 
first project was called “Manhattan Project.” In 1939, there was a rumour that the 
Nazis were developing an atomic bomb. It was necessary for the U.S. to build an 
atomic weapon before its enemies such as German or Japan did. The U.S. 
government initiated the Manhattan project under the Army Corps of Engineers in 
June 1942. The main target of the second project was to develop microwave for 
radars and weapons. Under the guidance of the government, the physicists began to 
develop various radio wave weapons such as electronically guided anti-aircraft guns 
and radar-guided bombing system with electromagnetic waves. All of them were 
microwave applications. The physicists struggled to develop (1) shorter wavelength 
and (2) higher output microwaves. A shorter wavelength could transmit more 
information. Higher output could reach a further point.   
This research in microwaves would lead to laser technology after the war. 
                                                 
2 This thesis is “Über die von der molekularkinetischen Theorie der Wärme geforderte 
Bewegung von in ruhenden Flüssigkeiten suspendierten Teilchen (On the Motion-Required 
by the Molecular Kinetic Theory of Heart- of Small Particles Suspended in a Stationary 
Liquid).” 
3 On the wartime research in applied physics, see Townes, How the Laser Happened: 
Adventures of a Scientist, pp.33-46. 
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With the financial support of the U.S. Air Force, Army, and Navy, in 1953 Charles H. 
Townes, a physicist at Columbia University, applied Einstein’s theory to invent the 
first maser, which was a device operating on principles similar to those of the laser, 
but producing microwave rather than optical radiation.4 This maser was not capable 
of continuous output, which was indispensable for the practical use of the 
photoelectric effect. U.S.S.R. physicists Nikolay Basov and Aleksandr Prokhorov 
independently solved this problem with the idea of Townes’s maser and attained 
continuous output.5  Based on these discoveries, physicists at many research 
institutes (e.g., MIT Lincoln Laboratories, IBM, Westinghouse, Siemens, RCA Labs, 
GE, Bell Laboratories, and Technical Research Group (TRG)) competed to amplify 
shorter wavelength light to produce visible light because the shorter the wavelength 
light, the more information could be transmitted.  
The winner of the competition was Gordon Gould, a graduate student of 
Columbia University. In 1957, he came up with a stimulated emission with shorter 
wavelength light and noted his idea in his notebook. He named this idea LASER 
(Light Amplified by Stimulated Emission of Radiation). But since Gould did not 
publish his idea and did not promptly apply for a patent, other physicists did not 
recognize his finding.6 They continued researching to develop shorter wavelength 
light. Townes and Arthur Schawlow also investigated the possibility of an optical 
maser, a prototype of the gas laser. They published the first detailed proposal for 
building an optical maser in Physical Review in 1958.7  
Theodore H. Mainman, an electronic engineer at Hughes Aircraft Research 
                                                 
4 On Townes and his works, see ibid. 
5 Townes, Basov, and Prokhorov won the Nobel Prize in Physics in 1964 for fundamental 
work in the field of quantum electronics. 
6 Gould brought his idea of a laser to TRG in New York. TRG and Gould presented their 
research proposal to the Department of Defense Advanced Research Project Agency to 
receive research funding. The agency accepted their research proposal and offered one 
million dollars to support Gould’s research at TRG. Gould and Townes went to court to 
claim their invention. Since Townes and his colleague Arthur L. Schawlow presented the 
laser light and applied for a patent in 1958, Gould went to court and appealed that the laser 
was his idea. The final judgment supported Gould’s appeal in 1977. Ibid., pp.101-104 and 
pp.120-124. 
7 Schawlow and Townes, "Infrared and Optical Maser." 
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Laboratories in California, used a solid body pink ruby to amplify visible light in 
1960.8  It was the first successful light amplification by stimulated emission of 
radiation. Because Mainman used a pink ruby to amplify the laser beam, it was 
named the “ruby laser.”  Many various lasers were developed after Maiman’s 
success.9 
These lasers were an important breakthrough in applied physics in the 20th 
century. It was regarded as “the greatest invention of the 20th century.” However, it 
was necessary for the practical use of the laser to overcome many technical obstacles. 
Among the technical problems, two problems especially needed to be solved for the 
practical use of the laser. The first was the size of the laser. The lasers developed by 
these physicists required a large-scale amplification facility to produce a laser beam. 
It was necessary to scale down the amplification facility. Otherwise, the application 
areas for the lasers would be seriously limited due to the large size facility. The 
second obstacle was the costs of production. For instance, Theodore Maiman used a 
solid body pink ruby, which was not cheap material, to amplify the laser beam. It 
was necessary to cut the production costs by both scaling down the amplification 
facility and reducing the material costs. 
It was predicted that a semiconductor laser might be able to solve these 
problems. A semiconductor laser needed a very small size amplification system of 
only one inch cubed. It used a semiconductor, which was supplied at a very 
reasonable price compared to other materials used for lasers, as its amplification 
mediation.  
The first theoretical idea of a semiconductor laser emerged in a letter written 
in 1953 by John von Neumann, a Hungarian mathematician.10 Neumann believed it 
                                                 
8 Despite the fact that Mainman successfully amplified the laser beam, his laser did not 
receive much attention. For instance, Physical Review rejected his article on the laser. 
Physical Review Letters also rejected his report of the ruby laser. Nature reviewed his laser 
with only three hundred words. 
9 For example, Ali Javan, William Bennet, and Donald Herriot developed the first gas laser 
by using helium and neon (He-Ne) in 1960. C. Kumar and N. Patel worked with carbon 
dioxide and developed carbon monoxide lasers which they mixed with nitrogen, helium, and 
water to fine-tune the laser properties. 
10 Grundmann, Nano-Optoelectronics: Concepts, Physics, and Devices, Nanoscience and 
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would be possible to attain stimulated emission with the use of a semiconductor; 
however, he did not present this idea at any academic society. The first publicly 
released material on light amplification using a semiconductor was a patent for a 
“semiconductor maser” granted to Nishizawa Junichi, a physicist at Tohoku 
University, in 1957. This maser, run with principles similar to those of the laser, 
reinforced the feasibility of stimulated emission in semiconductors. GE applied for a 
patent for the same idea in the U.S. eighteen days after Junichi’s application in Japan.  
Two years after the invention of the first laser in 1960, four different research 
groups almost simultaneously developed the semiconductor laser.11 In September 
1962, Gunther Fenner, a member of the research group headed by Robert N. Hall at 
the GE Development Centre, successfully operated the first semiconductor laser.12 A 
few weeks later, Nick Holonyak at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 
Marshall I. Nathan at the IBM Research Laboratory in Yorktown Heights, and 
Robert Rediker at the Lincoln Laboratory Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
independently developed the semiconductor laser.13 They were big breakthroughs in 
semiconductor laser technology. All the semiconductor lasers developed by those 
institutions, however, worked only a few seconds at the very low temperature of 
minus 196 degrees centigrade. Subsequently, physicists began competing to develop 
a semiconductor laser that would work at room temperature with high stability. 
Physicists began to research semiconductor lasers from the end of the 1950s. 
However, both the number of the researchers researching semiconductor lasers and 
the research outcomes were fairly limited. It was not until the late 1960s that 
physicists regularly released their research in academic journals. Figure 3-1 shows 
the number of articles on the semiconductor laser published in the Journal of 
                                                                                                                                         
Technology, p.3. 
11 Holonyak and Bevacqua, "Coherent (Visible) Light Emission from Ga(As1-Xpx) 
Junctions"; Quist et al., "Semiconductor Maser of GaAs"; Nathan et al., "Stimulated 
Emission of Radiation from GaAs P-N Junctions"; Hall et al., "Coherent Light Emission 
from GaAs Junctions." 
12 Hall et al., "Coherent Light Emission from GaAs Junctions." 
13 Quist et al., "Semiconductor Maser of GaAs"; Nathan et al., "Stimulated Emission of 
Radiation from GaAs P-N Junctions"; Holonyak and Bevacqua, "Coherent (Visible) Light 
Emission from Ga(As1-Xpx) Junctions."    
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Applied Physics and Journal of Applied Physics Letters, two widely recognized 
international journals in applied physics published by the American Institute of 
Physics. Since 1931, two issues of the Journal of Applied Physics have been 
published per month to provide a better understanding of the physics underlying 
modern technology.  Since 1962, the weekly journal Applied Physics Letters has 
offered up-to-date reports on new experimental and theoretical findings in applied 
physics. 
 
Figure 3-1: Number of Semiconductor Laser Publications  
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In both journals, the first papers about the semiconductor laser were published in 
1963. But it was not until the 1970s that physicists regularly released their findings 
on the semiconductor laser, indicating that during this time they were beginning to 
conduct their research in “open science,” features the principle of research outcome 
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disclosure.14  
                                                 
14 On the discussion about the open science, see Dasgupta and David, "Toward a New 
Economics of Science"; David, "Common Agency Contracting and the Emergence of "Open 
Science" Institutions." 
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3.2. Accumulation of Human Capital 
 
The state of aggregate knowledge in the industry strongly affects the R&D 
output of a firm. This section looks at the state of knowledge in semiconductor laser 
technology by examining the number of physicists who received doctoral degrees in 
semiconductor laser studies. Since semiconductor laser technology requires highly 
complex and detailed expertise in applied physics, the number of doctoral degree-
holders in semiconductor laser can serve as an indicator of human capital 
accumulation in semiconductor laser technology. The Bibliography of Doctoral 
Theses on Semiconductor Lasers reveals the number of doctoral degrees in 
semiconductor laser technology issued throughout the world.15   
It must be noted that there might be several biases in using the number of 
doctoral degrees to estimate the accumulation of human capital. Firstly, because 
countries did not necessarily adopt the same educational and academic system, there 
are institutional differences in their academic systems. For instance, there are two 
types of doctoral degree in Japan. The first is the doctoral degree that one can 
receive by completing the required courses and a doctoral thesis in a certain period 
of time, which is usually from 5 to 8 years. This type of doctoral degree is listed as 
“the first (Kō).”The second, which is listed as “the second (Otsu)”, is for those who 
do not receive “the first” doctoral degree. This type of doctoral degree is given to 
those who did not receive “the first” doctoral degree but published prominent 
scholarly achievements, which can be conceived as an equal achievement to a 
doctoral thesis. This distinction reflects the fact that the doctoral degree used to be 
regarded as an honour given to someone regarded as a prominent scholar in his 
field.16 Therefore, the number of doctoral degree holders might be biased toward 
being smaller in this social and academic system, compared to the U.S., which had 
                                                 
15 Takahashi, Bibliography of Doctoral Theses on Semiconductor Lasers; Takahashi,  
Bibliography of Doctoral Theses on Semiconductor Lasers II. 
16 For the overview of the academic system in science and technology area and how to use 
published papers in those fields, see Ueda et al., eds. Rikōgaku Bunken no Tokushoku to 
Riyōhō (Handbook of Literature in Science and Technology). 
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no such distinction in the doctoral degree. However, this institutional difference was 
bigger in the arts and social science areas than in the natural science. 
Secondly, since scientists and engineers who have been involved in 
semiconductor laser research are not necessarily limited to those with doctoral 
degrees, it would be preferable to examine the number of bachelor and master 
degrees in semiconductor laser technology. However, no systematic and consistent 
data identifies the number of students specialising in semiconductor laser in 
undergraduate and master degree programs because it is difficult to trace students’ 
specialities in more detail than physics in undergraduate and master courses. 
Another possible limitation might be the institutional difference in academics (e.g., 
in the procedures and conditions in conferring a doctoral degree). Researchers in 
different countries might have different preferences for receiving a doctoral degree. 
Despite these points, the Bibliography of Doctoral Theses on Semiconductor Lasers 
has provided the best systematic and consistent data about human capital 
accumulation in semiconductor laser thus far. 
Figure 3-2 plots the cumulative number of doctoral degree holders in 
semiconductor laser technology in the top seven countries in terms of the number of 
doctoral degree holders in the world. The first doctor degrees in semiconductor 
lasers were granted in France and Russia in 1963.  The first such degree in Japan 
was granted in 1966. 
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Figure 3-2: Accumulative Number of Doctoral Degrees 
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Source: Takahashi, Bibliography of Doctoral Theses on Semiconductor Lasers II. 
 
Clearly, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have been the two leaders in human capital 
accumulation in semiconductor lasers since 1965. Japan was one of the countries in 
the second group in the 1960s, and in the 1970s, the number of doctoral degrees 
began increasing in Japan. Japan was diverging from the second group and 
increasing at the same ratio as the two leading countries. However, a certain 
difference existed in the total number of doctors between the leading countries and 
Japan, even though the difference was decreasing somewhat.  
 The following figure shows the accumulative number of doctoral degrees per 
capita. This figure provides a slightly different view on human capital accumulation 
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in semiconductor lasers. The U.S. was not the leading country in the human capital 
accumulation per capita. Japan became the second largest country after U.S.S.R. in 
1983. However, it did not stand out from other rival countries until the 1980s. 
 
Figure 3-3: Accumulative Number of Doctoral Degrees Per Capita 
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Source: Takahashi, Bibliography of Doctoral Theses on Semiconductor Lasers II. U.S. 
Census Bureau, International Data Base (IDB). 
 
The following table indicates the top ten research institutions in the cumulative 
number of doctoral degrees specialising in semiconductor laser studies.   
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Table 3-1: Top 10 Institutions in the Cummulative Number of Doctoral Degrees 
Granted 1965-1985 
 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 
P.N. Lebedev Physics Institute (USSR) 3 20 30 36 48 
A.F. Ioffe Physicotechnical Institute (USSR) 0 5 12 22 37 
University of Illinois at Urban-Champaign (US) 1 9 17 23 33 
Tokyo Institute of Technology (Japan) 0 1 3 9 28 
The University of Tokyo (Japan) 0 3 7 13 19 
University of California, Berkeley (US) 1 2 4 11 18 
California Institute of Technology (US) 0 1 3 8 18 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (US) 0 3 7 12 18 
Osaka University (Japan) 0 1 4 7 14 
Humboldt University, Berlin (Germany) 0 1 2 5 13 
Source: Takahashi, Bibliography of Doctoral Theses on Semiconductor Lasers II. 
 
The P.N. Lebedev Physics Institute and the University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign (UIUC) were the two leading institutions until the mid-1970s, when the 
A.F. Ioffe Physicotechnical Institute overtook UIUC. The Tokyo Institute of 
Technology increased the number of doctoral degrees granted in the late 1970s and 
ranked fourth in 1981. The human capital accumulations in the semiconductor laser 
at the institutional level indicate that Japanese institutions were not at the head, but 
they were among the leading institutions. The evidence indicates two important 
points: 
 [3-1] The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. were the two leading countries in human capital 
accumulation in semiconductor laser technology.   
 [3-2] Although Japan accelerated its human capital accumulation from the 
1970s, it was not the leading country in human capital accumulation in 
semiconductor laser technology. 
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3.3 Collaborative Research and Networks 
 
Many studies in the history and sociology of science and technology 
suggest that science and technology are dependent on each other, and both scientific 
and technological knowledge involve interaction among scientists and engineers. 17 
Technological spillover, which creates positive externalities for innovation, is an 
important factor of technological progress and requires that scientists and engineers 
collaborate, sharing complementary knowledge. The previous research suggests that 
networking among scientists and engineers enhances knowledge spillover and 
contributes to technological development.18  
No single measurement casts light on every aspect of collaboration between 
scientists and engineers. This thesis uses co-author publication as a proxy measure 
for collaboration among scientists and engineers. Co-publication can be considered 
evidence of collaborative research.19 It, however, has limitations in measuring 
collaborative research in academics.20 First, co-publication does not capture informal 
collaborative research, which usually does not appear in academic journals.21 
Collaborative research can take various forms from a formally organized research 
consortium to casual conversation among scientists and engineers. Secondly, co-
                                                 
17 Bijker, Hughes, and Pinch, The Social Construction of Technological Systems: New 
Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology; Latour, "Give Me a Laboratory and I 
Will Raise the World"; MacKenzie, "Missile Accuracy: A Case Study in the Social Processes 
of Technological Change"; Merton, "Priorities in Scientific Discovery: A Chapter in the 
Sociology of Science"; Mulkay, Science and the Sociology of Knowledge, Controversies in 
Sociology; Fleming and Sorenson, "Science As a Map in Technological Search." For the 
recent literature on the relationship between science and technology, see Murray, 
"Innovation as Co-Evolution of Scientific and Technological Networks: Exploring Tissue 
Engineering." 
18 David, "Knowledge Property and the System Dynamics of Technological Change"; Dietz 
and Bozeman, "Academic Careers, Patents, and Productivity: Industry Experience as 
Scientific and Technical Human Capital." 
19 Smith, "The Trend toward Multiple Authorship in Psychology." 
20 On the previous researches on collaborative research and their problem, see Katz and 
Martin, "What is Research Collaboration?" 
21 On informal know-how trading, see Von Hippel, "Cooperation between Rivals: Informal 
Know-How Trading." Von Hippel interviewed engineers of competing firms in the U.S. 
steel minimill firms and observed the informal know-how trading among them. 
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publication does not measure collaborative research that was not successful, since 
the published article is usually a result of successful research. Thirdly, co-
publication does not allow the investigation of micro-level qualitative aspects of 
collaborative research, although it is possible to infer the intensity of a collaborative 
research network by counting the number of co-publications from a given pair of 
scientists. It is, for example, difficult to see the process of collaborative research and 
the contribution of each collaborator. Furthermore, Katz and Martin maintained that 
the definition of “collaborative research” is not perfectly definable because 
collaborative research can be conducted at several levels (e.g., individual, research 
group, institutional, and country).22  
Despite these limitations, co-publication data has been the most widely 
used method to analyse collaborative research. It provides systematic and consistent 
data, and it is less expensive than interviews or questionnaires. To examine co-
publication, this thesis uses the Journal of Applied Physics and the Journal of 
Applied Physics Letters, which are widely recognized international journals in 
applied physics. Since these journals are published by an American academic society, 
U.S.S.R. researchers did not publish their studies in these journals for political 
reasons. Therefore, it should be noted that these journals do not provide any data 
about collaborative research in the U.S.S.R. Table 3-2 shows the number of articles 
and co-publications on the semiconductor laser in the Journal of Applied Physics 
and the Journal of Applied Physics Letters over the period 1962-1985. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22 Katz and Martin pointed out the problem of the definition. Katz and Martin, "What is 
Research Collaboration?", pp.11-13. 
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Table 3-2: Number of Articles and Co-Publications 1962-1985 
 JAP JAPL 
Total Number of Articles on Semiconductor Laser 356 761 
Number of Co-Publications 280 691 
Number of Single Author Publications  76 70 
Number of Intra-Organisational Co-publications 241 602 
Number of Inter-Organisational Co-Publications23 39 89 
Source: Journal of Applied Physics, 1962-1985. Journal of Applied Physics Letters, 1962-
1985. 
 
This table reveals that the most of the articles were co-publications. From 1962 to 
1985, 356 papers in the Journal of Applied Physics and 761 papers in the Journal of 
Applied Physics Letters were about semiconductor laser technology. Seventy-nine 
percent of all semiconductor laser papers (i.e., 280 papers) were co-publications in 
the Journal of Applied Physics. The Journal of Applied Physics Letters had a higher 
percentage of co-publications (91 percent). These figures suggest that co-publication 
was dominant in semiconductor laser research. 
Collaborative research, however, was limited to the scientists and engineers 
who belonged to the same institution. Katz and Martin maintained that many 
different levels of collaboration exist.24 They introduced inter and intra distinctions 
of collaboration. This thesis focuses on inter-organisational collaboration. The last 
two rows in Table 3-1 indicate both intra- and inter-organisational co-publications in 
the Journal of Applied Physics and the Journal of Applied Physics Letters. From 
1962 to 1985, 39 inter-organisational co-publications (11 percent) appeared in the 
Journal of Applied Physics, and 89 (12 percent) were published in the Journal of 
Applied Physics Letters.   
Table 3-3 shows the number of organisations involved in inter-
                                                 
23 A research consortium was launched in Japan in 1979. The consortium published 2 
articles in the Journal of Applied Physics Letters in 1984 and in 1985. Since they were 
published under the name of the consortium, this chapter does not count them as inter-
organisational co-publications. The consortium will be closely examined in the next chapter. 
24 Katz and Martin, "What is Research Collaboration?", pp.5-8. 
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organisational collaborative research and the number of inter-organisational co-
publications. It counts the number of inter-organisational co-publication on 
semiconductor laser technology published in Journal of Applied Physics and Journal 
of Applied Physics Letters from 1962-1985. 
 
Table 3-3: Number of Organisations and Inter-Organisational Co-Publications 
1962-1985
25
 
 JAP JAPL 
The U.S. 
Number of Organisations Involved in Inter-Organisational 
Co-Publications 
16 23 
Number of Inter-Organisational Co-Publications 32 70 
Japan 
Number of Organisations Involved in Inter-Organisational 
Co-Publications 
2 14 
Number of Inter-Organisational Co-Publications 2 8 
Europe 
Number of Organisations Involved in Inter-Organisational 
Co-Publications 
8 17 
Number of Inter-Organisational Co-Publications 5 14 
Source: Journal of Applied Physics, 1962-1985. Journal of Applied Physics Letters, 1962-
1985. 
 
The first row for each region indicates the number of institutions involved in inter-
organisational co-publication. The second row signifies the number of inter-
organisational co-publications in the journals from 1962 to1985. These figures 
reveal that the U.S. institutions dominated inter-organisational collaborative research 
in both journals.  
There are two different types of collaborative connections in the inter-
organisational collaboration network; direct collaborative connection and indirect 
connection, which can provide participating organisations with different types of 
                                                 
25 Because some of the inter-organisational co-publications in the JAPL were inter-regional, 
they are counted in each region. Therefore, the total number of inter-organisational co-
publications in the JAPL does not match with Table 3-2. 
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benefits.26  The direct connection refers to the number of direct linkages maintained 
by an organisation. Organisations can share the R&D facility and avoid excessive 
investment through direct collaboration. Direct connections can also provide 
knowledge spillovers. The indirect connection is the number of organisations that a 
given organisation can indirectly reach in the network through its partners and their 
partners. The indirect connection of the network can provide informal access to 
complementary knowledge and information leakage, while it cannot provide formal 
resource-sharing benefits.27 Figure 3-3 illustrates an example of the inter-
organisational network.  Organisation A has two direct connections with 
organisations B and C on the one hand.  It has seven indirect connections with 
organisation D, E, F, G, H, I, and J on the other hand. 
  
Figure 3-4: Direct and Indirect Connections 
 
Figures 3-4, 5, and 6 illustrate collaborative networks in the U.S., Japan, and 
Europe.28 Calculating from all inter-organisational co-authored papers on 
                                                 
26 Gautam nicely reviews direct ties and indirect ties of the network. Gautam, "Collaboration 
Networks, Structural Holes, and Innovation: A Longitudinal Study." 
27 Noting that strong social relationships would not supply much diversified knowledge, 
Granovetter argued that the weak ties would enable the reaching of knowledge that was not 
accessible via strong ties. Granovetter, "The Strength of Weak Ties." 
28 These figures were processed with a network analysis software, UCINET. Borgatti, 
Everett, and Freeman, UCINET 6.0 Version 1.00. Appendix II lists all the institutions 
involved in inter-organisational co-publication. It also indicates the number of 
H 
B 
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F J 
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semiconductor laser technology published in the Journal of Applied Physics and the 
Journal of Applied Physics Letters from 1965 to 1985, these figures plot the 
organisations that were involved in inter-organisational collaborative research. 
Organisations involved in the collaborative research are connected with their 
partners. These figures visualize both the direct connections and the indirect 
connections of the social networks in those regions, which allow one to see the 
actual collaborative networks. The coloured circles denote the organisations in the 
region titled in the figure. The colourless circles denote the organisations in other 
regions. The number indicated on the connection signifies the number of inter-
organisational co-publications that the organisations published in the Journal of 
Applied Physics and the Journal of Applied Physics Letters from 1965 to 1985. A 
greater number of the circles indicate that the inter-organisational collaborative 
network was widely developed. If the network was smaller in scope but denser, we 
observe the smaller number of the circle and the greater number of the lines 
connecting to the circles. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-5: The U.S. Collaborative Organisational Networks 
                                                                                                                                         
interorganisational-co-publications that each institution published in the journals. 
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Source: Journal of Applied Physics, 1965-1985 and Journal of Applied Physics Letters, 
1965-1985. Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman, UCINET 6.0 Version 1.00. 
 
This figure demonstrates the collaborative research network of the U.S. 
organisations. The University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign was an important hub 
connecting the organisations. Both Bell laboratories and Xerox were also a hub 
connecting the research organisations. No such research institution existed either in 
Japan or in Europe. The U.S. organisations developed thicker and wider networks, 
compared to those of Japan and Europe (Figures 3-5 and 3-6). 
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Figure 3-6: Japanese Collaborative Organisational Networks 
 
Source: Journal of Applied Physics, 1965-1985 and Journal of Applied Physics Letters, 
1965-1985. Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman, UCINET 6.0 Version 1.00. 
 
Figure 3-5 shows that the collaborative networks in Japan were much more scattered 
than those of the U.S. were.29 The number of organisations and the number of the 
lines linking organisations together were smaller than those of the U.S. were. 
Furthermore, all of the connections were one-to-one institutional relationships, and 
most of the networks were domestic.30 Hitachi was the only institution that 
                                                 
29 It should be noted that one informal research workshop about the semiconductor 
compound was organized by a few physicists. This workshop, called “Shimoda Workshop,” 
was annually held a few days each winter, beginning in the early 1980s. Approximately 50 
young engineers from different rival firms and different universities came to this workshop 
to discuss technology. Interviewee D, E, and G. On the interviewees, see Appendix III. 
30 Examining international and intranational knowledge spillover in the U.S. and Japan, 
Branstetter found strong evidence of intranational knowledge spillovers in both the U.S. and 
Japan. The evidence that Japanese firms benefit positively from research undertaken by U.S. 
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conducted international collaborative work. No institution in Japan had a research 
network with several institutions as the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign did 
in the United States.   
 
Figure 3-7: Europe Collaborative Organisational Networks 
 
Source: Journal of Applied Physics, 1965-1985 and Journal of Applied Physics Letters, 
1965-1985. Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman, UCINET 6.0 Version 1.00. 
 
Figure 3-6 plots the research networks in Europe. Europe had more networks than 
Japan did. The number of networks and the scope of each network were smaller than 
those of the U.S. were.   
                                                                                                                                         
firms was limited. Branstetter also observed that there was no evidence showing that the U.S. 
firms benefited positively from research undertaken by Japanese firms. His argument on 
knowledge spillover in the U.S. and Japan suggested that knowledge spillovers were more 
intranational than international. Branstetter, "Are Knowledge Spillovers International or 
Intranational in Scope? Microeconometric Evidence from the U.S. and Japan." 
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 Table 3-4 summarizes the inter-organisational collaborative networks. The 
first and second rows show the scale of the research network. The large number of 
inter-organisational co-publications suggests that much technological knowledge 
was developed in the networks. Both the number of co-publications and the number 
of institutions reflect the scale of the research networks. The number of links 
denotes the lines connecting the institutions. The large number of links indicates that 
the network was densely and widely developed.  
 
Table 3-4: Scale and Scope of Research Networks 
 The U.S. Japan Europe 
Number of Inter-Organisational Co-Publications 199 18 34 
Number of Institutions 56 19 34 
Number of Links 49 14 28 
Source: Journal of Applied Physics, 1965-1985 and Journal of Applied Physics Letters, 
1965-1985.  
 
This table indicates that the collaborative research networks of the U.S. 
organisations were more intense and wider in scope. The U.S. organisations were 
involved in inter-organisational collaborative research more than Japanese and 
European firms were. 
This evidence reveals one important point: 
 
 [3-3] The formal inter-organisational collaboration in semiconductor laser 
technology was more developed in the U.S. than in Japan and Europe.  
 
Why was inter-organisational collaboration in semiconductor laser 
technology more developed in the U.S. than in Japan and Europe? One of the central 
motivations behind inter-organisational collaboration is to gain complementary 
knowledge. As a firm grows complementary knowledge in its R&D divisions, it gets 
less motivation to conduct inter-organisational collaboration. Given that, the 
difference in the inter-organisational collaboration between the U.S., Japan, and 
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Europe might be attributed to differences in the resource allocation of the firms in 
those regions. If Japanese firms tended to internalise complementary technological 
knowledge more than the U.S. and European firms did, Japanese firms would have 
less incentive to conduct inter-organisational collaboration than did the U.S. and 
European firms. Since there has been no empirical study discussing it, this question 
still needs more detailed empirical examination. It might be attributed to socio-
cultural factors such as research community ethos. It might be attributed to the 
career and incentive structure of corporate engineers and university scientists. The 
central point of this section is, however, that inter-organisational collaboration, an 
important route to access outside complementary knowledge, was not used much in 
Japan compared to the U.S. and Europe. 
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3.4. Conclusion 
 This chapter examines human capital accumulation and research networks in 
the U.S., Japan, and Europe. First, it shows that physicists began semiconductor 
laser research in the 1950s, but not until the 1970s did physicists regularly publish 
their research in academic journals. Second, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. were the two 
leading countries in human capital accumulation in semiconductor laser technology. 
While the number of doctoral degrees began increasing in the mid-1970s in Japan, 
the total number was still behind these two countries. Third, this chapter examines 
the collaborative research networks in the U.S., Japan, and Europe. The fact that the 
majority of papers published in the Journal of Applied Physics and the Journal of 
Applied Physics Letters were co-publications suggests that technological knowledge 
about the semiconductor laser was developed mainly through teamwork among 
physicists. And the fact that the inter-organisational co-publication in these journals 
was quite limited suggests that interaction among the physicists was mainly limited 
to intra-institutional collaboration. Finally, the chapter examines the collaborative 
networks in the U.S., Japan, and Europe. Even though it must be noted that the co-
authored papers allows us to examine only the formal inter-organisational 
collaborative research, it reveals that networks in Japan were smaller and more 
dispersed in scale and scope than those in the U.S. and Europe. These findings are 
summarized as follows. 
  
 [3-1] The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. were the two leading countries in human capital 
accumulation in semiconductor laser technology.   
 [3-2] Although Japan accelerated its human capital accumulation from the 1970s, 
it was not the leading country in human capital accumulation in semiconductor 
laser technology. 
 [3-3] The formal inter-organisational collaboration in semiconductor laser 
technology was more developed in the U.S. than in Japan and Europe.  
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These findings indicate that the U.S. firms were in a better position to access 
outside complementary knowledge. It casts doubt on the argument that Japan had a 
better research community than its counterparts, while the human capital 
accumulation in semiconductor laser technology in Japan began rapidly increasing 
in the mid-1970s. These findings also suggest that Japan attained technological 
development in semiconductor lasers and gained significant market share in the 
semiconductor laser and its application areas from the beginning of the 1980s in 
spite of the fact that the human capital accumulation and research networks in 
semiconductor lasers were not specially advanced in Japan compared to those in the 
U.S. and Europe. The fifth chapter, Competition, Knowledge Spillover, and 
Innovation, will revisit these points to discuss patterns of knowledge spillover in the 
U.S. and Japan. It will analyse how the less developed research network was one of 
the important institutional conduits leading firms to compete in the same product 
markets. 
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4. Semiconductor Laser Research Consortium: the 
OMCS Project 
 
As shown in the previous chapters, the U.S., European, and Japanese firms 
began basic R&D in semiconductor lasers from the 1960s. However, the firms’ R&D 
was still at a nascent level in the 1970s.1 In this context, the Japanese government 
launched a research consortium in 1979, which aimed to develop the basic 
technologies for semiconductor lasers. Examining various optoelectronics 
technological areas such as optical fibre, optical storage, and optical sensors, the 
JTEC report put an emphasis on the fact that the government-launched joint research 
consortium of 1979, Optical Measurement and Control System (OMCS), had played 
an important role in spurring the technological and industrial development of the 
semiconductor laser.2 It, however, did not clearly explain how the research 
consortium contributed to the competitiveness of Japan’s semiconductor laser 
technology.  
A consortium is an organised form of collective action, which brings 
together multiple organisations (e.g., firms, universities, and government research 
institutions) under one organisational umbrella, and the participants conduct 
cooperative R&D. A central challenge of research consortia is the promotion of 
inter-organisational learning for the benefit of all participants. Whereas the previous 
research has listed such advantages of cooperative R&D as cost- and risk-sharing,3 
this chapter pays attention to technological spillover and competition enhancement. 
                                                 
1 Examining the commercialising process of nascent technology, Wood and Brown divided 
the process into three stages: appropriation, implementation, and manufacture. The R&D in 
semiconductor lasers was categorized as being in the first stage, which involves monitoring, 
assessing, and capturing new technologies. On the phases of R&D, see Wood and Brown, 
"Commercializing Nascent Technology: The Case of Laser Diodes at Sony." 
2 Forrest et al., JTEC Panel on Optoelectronics in Japan and the United States Final Report, 
pp.xviii-xix. 
3 For example, Katz et al., "R and D Cooperation and Competition"; Odagiri, Nakamura, 
and Shibuya, "Research Consortia as a Vehicle for Basic Research: The Case of a Fifth 
Generation Computer Project in Japan." 
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It focuses on the fact that the participating firms were rivals in the product market 
and addresses the following points: 
 
 [4-1] The participating firms underinvested in R&D of the consortium because 
they were rivals in the product market. As a result, no important technology was 
produced in the consortium. 
 [4-2] The fact that direct rivals were participating in the consortium became the 
institutional conduit for competition and stimulated competition in certain 
technological areas.  
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4.1 Previous Research and Approach 
Research Consortia 
Since the late 1960s, governments of developed countries have adopted 
joint research projects.4 The best-known cooperative R&D project in Japan is the 
VLSI (Very Large Scale Integrated circuit) project, which was launched in 1975 to 
help Japanese firms compete with their rivals. Another example is the SEMATECH 
(Semiconductor Manufacturing Technology), which imitated the VLSI project and 
was established in the U.S. in 1988.5  
Analysing research consortia since the 1970s, economists have indicated 
that the R&D incentive of a firm and the public R&D incentive tend to be 
divergent.6  In other words, the private R&D of a firm in the market economy is not 
likely to achieve a socially desirable level of R&D. Arrow contended that 
technological knowledge, which is the main output of R&D, can be non-exclusively 
used by others.7 Expanding on Arrow’s argument, Spence asserted that non-
excludability produced market failure in corporate R&D.8 If a single firm undertakes 
                                                 
4 Aldrich and Sasaki have done a comparative study of research consortia in the U.S. and 
Japan. Aldrich and Sasaki, "R&D Consortia in the United States and Japan." Ham, Linden, 
and Appleyard also examined research consortia in the U.S. and Japan in semiconductor 
technology. Ham, Linden, and Appleyard, "The Evolving Role of Semiconductor Consortia 
in the United States and Japan." 
5 On the VLSI project see, Sakakibara, "Soshiki to Inobēshon: Jirei Kenkyū Chō LSI Gijutsu 
Kenkyū Kumiai (Organisation and Innovation: Case Study, VLSI Consrotium)." On the 
SEMATECH project, see Grindley, Mowery, and Silverman, "SEMATECH and 
Collaborative Research: Lessons in the Design of High-Technology Consortia." Yamamura 
examined the differences in Antitrust law and discussed how the differences affected joint 
research projects in the U.S. and Japan. Yamamura, "Joint Research and Antitrust: Japanese 
vs. American Strategies." 
6 Katz reviewed the sources of the divergence: technological spillover, access to 
complementary technologies and products, government policies, and ability to sell R&D 
results. Katz et al., "R and D Cooperation and Competition", pp.138-139. 
7 Arrow also emphasised that knowledge is characterised by a greater degree of uncertainty, 
indivisibility, and asymmetry than other types of economic goods. On non-excludability and 
externality of technological information, see Arrow, "Economic Welfare and the Allocation 
of Resources for Invention." 
8 On market failure in R&D, see Spence, "Cost Reduction, Competition, and Industry 
Performance." 
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R&D and if technological information produced by the R&D is distributed to other 
firms, resources necessary for the R&D will be socially utilized. However, the firm 
does not have a strong incentive to become involved in the R&D because of the non-
excludability of technological information. The R&D incentive of a firm depends on 
the extent of appropriability of R&D benefits and business opportunity. It is difficult 
for a firm to garner all the profit from the R&D results. Therefore, the benefits 
available to the innovator are usually smaller than the social benefits from R&D.9 
Since the appropriability of innovation is not always perfect to a firm, it has an 
incentive to lower the level of R&D investment. As a result, a socially desirable 
level of R&D is not realised.   
By contrast, a separate line of research has indicated that private R&D 
investments may be excessive, beyond the socially desirable level of R&D 
investments. Dasgupta and Stiglitz contended that when multiple firms undertake 
R&D in the same technological area, the first successful firm is likely to take most 
of the profit from R&D.10 If rival firms increase their level of R&D investments, the 
possibility that other firms will win the R&D race diminishes. Therefore, firms have 
an incentive to rush to increase their level of R&D investments. R&D competition 
then becomes socially redundant and involves excessive investment. 
Although their arguments differ, economists seem to agree that private 
R&D competition leads to market failure. Thus, some contend that a research 
consortium may offer a solution. If firms can share R&D costs through a research 
consortium and if they can secure appropriability of technology in the consortium, 
the desirable level of R&D investment can be achieved. A research consortium can 
also solve redundant excessive investment in the same technological areas. This 
argument offers justification for governments to launch research consortia.  Previous 
                                                 
9 For example, Bernstein and Nadiri empirically examined the divergence between the social 
returns and the returns that the firm could gain from R&D. They showed that the social 
benefits were greater than the private benefits. Bernstein and Nadiri. "Interindustry R&D 
Spillovers, Rates of Return, Andproduction in High-Tech Industries." Katz summarized four 
different sources of divergence between private and social incentives to conduct R&D. Katz 
et al., "R and D Cooperation and Competition", pp.138-139. 
10 This phenomenon is sometimes called diseconomies of common pool. See Dasgupta and 
Stiglitz, "Industrial Structure and the Nature of Innovative Activity." 
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research maintained that a research consortium could allow sharing fixed costs of 
R&D, realize economies of scale in R&D, secure appropriability of technology, and 
help attain a socially desirable level of R&D. 
Katz, however, developed a counterargument against this viewpoint.11 
Indicating that a research consortium does not necessarily solve market failures, he 
discussed that the portfolio of participating firms plays an important role in the 
performance of joint research. When the level of product market competition among 
participating firms is intense and when the level of spillover potential in a research 
consortium is low, firms underinvest in the consortium. 
 Using Katz’s arguments as a basis, Branstetter and Sakakibara examined 
large-sample Japanese government-sponsored research consortia and came to two 
conclusions: (1) higher potential spillover produced a higher level of R&D 
productivity; (2) a higher level of competition in the product market among the 
participants decreased the research productivity of the research consortium and the 
participants.12 They also concluded that government sponsorship in Japan generally 
increased the R&D productivity of the participating firms because of the high level 
of spillover potential and the low level of product market competition. With this 
study, Branstetter and Sakakibara provided an important ground sketch of the 
research consortia in Japan. Unfortunately, however, since their data covers only the 
consortia launched from 1980 to 1990, the OMCS project launched in 1977 was not 
included in their study.  
The OMCS project had two unique characteristics that research consortia 
examined by Branstetter and Sakakibara did not have. The first involved the 
characteristics of the participating firms. Branstetter and Sakakibara pointed out that 
in selecting participants for the consortia, MITI has generally sought to bring 
together firms with complementary research assets since the early 1980s. In other 
words, beginning in the early 1980s, MITI has avoided selecting rival firms whose 
                                                 
11 Katz, "An Analysis of Cooperative Research and Development"; Katz et al., "R and D 
Cooperation and Competition." 
12 Branstetter and Sakakibara, "When Do Research Consortia Work Well and Why? 
Evidence from Japanese Panel Data", p.157. 
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research assets are substitutive. However, in selecting participants for the OMCS 
project, MITI selected direct rivals in the product market. The second characteristic 
involved the organisational structure of the research consortium. The OMCS project 
was the first consortium to have a joint laboratory in which participating firms 
worked together.13 Since a central challenge of research consortia is the promotion 
of inter-organisational learning from which participants can benefit, this 
organisational structure designed to promote interaction among the participating 
engineers was important.   
 
Approach 
The previous research about the OMCS has been limited. The only detailed 
studies of the OMCS project were conducted by Merz and Īzuka.14 Since both Merz 
and Īzuka were the OMCS participating engineers, their studies provided important 
and valuable insights on the OMCS. However, no attempt has been made to examine 
the OMCS from the standingpoint of economics. 
The approach for analysing the research consortium basically follows Katz, 
Branstetter, and Sakakibara: it focuses on the level of product market competition 
among participating firms and the level of spillover potential in a research 
consortium. It also follows the basic framework to analyse the collective action 
along the lines developed by Mancur Olson. Focusing on the logical basis of 
organized collective action, Olson provided a theoretical framework to analyse 
collective action.15 Since a research consortium, in which participants pursue the 
same R&D goal in a certain period, is certainly collective action, it takes his 
                                                 
13 The VLSI project also had a joint laboratory in which the participating firms worked. 
However, no research team existed in which the engineers from the different participating 
firms worked together in the VLSI project. Wakasugi and Gotō, "Kyōdō Kenkyū Kaihatsu to 
Gijutsu Kakushin (Collaborative R&D and Technological Innovation)." 
14 Merz, "The Optoelectronics Joint Research Laboratory: Light Shed on Cooperative 
Research in Japan"; Īzuka, "Erekutoronikusu Bunya ni Okeru Dōgyōshakan no Kyōdō 
Kenkyū Kaihatsu (Joint Research Projct among Competing Frms in the Electronics Area)." 
15 Olson, The Logic of Collective Action; Public Goods and the Theory of Groups; Olson, 
The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities. 
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perspective on collective action to study the OMCS project.  
First, it describes the foundation and structure of the OMCS project in order 
to examine the level of spillover potential. Then, using patent and patent citation 
data, this thesis examines the extent to which the consortium produced important 
technological innovation.16 Because of the lack of a patent citation database in the 
Japan Patent Office, no studies use patent citation data to analyse technological 
change in Japan.  Research about research consortia in Japan has simply used the 
number of patent applications as an indicator of R&D output.17 This study is the first 
attempt to use patent citation to examine research consortium and technological 
change in Japan. It uses the Derwent Innovations Index, a database of citations 
appearing in patents from six major patenting authorities. This thesis also uses 
interview data to show how the OMCS project was organised and operated,  how 
participating engineers were engaged the joint research, and how this joint project 
affected the participating firms’ in-house R&D. 
 
                                                 
16 Regarding to the advantages and the disadvantages of using patent as a measurement of 
technological change, see How to Measure Technologocal Innovation in the first chapter, 
Introduction. 
17 For example, Branstette and Sakakibara, "Japanese Research Consortia: A 
Microeconometric Analysis of Industrial Policy"; Branstetter and Sakakibara, "When Do 
Research Consortia Work Well and Why? Evidence from Japanese Panel Data." 
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4.2 Optoelectronics Measurement and Control System Project 
OMCS Research Theme 
The 1949 Foreign Exchange Law protected the Japanese economy against 
direct investment from overseas. In the early 1960s, the U.S and some European 
governments demanded that the Japanese government push economic liberalisation. 
In 1962, the International Monetary Fund asked the Japanese government to accept 
Article 8 of the IMF.18 It was projected that this economic liberalisation would have 
a major impact on Japanese firms. When economic liberalisation was introduced, 
foreign capital would begin buying Japanese firms without permission from MITI. 
Both the government and the industries faced serious issues regarding how to gain 
competitiveness under these new conditions.   
The government and the industries realised that the R&D capability of 
technology-intensive industries was not strong enough to compete against 
international players. It was necessary (1) to catch up with the technological level of 
the western nations and (2) to develop domestic technologies that could compete 
against international players and contribute to long-term economic growth. Thus, in 
1966, MITI initiated the Industrial Technology Research and Development Project, 
which was a government-sponsored joint research schema called the “Large Scale 
Project.” This project aimed to launch research consortia that would promote new 
and innovative industrial technological development contributing to the growth of 
national economy and social welfare.   
With the assistance of corporate engineers, Sakurai Kenjirō and Shimada 
Junichi, MITI’s officials, planned to launch a Large Scale Project consortium in the 
optoelectronics area in 1977.19 The plan was for this research consortium to develop 
                                                 
18 Article 8 of the IMF pledges: (1) avoidance of restrictions on current payments, (2) 
avoidance of discriminatory currency practices, (3) convertibility of foreign-held balances, 
(4) furnishing of information, (5) consultation between members regarding existing 
international agreements, and (6) obligation to collaborate regarding policies on reserve 
assets. 
19 The description of the research consortium in this thesis relies on Mitsubishi Sōgō 
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a semiconductor laser, which was regarded as a new technology that would be 
competitive against international players.  
The main objective of the consortium was to develop an optoelectronics 
measurement and control system that could be used in a large manufacturing facility.  
The project leader, Shimada Junichi, coined a new technological concept, the Opto 
Electronic Integrated Circuit (OEIC), and set it as the core R&D target.20 Since the 
semiconductor laser was regarded as a key device for the OEIC, semiconductor laser 
technologies became an important and practical R&D target for the consortium.   
 
Participation and Budget 
MITI officials named the consortium “Optical Measurement and Control 
System (OMCS)” and appropriated 18 billion Japanese yen in 2005 value (15.7 
billion Japanese yen in 1986 value) for this project.21  Because of the variety of 
consortia in various areas, the budgets varied. However, the budget of the OMCS 
project was slightly larger than the average budget of Large Scale Projects (Table 4-
1).   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                         
Kenkyūjo, (Mitsubishi Research Institute), Hikari Kankei Kenkyū Kaihatsu Purojekuto no 
Gijutsu Sangyō Shakai eno Inpakuto ni kansuru Chōsa, (Report on the Impact of 
Optoelectronics Research Consortia on Technology, Industry, and Society); Merz, "The 
Optoelectronics Joint Research Laboratory: Light Shed on Cooperative Research in Japan"; 
Shimada, "Ai to Kanashimi no Hikari Ōpuro, Purojekuto Rīdā no Memo Yori, 
(Optoelectronics Large Project - Project Leader's Memo)." 
20 Shimada, "Ai to Kanashimi no Hikari Ōpuro, Purojekuto Rīdā no Memo Yori, 
(Optoelectronics Large Project - Project Leader's Memo)" ,p.5. 
21 Mitsubishi Sōgō Kenkyūjo, (Mitsubishi Research Institute), Hikari Kankei Kenkyū 
Kaihatsu Purojekuto no Gijutsu Sangyō Shakai eno Inpakuto ni kansuru Chōsa, (Report on 
the Impact of Optoelectronics Research Consortia on Technology, Industry, and Society), 
p.11. 
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Table 4-1: OMCS and Other Large Scale Projects 1962-1992 
 
Real R&D 
Expense 
(Million Yen) 
Project 
Term 
(Year) 
Number of 
Participating 
Firms 
Annual R&D Expense per 
Participant  (Million Yen) 
OMCS 
18.730 7 14 191.224 
Sample 30    
Average 17.128 8.167 18.6 112 
Median 14.188 8 15 118 
Source: Kawatetsu Tekuno Risāchi, (Kawatetsu Technology Research). “Kokka Purojekuto 
no Unei/ Kanri Jōkyō Bunseki Chōsa Hōkokusho II, (Evaluation Report on Operation and 
Management of National Projects).” The R&D expenses indicate real R&D expenses in 
2005 Japanese yen value. Appendix IV includes this table converted into 2005 U.S. dollar 
value. 
 
When MITI planned the consortium, nine Japanese electronics firms (NEC, 
Fujitsu, Hitachi, Toshiba, Mitsubishi Electric, Matsushita Electric Industries, Sony, 
Sharp, and Sanyo) had already been involved in R&D in semiconductor laser since 
the late 1960s. However, none of them had yet developed a commercialised 
semiconductor laser. The firms’ R&D in semiconductor laser was still on the nascent 
“precompetitive” stage. 
Since this project focused on the semiconductor laser, first, MITI selected 
five leading firms in semiconductor laser: NEC, Fujitsu, Mitsubishi Electric, Toshiba, 
and Hitachi.22 Matsushita Electric Industries was also selected as a participant. Then 
MITI selected nine other participating firms that planned to develop semiconductor-
related technologies, such as a fibre and information system. Although Sony, Sanyo, 
and Sharp had begun R&D in semiconductor lasers, they were not selected because 
they had researched only the short-wavelength semiconductor laser. The five leading 
firms and Matsushita Electric Industries were researching both the short-wavelength 
and the long-wavelength semiconductor laser. Table 4-2 lists the participating 
                                                 
22 When the consortium was launched, MITI consulted with these firms about the 
consortium and made participation overtures. Regarding how MITI started this project, see 
Ibid. 
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institutions of the OMCS project. 
 
Table 4-2: Participating Firms 
Five Main Participating Firms 
Fujitsu 
Major maker of telecommunication and information 
equipments 
Hitachi Leading general electric machinery maker 
Mitsubishi Electric Third largest integrated electric machinery company 
NEC 
Major manufacturer of telecommunications and electronic 
machines 
Toshiba Second largest general electric machinery maker 
Other Participating Firms and Research Institution 
Fuji Electrics Specializes in generator, transformers and magnet switches 
Fujikura  Forth largest manufacturer of electric wires and cables 
Furukawa Electric  
Non-ferrous metal processor with top stress on electric cables 
and wires 
Matsushita Electric  Largest electric appliance enterprise 
Nippon Sheet Glass Second largest sheet glass manufacturer 
Shimadzu 
Top maker of scientific equipment and related industrial 
machines 
Sumitomo Electric Industries  Largest maker of electric wires and cables 
Oki Electric Industries Telecommunication and electronics manufacturer 
Yokogawa Electric Top manufacturer of industrial measuring instruments 
Electrotechnical Laboratory MITI’s research institution 
Source: Tōyō Keizai Shinpōsha. Japan Company Handbook.  
 
 Much of the previous literature has discussed firms’ motivations for 
participation in joint research.23 The evaluation report on the consortium pointed out 
                                                 
23 Odagiri, Nakamura, and Shibuya summarised the previous literature discussing the 
motivations to participate in joint research and grouped them into five points: cartelisation 
factor, spillover factor, complementarity factor, subsidization factor, and national 
commitment factor. Odagiri, Nakamura, and Shibuya, "Research Consortia as a Vehicle for 
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that the participating firms had different motivations.24 For example, some firms 
sought a better connection with MITI by participating in this project. Some firms 
that had not begun R&D in semiconductor lasers planned to develop their 
optoelectronics business by participating in the consortium and learning skills and 
capabilities in semiconductor laser technology from other participants.25 
Research funding was an important factor as well.26 Because the Japanese 
government planned to liberalise its economy in the 1960s, it was necessary for the 
firms to become competitive against international big players before economic 
liberalization occurred. Many technology-intensive firms established central R&D 
laboratories in the 1960s, in an effort to develop advanced research and to enhance 
basic R&D capability, which was regarded as a weakness of Japanese firms.  In the 
context of the high economic growth of the 1960s, a “central R&D laboratory 
boom” occurred. The participating firms of the OMSC project had established their 
central R&D laboratories in the late 1950s. But after the Bretton Woods cancellation 
by the U.S. and the oil crisis, the Japanese economy stagnated in the 1970s. Under 
the recession, it became difficult for the firms to continue allocating sufficient 
money to basic research, which had inherently high uncertainty. Therefore, it was 
important to obtain subsidization from the government by participating in a joint 
research project. MITI recognized the situation that the firms were facing. The 
evaluation report indicated that it was also important to provide financial support to 
the participating firms so that they could invest in an R&D facility when they 
                                                                                                                                         
Basic Research: The Case of a Fifth Generation Computer Project in Japan", pp.192-193. 
24 Mitsubishi Sōgō Kenkyūjo, (Mitsubishi Research Institute), Hikari Kankei Kenkyū 
Kaihatsu Purojekuto no Gijutsu Sangyō Shakai eno Inpakuto ni kansuru Chōsa, (Report on 
the Impact of Optoelectronics Research Consortia on Technology, Industry, and Society). 
25 Examining motives for participating in cooperative R&D, Sakakibara discussed that the 
skill-sharing motive could be competition enhancing, while cost-sharing R&D cooperation 
could be competition suppressing in terms of their roles in R&D competition. Sakakibara, 
"Heterogeneity of Firm Capabilities and Copperative Research and Development: an 
Empirical Examination of Motives." 
26 Odagiri et al. called it subsidization. Odagiri, Nakamura, and Shibuya, "Research 
Consortia as a Vehicle for Basic Research: The Case of a Fifth Generation Computer Project 
in Japan", p.193. 
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confronted difficulty in investing in basic and uncertain R&D.27 Compared with the 
private R&D investment of the participating firms, the research fund provided by the 
consortium was quite substantial. As shown in Table 4-1, the annual R&D expense 
per participant firm was 191 million yen in 2005 value.  
Surveying the optoelectronics industry of Japan, the OITDA reported the 
amount of R&D investment and the number of the firms in semiconductor lasers. 
First, the survey reported that twenty firms manufactured semiconductor lasers in 
Japan in 1990.28 According to the OITDA’s survey, only one firm reported R&D 
investment in semiconductor lasers over 200 million yen (Table 4-3).29  
 
Table 4-3: R&D Investment and Number of Firms in 1990 
R&D Investment 
Number of Firms 
10 million – 50 million 6 
50 million – 100 million 4 
100 million – 500 million 7 
500 million – 1 billion 4 
1 billion – 2 billion 1 
2 billion – 5 billion 0 
5 billion – 10 billion 0 
10 billion – 20 billion 1 
20 billion – 50 billion 0 
Over 500 billion 0 
Source: Denpa Shinbun Sha, Denshi Kōgyō Nenkan (Annual Report on the Electronics 
Industries), 1993, p.629. 
 
Because the survey did not reveal individual respondents, these figures do not 
                                                 
27 Mitsubishi Sōgō Kenkyūjo, (Mitsubishi Research Institute), Hikari Kankei Kenkyū 
Kaihatsu Purojekuto no Gijutsu Sangyō Shakai eno Inpakuto ni kansuru Chōsa, (Report on 
the Impact of Optoelectronics Research Consortia on Technology, Industry, and Society), p.v. 
28 Denpa Shinbun Sha, Denshi Kōgyō Nenkan (Annual Report on the Electronics Industries), 
1993, p.623. 
29 Ibid., p.629. 
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necessarily signify the OMCS participants’ R&D investment. However, since all of 
the participating firms were members of the OITDA, this survey can provide a rough 
estimation for total R&D investment in semiconductor lasers. Most of the firms’ 
investments ranged from 10 million to 1 billion Japanese yen. The OMCS 
appropriated 19 million yen in 2005 value for this project. These figures suggest that 
the research fund for the consortium was significant for the participants, especially 
when they had difficulty in raising money for their central research laboratory in 
1970s.   
 
 
Research Organisation 
This project consisted of two different types of research unit: the individual 
laboratory and the joint laboratory. The participating firm organised an individual 
laboratory in its own R&D facility and received research funds for project-related 
work.  Every individual laboratory was assigned a specific R&D target.  In the joint 
laboratory, engineers from different participating firms collaborated and conducted 
joint R&D.  NEC, Hitachi, Toshiba, Mitsubishi Electric, Fujitsu, Matsushita Electric 
Industries, Oki Electric Industries, Furukawa Electric, and Sumitomo Electric 
Industries sent several engineers to the joint laboratory to work together in each sub-
research group. Since no interaction occurred among the individual laboratories, the 
joint laboratory was where the actual collaborative research was conducted. The 
joint laboratory had six sub-research groups. Each group researched basic 
technologies of the semiconductor laser.  Table 4-4 indicates the joint research 
laboratories, their leaders, and the researchers. Epitaxy technology, which was one 
of the most important research targets in the OMCS and will be examined in the next 
chapter, was researched in the number 2 and 3 laboratories. 
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Table 4-4: Sub Research Groups in Joint Research Laboratory 
Research 
Laboratory 
Number 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Research 
Theme 
Bulk 
Crystal 
Growth 
FIBI MBE Epitaxy Interface 
Physics 
Dry 
Etching 
Material 
Evaluation 
Research 
Leader 
T. Fukuda 
(Toshiba) 
T. 
Hashimoto  
(Fujitsu) 
M. Ishii  
(Mitsubishi) 
H. 
Nakajima  
(Hitachi) 
K. 
Asakawa  
(ETL) 
K. Ishida  
(NEC) 
Number of Researchers 
Fujitsu 1 4    1 
Furukawa 1    1 1 
Hitachi 1   3  1 
Matsushita 2 1 1 2   
Mitsubishi 2  3   1 
NEC   2  2 2 
Oki   1 2  1 
Sumitomo  1 3 1   
Toshiba 3  1   1 
Total 10 6 11 8 3 8 
The number of researchers shown in this table was in 1985. The parentheses indicate the 
participating firm that sent the research leader. Source: Merz, “The Optoelectronics Joint 
Research Laboratory: Light Shed on Cooperative Research in Japan.” 
 
This organisational setting was designed to promote interaction among engineers 
from the different firms. The OMCS project was the first research consortium 
funded by MITI in which engineers from different firms worked together in the 
same joint laboratory. Before the OMCS project, the research units in the joint 
laboratory were usually composed of engineers from the same firms. This 
organisational setting of the consortium was particularly designed to promote the 
interaction of technological knowledge among the participating firms. Therefore, the 
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level of potential spillover was high.   
All engineers and administrative staff worked full-time in the consortium.  
However, all of them also belonged to a participating institution. When the 
consortium ended, the engineers and administrative staff were expected to return to 
the firms or the institution that had sent them to the consortium. The OMCS project 
was planned as an eight-year project, starting in 1979. The term was, however, 
shortened one year, and the OMCS ended in 1985.  
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4.3. Underinvestment of the Participating Firms 
 
Focusing on the logical basis of organized collective action, Mancur Olson 
has provided a theoretical framework to analyse collective action.30 In the Logic of 
Collective Action, Olson argued the participants are motivated to act collectively and 
to contribute to the group, only when a benefit is strictly reserved for the individual 
participant. If the benefits are not properly reserved for the group members, the 
participants will have an incentive to free ride. In other words, he showed that 
common interest is not enough to motivate the participants to contribute to the group. 
The free rider problem leads to the non-production or under-production of a 
collective good. The participants have an incentive to contribute to the group in 
collective action when (1) benefits outweigh the costs and (2) the participant is 
provided with selective incentives. A type of selective incentive is a social incentive, 
which only works in smaller groups. A social incentive is the “desire to win prestige, 
respect, friends, and … other psychological objectives.”31 
 According to Olson’s argument, to what extent the participants of consortia 
in general have a disincentive to corporate and pursue a collective goal depends on 
its benefits and costs, and the selective incentive. First, the benefits to contribute to 
the group R&D were not strictly and properly reserved to the participating firms in 
the OMCS project. The results of the collaborative R&D were published as either 
patent or academic papers. Since both patents and academic papers were open to the  
public, non-participants could access these R&D results. Furthermore, the patents 
under the name of the government could not be used for cross-licensing, even 
though the participating firms could use them for their business. The U.S. 
government introduced the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980, which allowed for the transfer of 
exclusive control over many government funded inventions to universities and 
businesses operating with federal contracts for the purpose of further development 
                                                 
30 Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. 
31 Ibid., p.61. 
4. Semiconductor Laser Research Consortium: OMCS Project 
 136 
and commercialisation.32 The contracting universities and businesses were permitted 
to exclusively license the invention to other parties. The Bayh-Dole Act was 
designed to increase appropriability of collaborative R&D and stimulate 
government-funded collaborative R&D. In other words, it was designed to reserve 
the benefits of cooperation to the participants. However, there was no institution like 
the Bayh-Dole Act to stimulate contributions to collaborative research in Japan until 
1999. Appropriability of the collaborative R&D for the participating firms was 
limited to the tacit knowledge that the participating engineers could exclusively 
acquire from the collaborative research. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the 
incentive of the participating firms to contribute to the group R&D was not 
significant in the consortium due to the low appropriability. 
Furthermore, the costs of fully engaging in the consortium were high. Katz 
indicated that participating firms underinvest in a consortium when they are 
competing in the product market.33 If participating firms were competing in the 
same product market, they would confront the risk that an important confidential 
R&D result might be leaked out to the rival firms through the collaborative R&D. 
The main participants dedicated to semiconductor laser R&D in the OMCS were 
competing in the product market. The way in which MITI selected the participating 
firms suggests that competition in the product market among the firms was quite 
high. MITI selected the five leading firms in semiconductor laser technology for the 
consortium (Hitachi, NEC, Toshiba, Mitsubishi Electric, and Fujitsu). One 
additional firm, Matsushita Electric Industries, participated in the consortium for 
semiconductor laser research. When MITI planned OMCS, nine firms had already 
started R&D in semiconductor laser. Six of those nine firms participated in the 
consortium. Furthermore, their business background was quite similar. All were 
competing in various consumer electronics markets. Branstetter and Sakakibara 
suggested that in selecting participants for consortia formed beginning in the early 
                                                 
32 On the Bayh-Dole act, see Bremer, "University Technology Transfer Evolution and 
Revolution", pp.20-21. 
33 Katz, "An Analysis of Cooperative Research and Development"; Katz et al., "R and D 
Cooperation and Competition", p.145. 
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1980s, MITI generally sought to bring together non-direct rival firms with 
complementary research assets. However, in selecting the participants for the OMCS 
project, MITI selected direct rivals in the product market. Table 4-5 describes the 
participants and their semiconductor laser application products in 1984.  
 
Table 4-5: Semiconductor Laser-Related Product Markets of Participants 
 
Laser 
Printer 
Video 
Disc 
Rewritable 
Disc 
Compact 
Disc 
Toshiba   ● ● 
NEC ●  ● ● 
Hitachi ● ● ● ● 
Fujitsu ●    
Matsushita   ● ● 
Mitsubishi ●   ● 
Source: Yano Keizai Kenkyūjyo, (Yano Research Institute). Kakudai Suru Rēzā Sangyō no 
Shijō Jittai to Kongo no Juyō Tenbō (Survey on Semiconductor Laser Market and Its 
Prospects), p.15 
 
 This table suggests that these participants were competing in the 
semiconductor-related final product market. It must be noted that they were also 
competing in the semiconductor laser market. The participating firms intended to 
develop semiconductor lasers not only for their own use, but also for sales to 
assemblers. The participants, therefore, were competing not only in the final product 
market but also in the device market.   
The evidence suggests that the high level of competition in the product 
market reduced the level of commitment and produced non-cooperative behaviour 
on the past of firms. In other words, the participating firms underinvested in the 
consortium, as Katz predicted they would. First, the evaluation report of the 
consortium noted that the firms were reluctant to send their star scientists to the 
consortium.34 Since the star scientists were allocated to undertake important in-
                                                 
34 Mitsubishi Sōgō Kenkyūjo, (Mitsubishi Research Institute), Hikari Kankei Kenkyū 
Kaihatsu Purojekuto no Gijutsu Sangyō Shakai eno Inpakuto ni kansuru Chōsa, (Report on 
the Impact of Optoelectronics Research Consortia on Technology, Industry, and Society), 
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house R&D, new graduates and non-star scientists were sent to the consortium. The 
interview results show35, 
 
“We did not send someone who was the ace engineer of the 
company.” [Interviewee:G] 
 
“The participating firms sent less important engineers to the 
consortium. They sent engineers who were thought in their firm as 
less likely to contribute to the profit-making business activity of 
the firms.” [Interviewee: D] 
 
Second, the participating engineers were usually not allowed to use R&D 
results and technological data produced in their own R&D departments. They were 
asked to limit their communication with others to published information such as an 
academic paper, a presentation at an academic society, or a corporate technical 
journal. One interviewee suggested,  
 
“It was not easy to manage collaborative research because the rival 
firms participated in the same research group.” [Interviewee: N] 
 
This non-cooperative behaviour promoted by the high level of competition 
in the product market vitiated the joint research efforts of the consortium. Patent 
citation data indicates that no important technology was produced in the consortium. 
The OMCS project produced 352 patents from 1982 to 1988.36 Through the Derwent 
Innovations Index, 286 of these patents were identified.37 The most highly cited 
                                                                                                                                         
pp.80-81. 
35 On interviewees, see Appendix III. 
36 Nihon Sangyō Gijutsu Shinkō Kyōkai, (Japan Industrial Technology Association), Kōgyō 
Gijutsuin Shokan Kokuyū Tokkyo Sō Risuto (the List of Agency of Industrial Science and 
Technology Holding Patent). 
37 Approximately 100 patents are not identified in the Derwent Innovations Index because 
the database coverage is limited in Chemical, Engineering, and Electrical and Electronic 
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patent had 11 citations by 2005. The average number of citations of the consortium 
patents was 0.93. Compared to the patents in semiconductor lasers that the 
participating firms obtained from their private R&D before, during, and after the 
consortium, the number of OCMS patent citations was disappointing.   
 
Table 4-6: Patent Citation: OMCS and Participating Firms’ Private R&D 
 Number of 
Observations 
Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Max 
OMCS Patents 
(1982-1988) 
286 0.9021 0 1.4950 11 
Patents obtained by Participating Firms’s Private R&D 
Before OMCS 
1970-1981 
316 4.8418 0 9.2805 55 
During OMCS 
1982-1988  
4,633 1.8619 0 5.1745 65 
After OMCS  
1989-2000 
9,090 2.1072 0 5.0856 71 
Source: Derwent Innovations Index. With the Derwent Innovations Index, this table 
identifies the patents obtained by the OMCS project and the participating firms’ private 
R&D. Then it examines the number of citation each patent received until 2004. 
 
 Assuming that a highly cited patent is an important technology, it seems that 
no important technological invention was produced in the consortium. Although the 
organisational setting was designed to facilitate the interaction of technological 
knowledge, non-consortium research produced more important technologies than the 
consortium. From Table 4-6, it is possible to conclude the following point. 
 
 [4-1] Important technology was not produced in the consortium, compared to the 
in-house R&D of the participating firms. 
                                                                                                                                         
areas. It does not cover such areas such as textiles, paper, physics, and performing 
operations. Because this consortium focused on the development of semiconductor laser, 
many of the patents are classified in the Electrical and Electronic area. Still, we cannot 
investigate the citation of some patents with the Derwent Innovations Index. 
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 As the evaluation report pointed out, the fact that the participating firms 
underinvested in the consortium was one reason for this disappointing result of the 
OMCS project. Star engineers of the participating firms were conducting private 
R&D in their firm. The patenting rule of the consortium was another factor that 
negatively affected the consortium. The participating firms did not have an incentive 
to patent an important R&D result under the patenting rule of the government-
sponsored consortia. MITI sponsored two types of research: contract research and 
subsidisation research. With contract research, the government provided all 
necessary funds to the research consortium. The patents from the contract research 
consortium were assigned not to the participating firms but to the government.38 
With subsidisation research, the government provided half of the research funds. The 
participating firms, however, could be an assignee of the patents resulting from the 
subsidised research. Since the OMCS project involved contract research, the patents 
from the consortium were assigned to the government and thus could not be used for 
cross-licensing.  It was necessary for a firm to be a single assignee of a patent in 
order to use a patent for cross-licensing. The participating firms, therefore, were 
motivated to patent important R&D results under their own name.39  
The previous research about SEMATECH suggests another factor dampening 
the cooperative R&D in the OMCS project. Grindley, Mowery, and Silverman 
suggested that one of the factors underlining SEMATECH’s success was the source 
of funding. Half of SEMATECH’s budget was federal funding. The other half was 
from the participating firms. Their analysis has implied that the reduced federal 
support brought flexibility in consortium management and industry involvement in 
programme management. They noted, “in order to retain industry involvement in 
and commitment to SEMATECH, its member firms must retain primary control over 
                                                 
38 As described earlier, no Japanese law was equivalent to the Bayh-Dole Act at that time. 
39 Interviewee C said, “Actually, I guess it was not difficult for the participating firms to 
patent R&D results from the consortium under the name of their own because many of them 
were doing almost the same R&D at their own R&D laboratory. I do not know to what 
extent it happened. We did not check it and did not try to do it. Even if we tried, it would not 
have been possible. Moreover, it was OK for MITI because our primal goal was to promote 
industrial development. We could not do what firms did not want.” 
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the consortium’s research agenda” and “efforts by federal sponsors to tighten control 
of SEMATECH’S research agenda for agency missions may have a chilling effect 
on industry contributions of funding and personnel.”40 As described above, the 
OMCS project was a government-sponsored consortium. It is, therefore, possible to 
suppose that the government funding diminished the OMCS participants’ 
commitment to the consortium and induced non-cooperative strategy in the firms in 
the consortium. 
 
                                                 
40 Grindley, Mowery, and Silverman, "SEMATECH and Collaborative Research: Lessons in 
the Design of High-Technology Consortia", p.750. 
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4.4. Competition Enhancement Effect 
 
The findings of this chapter show that important technology was not 
produced in the consortium compared to the in-house R&D of the participating firms. 
It must be, however, noted that both the previous literature on consortia and several 
anecdotal evidences suggest that the OMCS potentially promoted R&D competition 
among the participants. 
Reviewing the various research consortia in Japan, Kodama maintained that 
the participating companies tended to set up duplicative in-house R&D to absorb the 
benefits from cooperative R&D in consortia.41 Assuming that external knowledge is 
an important source of innovation, Cohen and Levinthal discussed that it was 
important for firms to have their own R&D to gain absorptive capacity to use 
external knowledge. R&D not only generates new knowledge but contributes to the 
firms’ absorptive capacity. Since accumulating absorptive capacity in one period 
helps its more efficient accumulation in the next, it was reasonable for the 
participating firms to invest in the areas where they undertook the collaborative 
R&D in the OMCS project. The participating engineer noted,  
 
“The participating firms started the in house R&D project in the 
same area, if the collaborative research went well or seemed to go 
well in the area. If the research turned out to be unsuccessful in a 
certain area, the participating firms tended to stop in house R&D in 
that area.” [Interviewee: S] 
 
 The participating firms eventually tended to conduct in house R&D in the 
                                                 
41 Kodama, "Direct and Indirect Channels for Transforming Scientific Knowledge into 
Technical Innovations." Branstetter and Sakakibara, and Sakakibara also suggested that 
firms tended to increase in-house R&D in the area where they undertook the collaborative 
R&D. Branstetter and Sakakibara, "Japanese Research Consortia: A Microeconometric 
Analysis of Industrial Policy", p.215; Sakakibara, "The Diversity of R&D Consortia and 
Firm Behavior: Evidence from Japanese Data", p.184 and 192. 
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same technological areas (e.g. epitaxy technology). Since many competing firms in 
semiconductor laser technology and targeting the same product markets participated 
in the consortium, this effect was spread to the product markets. It intensified the in-
house R&D competition of the participating firms in the areas where the 
participating firms conducted R&D and their research turned out to be good or 
seemed to be good. The evaluation report of the research consortia in the 
optoelectronics industry noted that the research in the consortium on epitaxy 
technology (MOCVD) promoted the in-house R&D of the participating firms and 
intensified R&D competition in those areas.42 
 Furthermore, this consortium promoted the new entries to semiconductor 
laser R&D competition. The main firms conducting R&D in long-wavelength 
semiconductor laser were limited to the firms, which were subcontractors of Nippon 
Telegraph and Telephone Public Corporation (NTT), which was a government-
owned telecommunication corporation, before the OMCS got started. The main four 
NTT subcontractors were NEC, Fujitsu, Hitachi, and Oki Electric. Since the 
relationship between NTT and its subcontractors was fixed based on long-term 
consideration, it was a barrier for potential entrants. NTT provided secure demand to 
the group of subcontractors called the “NTT family.” In other words, this 
discouraged potential entrants from investing in semiconductor laser R&D. However, 
non-NTT family firms such as Sumitomo Electric Ind, Furukawa Electric and 
Fujikura Cable Works, which had not begun semiconductor laser R&D, could 
participate in the OMCS project. By participating in the OMCS project, these firms 
accumulated know-how and information about semiconductor lasers and began in-
house semiconductor laser R&D.43 Merz, who was a visiting engineer of the OMCS 
project, reported that the firms such as Oki and Sumitomo, which were late comers 
in semiconductor laser R&D, could acquire advanced R&D capability in a relatively 
                                                 
42 Mitsubishi Sōgō Kenkyūjo, (Mitsubishi Research Institute), Hikari Kankei Kenkyū 
Kaihatsu Purojekuto no Gijutsu Sangyō Shakai eno Inpakuto ni kansuru Chōsa, (Report on 
the Impact of Optoelectronics Research Consortia on Technology, Industry, and Society), 
p.88. 
43 Ibid., p.23 and 74. 
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short period by participating in the project.44 Figure 4-1 shows the cumulative 
number of patents in semiconductor lasers that Sumitomo, Furukawa and Fujikura 
obtained. It shows that these firms began to obtain patents in semiconductor lasers 
from the beginning of the 1980s.  
 
Figure 4-1: Cumulative Number of Patents in the Semiconductor Laser 
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Source: Calculated from Derwent Innovation Index. The figures shows the number of 
patents obtained by the firms through the Derwent Innovation Index and calculates the 
cumulative total. 
 
These firms, which participated in the project to provide complementary 
knowledge, optical fibre technology, to the consortium, had not engaged in R&D in 
semiconductor lasers before the OMCS project was launched. However, they began 
independent in-house R&D in the areas in which they undertook collaborative R&D 
in order to exploit and appropriate technological knowledge and information created 
                                                 
44 Merz, "The Optoelectronics Joint Research Laboratory: Light Shed on Cooperative 
Research in Japan", p.82. 
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by the joint R&D. Because of this duplicative in-house R&D, the firms increased the 
number of their own patent applications in the same technological areas in which 
they were doing the research in the consortium.45   
Lastly, many of the interviewees suggested that the consortium produced an 
important externality. The fact that the government launched a consortium in 
semiconductor lasers with a large amount of money created the expectation that 
semiconductor lasers would be an important technology of the future. This 
expectation was not limited to the participating firms: it spread across the 
electronics-related industry. The project leader of the OMCS called this phenomenon 
the “flag ship effect.”46  He pointed out,  
 
 “The consortium played an important role as a flagship. The fact 
that MITI launched the consortium announced to the industry that 
semiconductor laser would be a key technology in the 
optoelectronics market.” [Interviewee:D] 
 
This factor takes place when the government launches a consortium in a 
certain technological area, signalling that the government is committed to promoting 
the industry. Since the OMCS was carried out as a major national project, it 
conveyed the message that optoelectronics would become an important technology 
in the future. Previous studies on the industrial policy of MITI47 have pointed out 
                                                 
45 From the resource-based view of the firm, it can be assumed that the consortium 
homogenized in-house R&D of certain areas in which the firms conducted R&D in the 
consortium. On the resource-based view, see Barney and Hesterly, Strategic Management 
and Competitive Advantage: Concepts and Cases; Penrose, The Theory of the Growth of the 
Firm. 
46 Shimada, "Ai to Kanashimi no Hikari Ōpuro, Purojekuto Rīdā no Memo Yori, 
(Optoelectronics Large Project - Project Leader's Memo)." Odagiri et al. referred to this 
effect as the national commitment factor. Odagiri, Nakamura, and Shibuya, "Research 
Consortia as a Vehicle for Basic Research: The Case of a Fifth Generation Computer Project 
in Japan", p.193. Brahm discussed how the aggregate strategic targeting actions of national 
governments affected the nature and intensify of rivalry in contemporary international high-
technology industries. Brahm, "National Targeting Policies, High-Technology Industries, 
and Excessive Competition." 
47 On the industrial policy of Japan, see Komiya, Okuno, and Suzumura, Industrial Policy of 
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this effect, and interviewees have verified its existence in the OMCS project. No 
R&D division in the firms was exclusively designed for the optoelectronics 
technology before the OMCS project was launched. Optoelectronics was a 
somewhat vague concept for the firms because how it would be used for their 
business was not clearly defined.  The laser was a “great solution looking for 
problems.” But when MITI launched the OMCS project, the project leader coined a 
new concept, the Optical Electronic Integrated Circuit (OEIC), and set it as an R&D 
target. The OEIC became an influential concept in the industry. Throughout the 
1960s and 1970s, electrical firms competed to develop the Integrated Circuit (IC). 
When MITI set the OEIC as an R&D target, the OEIC came to be regarded as the 
next generation IC.  The idea was to change the existing electronic IC to an optical 
electronic IC. It provided a clear concept about how optoelectronics would be used 
and how big the potential market would be. The project leader also noted,  
 
 “When MITI planned the consortium, there were academic 
societies for optoelectronics. However, the firms did not have any 
optoelectronics division. The fact that MITI launched the OMCS 
project, invested a significant amount of resources, and targeted 
the semiconductor laser as the next generation’s important device 
set the firms off organising a division for semiconductor laser and 
intensifying their own research.” [Interviewee:D] 
 
It is also clear that firms began to set up the new research groups and 
business units for semiconductor laser technology because the fact that the 
government invested a large amount of money in semiconductor laser R&D 
provided firms with the justification for setting up new research groups and business 
units specially designated for semiconductor laser technology.48 Before the OMCS 
                                                                                                                                         
Japan. 
48 Mitsubishi Sōgō Kenkyūjo, (Mitsubishi Research Institute), Hikari Kankei Kenkyū 
Kaihatsu Purojekuto no Gijutsu Sangyō Shakai eno Inpakuto ni kansuru Chōsa, (Report on 
the Impact of Optoelectronics Research Consortia on Technology, Industry, and Society), 
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project got started, the in-house semiconductor laser R&D of firms was usually 
conducted as a small research subgroup in the central R&D division.  
These anecdotes indicate that the effect of national commitment existed in 
the optoelectronics industry, even though the question remains, then, as to what the 
national commitment effect contributed to technological and industrial development. 
 
                                                                                                                                         
p.22. 
4. Semiconductor Laser Research Consortium: OMCS Project 
 148 
4.5. Conclusion 
  
MITI started the Large Scale Project to promote technological 
competitiveness in the international market, when economic liberalization was 
promoted by the government and it was necessary for firms to increase their R&D 
capability. In the late 1970s, the semiconductor laser was regarded as a domestic 
technology that would become a key industry of the national economy; thus, MITI 
launched the OMCS as a Large Scale Project to facilitate R&D in semiconductor 
lasers in 1979. 
 Unlike the other consortia funded by MITI, the main participating firms were 
direct rivals. As Katz indicated, the fact that the participants were competing in the 
product market affected the OMCS project.  First, it dampened the joint R&D in the 
consortium. The high level of competition in the product market among the 
participating firms induced non-cooperative behaviours in the consortium.  The 
participants underinvested in the OMCS project. Patent citation data shows that 
important technology was not produced in the consortium, compared to the private 
R&D results of the participating firms. The evaluation report of the consortium 
reported that the OMCS project could not develop the OEIC, which was the final 
target.49  
Competition among participating firms in the product market significantly 
affected the industry. The fact that MITI selected competing firms dampened the 
R&D of the consortium, but it stimulated competition in semiconductor laser 
technology among the firms. Examining research consortia in various technological 
areas, Sakakibara asserted that the technological and industrial diversity among the 
participating firms increased R&D expenditures of the individual participants.50  
                                                 
49 Ibid.,p.ii. 
50 Sakakibara, "The Diversity of R&D Consortia and Firm Behavior: Evidence from 
Japanese Data", p.192. Examining motives for participating in cooperative R&D, 
Sakakibara also discussed that the skill-sharing motive could be competition enhancing, 
while cost-sharing R&D cooperation could be competition suppressing in terms of their 
roles in R&D competition. However, because the participating firms had different motives 
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According to Sakakibara’s study, if the participating firms of the OMCS project had 
not been competing in the same technological area, they would have increased the 
level of R&D commitment and the number of patents in their own product market 
area more than if the participants were rivals. However, if the participating firms had 
not been direct rivals, the private R&D efforts of the participating firms would have 
been scattered and dispersed in the product markets, because their target product 
market would differ from one another. It must be noted that since the participants 
were direct rivals in the product market, the competition-enhancing effect spread 
throughout the industry in the case of the OMCS project.  
The finding that the participants underinvested in the consortium because 
they were rivals in the product market supports the previous literature.  However, the 
fact that the participants began to increase the number of patents in the area in which 
they were undertaking the joint research suggests that the consortium stimulated 
market competition in certain technological areas and could contribute to 
technological development.   
However, these findings do not necessarily show any direct causality in 
therms of the research consortium causing the technological development of 
semiconductor lasers and enhancing the technological competitiveness of the 
firms.51  
While the research consortium was not in itself the single factor leading to 
the technological development of semiconductor lasers in Japan, this thesis reveals 
that the consortium provided important path dependency for technological 
development and industrial development. It stimulated competition in 
semiconductor laser technology (e.g., material technology and epitaxy technology). 
                                                                                                                                         
to participate in the OMCS and their motives might have changed through the time periods, 
it was not clear which motives, cost-saving motive or skill-aquiring motive, was more 
important for the participants. Sakakibara, "Heterogeneity of Firm Capabilities and 
Copperative Research and Development: an Empirical Examination of Motives." 
51 Studying government funded collaborative research, Okimoto came to the same 
conclusion that a causal connection between industrial policy and competitiveness in high 
technology was not clear yet, even though the industrial policy facilitated the development 
of Japan’s high-technology industries. Okimoto, Between MITI and the Market: Japanese 
Industrial Policy for High Technology, Studies in International Policy, p.230. 
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The next chapter examines how the firms competed under the conditions provided 
by the research consortium, by scrutinising important technological changes in 
epitaxy technology.  
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5. Competition, Knowledge Spillover, and Innovation 
 
As discussed in the fourth chapter, the OMCS project was not successful in 
producing important technology, compared to the firms’ in-house R&D. However, it 
stimulated private in-house R&D in the technological area on which the research 
consortium focused. New entrants accumulated R&D competence through 
participation in collaborative research in the consortium and participated in 
semiconductor laser R&D competition. This chapter explores how the firms 
competed under the conditions that the research consortium provided and how 
Japanese firms gained competitiveness in the high volume product market. 
The JTEC report and the AIST survey provide important perspectives for this 
chapter. Reviewing the optoelectronics industry in the U.S. and Japan, JTEC found 
“Japan clearly led in consumer optoelectronics, that both countries were competitive 
in communications and networks, and that the United States held a clear lead in 
custom optoelectronics.” “Japan’s lead in high-volume consumer optoelectronics 
and related technologies gave it a dominant share of the overall global 
optoelectronics market.”1 Surveying key industrial technologies in 1983, the AIST 
designated semiconductor laser technology as one of the most competitive key 
industrial technologies in optoelectronics. The AIST survey pointed out that firms 
were competing in the same sort of products and that through fierce R&D 
competition, the firms increased R&D investments to develop their own 
technology.2 These points revealed by these reports are important issues in the 
exploration of the technological development of semiconductor lasers.  
How did this pattern of competitive advantage indicated by the JTEC report 
emerge? Examining the R&D strategy of the U.S. and Japanese firms, this section 
                                                 
1 Forrest et al., JTEC Panel on Optoelectronics in Japan and the United States Final Report,  
p.xv. 
2 Kōgyō Gijutsuin Sōmubu Gijutsu Chōsaka (Agency of Industrial Science and Technology), 
Wagakuni Sangyō Gijutsu no Taishitsu to Kadai, (Survey of Japanese Industrial Technology), 
pp.276-277. 
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aims to explore this issue with the following questions. [1] Why did Japanese firms 
compete in the same technological area with the same technological choice longer 
than their counterparts in the U.S.? [2] How did the pattern of the strategic 
behaviour of the firms affect technological change in the semiconductor laser? 
Through scrutinizing patent data, it aims to show how certain patterns of 
competition among the firms affected the areas in which knowledge spillover effects 
emerged and resulted in the different paths of technological development in the U.S. 
and Japan. More concretely, the U.S. firms tended to bring about lateral utilization 
knowledge spillovers, which enriched and exploited potential and untapped product 
markets by utilizing the fundamental technology of semiconductor laser technology. 
In contrast, the pattern of competition of Japanese firms induced domain-specific 
knowledge spillovers, which enhanced the development of the fundamental 
technology of the semiconductor laser instead of exploiting niche product markets. 
This chapter is developed in five sections. Scrutinizing how the 
semiconductor laser was invented and what the R&D targets were, the first section 
shows that both American and Japanese firms were targeting the same R&D goals in 
the 1970s. The second section reveals that it became necessary to develop new 
semiconductor laser technology to catch new growing product markets for 
semiconductor lasers. This section also shows that Japanese firms adopted the same 
technological choices and competed in the same areas, while their rivals in the U.S. 
assumed different strategies. Examining the economic conditions and the level of 
downward integration of the competing firms, the third section demonstrates that the 
growing electronics industry and the higher level of downward integration allowed 
Japanese firms to compete in the same technological area for a longer period than 
their rivals. The fourth section examines how the R&D strategies of the firms and 
the patterns of competition in the U.S. and Japan affected the nature of knowledge 
spillovers and how different trajectories of technological development emerged 
through different patterns of R&D competition and different institutional settings. 
The last section draws ironic conclusions from the development of epitaxy 
technology in the U.S. and Japan. 
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5.1. Invention of the Semiconductor Laser and LPE 
 
 Scrutinizing how the semiconductor laser was invented and what the R&D 
targets were, this section reveals that both American and Japanese firms were 
targeting the same R&D goals in the 1970s. 
 
 
Invention of the Semiconductor Laser 
The first semiconductor laser was invented in the 1960s. Three American 
institutions--GE, IBM, and MIT simultaneously but independently developed the 
first semiconductor lasers in 1962.3 A research group at GE headed by Robert N. 
Hall developed the first semiconductor laser on September 16, 1962. Within a month, 
physicists in the two other institutions independently demonstrated their own 
versions of the semiconductor laser. The development of the semiconductor laser 
was amazing and exciting news for physicists who were involved in laser-related 
R&D.  
This invention opened huge possibilities for lasers. Until the semiconductor 
laser was invented, laser apparatuses, as noted earlier, were all large-scale. For 
instance, the ruby laser, which was the first laser in the world, needed a five-meter 
square amplification apparatus. It also required a significant amount of energy input. 
The laser seemed exotic, complex, and dangerous “high tech” in the early 1960s. 
However, the invention of the semiconductor laser changed the notion of the laser, 
since it was a far simpler laser that would eventually fit on a tiny chip and be 
efficient enough to run with a small battery.  
However, this invention did not necessarily lead to smooth technological 
development. Suematsu Yasuharu, who was one of the star scientists in the 
optoelectronics technology, noted,  
 
                                                 
3 On the invention of four semiconductor lasers, see Dupuis, "The Diode Laser-the First 
Thirty Days Forty Years Ago." 
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“Semiconductor laser R&D began in 1962. However, it did not 
come to the attention of many engineers because of the poor 
performance of the semiconductor laser. The mainstream of laser 
R&D was still the Gas laser through the 1960s.”4 
 
 The semiconductor laser was still on a very nascent level, even though it was 
believed that it would have huge potential. Japanese firms started semiconductor 
laser R&D from the beginning of the 1960s. However, their research was still at a 
very basic level. The number of research personnel for semiconductor laser R&D 
was fairly limited through the 1960s.  
 
 
Room Temperature Operation by Bell Labs 
The semiconductor lasers developed by GE, IBM, and MIT worked properly 
only at minus 196 degree Celsius (i.e., liquid nitrogen temperature). Unless the 
semiconductor laser could work at room temperature, its potential would be fairly 
limited. Therefore, after the invention of the first semiconductor laser, the focus of 
R&D in semiconductor laser technology was to develop a semiconductor laser that 
could work at room temperature.  
It took eight years for the engineers to solve this technological problem. This 
period was later called “the winter years of semiconductor lasers”. The first 
semiconductor laser working at room temperature was developed in 1970 by a Bell 
Laboratory research team.5 The new semiconductor laser was named Double-
Heterostructure Laser (DH).  
Even though the semiconductor laser developed by Bell did not work stably, 
it was one of the turning points in the technological development of the 
semiconductor laser, stimulating competition as many firms developed reliable and 
                                                 
4 Suematsu, Handōtai Rēzā ga Tsūshin o Kaeru (Semiconductor Lasers Will Change the 
World), p.13. 
5 Panish, Hayashi, and Sumski, "Double-Heterostructure Injection Lasers with Room-
Temperature Thresholds as Low as 2300 A/cm2." 
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stable semiconductor lasers that could work at room temperature. The newspapers 
reported that this newly invented DH laser would fundamentally change Optical 
Engineering and that it would be the same as the transistor, which had produced a 
fundamental change in Electronic Engineering.6 Reporting that the newly invented 
semiconductor laser had huge potential, they described that it would enable people 
to transmit huge amounts of data by optical fibre. The newspapers also reported that 
this laser would make it possible to do face-to face communication with TV phones. 
After the invention of the DH laser, the laser technology became widely known 
among the public in the U.S. and in Japan. For instance, MITI reported on laser 
technology and its huge limitless potential for product markets.7  Twentieth Century 
Fox released the first Star Wars series in 1977. In the movie, the director, George 
Lucas, used many special effects. Lucas showed laser light as one of the futuristic 
technologies. Laser became thought of as the technology of the future. 
 The semiconductor laser developed by the Bell research team opened the 
possibility of using the semiconductor laser for optical communication.8 Optical 
communication was clearly an important application area that most of the firms were 
targeting. Many organisations were competing to develop semiconductor lasers, 
which could work stably with greater longevity at the room temperature. Based on 
patent data, the following tables show the firms that were involved with 
semiconductor laser R&D in the beginning of the 1970s (1970-1975).9 
                                                 
6 Asahishinbun (Asahi Newspaper), September 1st, the evening edition. 
7 Tsūshō Sangyō Shō, (Ministry of International Trade and Technology), Denshi Kōgyō 
Nenkan (Annual Report on the Electronic Industry), 1976, pp.513-524. 
8 In the same year as the DH laser was invented, the U.S. glass manufacturer, Corning Glass 
Works, invented an essentially complementary technology to the semiconductor lasers. 
Corning Glass Works invented the first practical optical fibre for communication in 1970. 
The optical fibre was also an important invention to open the possibility of using the 
semiconductor laser. The Japan Electronics Apparatus Industry Association stated that “the 
laser diode attained a continuous amplification at room temperature in 1970.  It is projected 
that it will be used in optical telecommunication and data communication soon.” Nihon 
Denshi Kikai Kōgyō Kai, Denshi Kōgyō 30 nenshi (A 30 year history of Electronics 
Industry), p. 269. 
9 In addition to those firms, many research institutions began their research in the beginning 
of the 1970s. The main research institutions in these areas were UIUC, MIT, NASA, US 
Navy, and Tokyo Institute of Technology. On the research institutions, see the third chapter. 
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Table 5-1: U.S. Firms in Semiconductor Laser R&D 1970-1975 
The U.S. firms Business Description 
American Optical Corp Eyewear company 
Bell Telephone Lab Telecommunication company 
Eastman Kodak Cameras, printers, accessories manufacturer 
Energy Conversion Devices Electronic components, storage batteries manufacturer 
GE Electronics conglomerate 
Hughes Aircraft Defence and aerospace 
IBM Computer and information technology 
McDonnell Douglass Commercial airplane and defence 
3M Consumer and industrial technology 
Motorola Communication and electronics 
Northern Rockwell Business conglomerates defence 
Quantronix Corp 
Manufacturer of lasers for scientific and industrial 
applications 
RCA Consumer electronics 
Texas Instruments Semiconductor and computer technology 
Union Carbide Petrochemical, chemical and polymers 
Western Electric 
Electrical engineering company, the manufacturing arm 
of Bell 
Westinghouse Electric  Nuclear reactor 
Xerox Printers and office products 
Source: Calculated from Derwent Innovations Index. The Derwent Innovations Index 
identifies all of the U.S. firms and research institutions that obtained a patent in 
semiconductor laser technology from 1970-1975. This table lists all of the firms that 
obtained more than two patents from 1970-1975. 
 
Table 5-2: Japanese Firms in Semiconductor Laser R&D 1970-1975 
Japan Business Description 
Hitachi Consumer and industrial electronics 
Kansai Paint Consumer / industrial paints and coatings 
Matsushita Electronic Industry Consumer and industrial electronics 
Matsushita Electronics Consumer and industrial electronics 
Mitsubishi Electric Consumer and industrial electronics 
NEC Consumer and industrial electronics 
NTT Telecommunication company 
Sanyo Electric Consumer and industrial electronics 
Sharp Consumer electronics 
Sony Consumer electronics 
Toshiba Consumer and industrial electronics 
Source: Calculated from Derwent Innovations Index. This table is created with the same 
procedure for Japanese firms as Table 5-1. 
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 These tables show that a greater number of firms was involved in 
semiconductor laser R&D in the U.S., compared to those in Japan. Furthermore, the 
business backgrounds of the U.S. firms were much more diversified than those of 
Japan. For instance, Hughes Aircraft and MacDonnell Douglass were aircraft and 
aerospace manufacturers. IBM and Xerox were computer and office equipment 
manufacturers. While Texas Instruments, Minnesota Mining and Manufacture, and 
Energy Conversion Devices were specialized industrial and electric device 
manufacturers, GE and RCA were more integrated industrial and consumer 
electronics manufacturers. This reflects the fact that American consumer electronics 
and computer firms diversified their business domains based on the high economic 
growth through the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s.10 By contrast, only 
electronics or telecommunication firms were involved in semiconductor laser R&D 
in the beginning of the 1970s in Japan. 
 Even though various firms were involved in semiconductor laser R&D in the 
beginning of the 1970s, they were competing for the same R&D target. Since the 
laser beam amplification was noisy and unstable and the life span of the 
semiconductor was short in the 1970s, all of the firms were competing to develop 
stable and long-life semiconductor lasers, which could work at room temperature. 
 LPE (liquid phase epitaxy) was the only dominant epitaxy technology in the 
1970s.11 The Bell Laboratory research group used LPE to amplify laser beam at 
room temperature in 1970. Because the other firms followed Bell’s technological 
choice, they adopted LPE for the epitaxy process. Figure 5-1 depicts an example of 
LPE technology. 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 On the diversification in the consumer electronics industry, see Chandler, "The 
Competitive Performance of U.S. Industrial Enterprises since the Second World War." 
Chandler, Inventing the Electronic Century: the Epic Story of the Consumer Electronics and 
Computer Industries. Chapter 2. 
11 On epitaxy technology, see 1.3. Epitaxy Technology in the first chapter. 
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Figure 5-1: LPE Technology 
 
Source: Elie, "Liquid Phase Epitaxy." US3933123. 
 
First, semiconductor materials are melted into liquidised metal and poured into a 
space divided by carbon separators (small cells in the middle of the box in Figure. 5-
1). The bars stuck in the box are substram, which becomes a semiconductor laser 
wafer. Second, the temperature of the semiconductor materials is lowered so that 
they become crystallised. Third, when the substratum is slid from right to left, 
different semiconductor materials attach to the substratum in order. As a result, 
semiconductor layers are formed on the substratum. 
 Since LPE did not require a special production facility, high-quality layers 
could be produced with minimal capital investment, compared to alternative 
techniques. The firms were competing to develop a semiconductor laser that could 
work longer with high reliability amplification by using LPE technology.  
 
Abstract of US3933123 
  
A method of and a device for 
the epitaxial deposition of a 
layer on a monocrystalline 
substrate from a material in 
the liquid state. During the 
deposition process,  
apportioned quantities of a 
second material are added to 
the material in the liquid state, 
using a jig with a plurality of 
vertically spaced, fixed, and 
slidable walls for controlling 
the addition. Application inter 
alia for the provision of 
semiconductor layers, for 
example, of material of the 
type AIIIBV, in particular 
from mixed crystals. 
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5.2. New Market and Technological Change 
 
 Using the same epitaxy technology, the U.S., European, and Japanese firms 
were competing to develop a reliable semiconductor laser that could work at room 
temperature. 
 Showing that a new product market emerged in semiconductor laser 
technology, this section reveals that it became necessary to develop new epitaxy 
technology to catch the new growing demand for semiconductor lasers. This section 
also shows that Japanese firms adopted the same technological choices and 
competed in the same areas, while their rivals in the U.S. assumed different R&D 
strategies. 
 
 
New Market and New Technology 
 It was believed that the semiconductor laser would be a key electronics device 
in the optoelectronics industry. After the invention of the DH laser by the Bell 
research team in 1970, firms were competing to develop a reliable long-life 
semiconductor laser with LPE, a relatively uncomplicated epitaxy technology.  
 The main application area in the beginning of the 1970s was long-distance 
telecommunication. At that time, the electronic wire was used for long-distance 
telecommunication. However, electronic wire long distance-telecommunication did 
not provide sufficient quality. The problem that long-distance telecommunication 
confronted was energy loss. Because of the energy loss, the electronic wire cable for 
long-distance telecommunication needed a relay device, called a repeater, every few 
kilometres. Too many relay devices caused a time lag, background noise and cutting-
off of the long-distant telecommunication. The engineers believed that the laser 
optical fibre would resolve these problems by reducing the energy loss. Since it was 
estimated that optical fibre would need only one-relay device every 180 kilometres, 
they believed that the optical fibre would enable clear, instant, and stable long-
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distance telecommunication. It was predicted that optical fibre would take the place 
of electric wire for long-distance telecommunication if a practical optical fibre and a 
reliable semiconductor laser could be developed. The Japan Electronics Apparatus 
Industry Association stated, 
 
“The semiconductor laser attained a continuous amplification at room 
temperature in 1970. It is projected that it will be used in optical 
telecommunication and data communication soon.”12 
 
 However, the size of the long-distance telecommunications market was not 
very large, even though it was an important social infrastructure. Once the 
semiconductor lasers had been set up in the long-distance telecommunication 
infrastructure, much of the additional demand would be replacement of the existing 
cable. Additionally, the product markets of the semiconductor laser were not clear 
until the late 1970s, even though optical communication (e.g. optical fibre) was 
regarded as one of the applications of semiconductor lasers. Hayashi Izuo, who was 
one of the Bell Laboratories’ engineers successfully developing semiconductor laser 
amplification at room temperature in 1970, noted in 1972, 
 
“It is difficult to estimate how the semiconductor laser will be 
developed. First, it is because we are still uncertain about the 
technological possibility. Second, we do not know what kind of product 
market will be found. Since the laser was invented, many various and 
dreamy potentialities have been pointed out. However, many of them 
have not been realized yet. Even though many technological problems 
remain unsolved in the semiconductor laser technology, the biggest 
problem lies in whether appropriate and effective potential uses can be 
                                                 
12 Nihon Denshi Kikai Kōgyō Kai, Denshi Kōgyō 30 nenshi (A 30 year history of 
Electronics Industry), p. 269. 
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found.”13 
 
While many firms competed to develop a semiconductor laser for optical fibre, 
Stanford University and 3M started researching laser technology for information 
storage on photographic videodisc in 1961.14 In those days, information was stored 
in an analogue signal. Their attempt was to store data in a digital signal. 
Unfortunately, their efforts were unsuccessful at that time because laser technology 
was still immature. Even though their research attracted little attention at the time, 
this was the first attempt to use optoelectronics technology for information storage. 
Ten years after Stanford and 3M’s attempt, some firms began to do research on 
videodisc technology in the early 1970s and developed several videodisc systems 
based on progress in laser technology. Taking different formats, Philips, Music 
Corporation of America (MCA), Nippon Victor, RCA, and Telefunken were 
competing to develop the videodisc.15 Japanese firms such as Mitsubishi, Toshiba, 
and NEC, also began to develop the videodisc.  
Announcing that it had developed an analogue pulse videodisc, called VLP 
(Video Long Play) system, in September of 1972, Phillips released the videodisc 
player in 1973.16 It was the first commercial laser application to an optical disc. 
Phillips’s videodisc demonstrated that laser technology would be used in the 
information storage area, in spite of the fact that this videodisc did not achieve 
commercial success. 
All of the firms that were trying to develop the videodisc in the beginning of 
the 1970s adopt Helium-Neon (He-Ne) laser, which was a type of small gas laser 
and more primitive laser than the semiconductor laser, for the source of light. The 
reason why they selected the He-Ne laser instead of the semiconductor laser was its 
reliability. The reliability of the semiconductor in continuous amplification at room 
                                                 
13 Hayashi, "Handōtai Rēzā o Omou (Semiconductor Laser)", p.355. 
14 The system of the photographic videodisc read a signal recorded on the disc by the 
strength of the penetration light from a mercury lamp. Nakajima and Ogawa, Zukai 
Konpakuto Disuku Tokuhon (Handbook of Compact Disc), p. 55. 
15 Ibid., p. 57. 
16 On the videodisc see, Ibid. 
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temperature was still less reliable than that of He-Ne laser in the beginning of the 
1970s.  
As the firms committed to semiconductor laser R&D, it became clearer that 
the semiconductor laser would eventually be used for optical information storage 
such as videodiscs, compact discs and laser discs.  By the end of the 1970s, it was 
obvious that the semiconductor laser would involve huge application areas.  For 
example, the Electronics Industry Year Book of 1979 noted,  
 
“It is expected that electronics products such as POS (point of 
sales) system and Video Disc will be widely used in shops and homes. 
It is projected a huge new market will appear based on the economies 
of large-scale production, if the semiconductor laser is used in these 
products. He-Ne laser is currently used in these products. However, 
firms and research institutions are actively conducting R&D in 
semiconductor lasers so that it can be used in these products.”17 
 
 Information storage was a new product market for the semiconductor laser. 
As expectations for the information storage market grew, it became clear that it 
would be necessary to develop manufacturing technology that would allow the 
production of reliable semiconductor lasers on a large scale for the mass markets. It 
had become apparent that LPE would prove difficult in the mass production of the 
semiconductor laser, even though LPE was a relatively uncomplicated technology 
and its production facilities tended to be inexpensive. 
When the firms were targeting high volume markets, engineers were 
confronting some technical problems that would be caused by using LPE. First, 
because it was necessary for an engineer to slide the substratum to form the layer 
with LPE, no systematic way to control the thickness of the layer existed in LPE 
technology. Since thickness control depended on the speed at which an engineer slid 
                                                 
17 Tsūshō Sangyō Shō, (Ministry of International Trade and Technology). Denshi Kōgyō 
Nenkan (Annual Report on the Electronic Industry), 1979, p.679. 
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the substratum, it highly relied on the tacit knowledge of skilled engineers. Second, 
the size of the substratum that LPE could use was limited. It was impractical to 
control the thickness of the layer with a large substratum by using LPE. The square 
measure of the semiconductor wafer had a strong impact on the economies of scale, 
since the larger wafer could allow production of more semiconductor laser chips at 
once. 
 It was necessary to improve the current LPE technology or change epitaxy 
technology from LPE to a new one in order to meet the growing demand for the 
semiconductor laser. Such problems in large-scale production became more obvious 
as many firms and research organisations realized that demands for the 
semiconductor laser would probably be enormous. The optoelectronics device 
market survey in 1982 reported,  
 
 
“The price of a semiconductor laser is five hundred thousand yen in 
1980. Since the price is high, it is important to reduce the production 
costs to develop and expand potential product markets.” 18 
 
“It is anticipated that the semiconductor laser product markets will 
be fully grown after 1985. Therefore, it is necessary for the 
semiconductor laser manufacturers to establish semiconductor laser 
mass production technologies and facilities.”19 
 
Two other epitaxy technologies, MOCVD and MBE, were likely solutions. 
The thickness control of both MOCVD and MBE were automatically operated. The 
square measure of the wafer with MBE and MOCVD was larger than that with LPE. 
Both MOCVD and MBE were, however, still nascent technologies in the 1970s, 
even though both had already been invented and were public.20  
                                                 
18 Sōgō Giken, Oputodebaisu Shijō Yōran (Optoelectronics Device Handbook), p.44. 
19 Ibid., p.44. 
20 The first patent in MOCVD was taken by Monsanto in 1959. The first academic report on 
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The engineers of Bell Laboratory published the first academic report on 
MBE in 1969.21 Figure 5-2 exemplifies the deposition process of MBE. 
 
Figure 5-2: MBE Technology 
 
Source: White, Ryu, and Lee, "A Hybrid Beam Deposition System and Methods for 
Fabricating Metal Oxide Zno Films, P-Type Zno Films, and Zno-Based II-VI Compound 
Semiconductor Devices" WO20004020686 
 
First, semiconductor materials are evaporated in small pots. Then the 
evaporated molecules are jetsprayed, one by one, in an ultra-high vacuum chamber 
in a certain order and form semiconductor layers on the substratum. MBE allowed 
the production of a thin semiconductor layer because it used molecules. Moreover, it 
was believed that MBE might solve the problem of mass production that LPE was 
expected to confront in the early 1980s. However, the speed of the deposition 
process on the substratum was slow, and the production facility was expensive 
                                                                                                                                         
MOCVD was published by Rockwell engineers in 1969. 
21 Arthur and LePore, "GaAs, GaP, and GaAsxp1-x Epitaxial Films Grown by Molecular 
Beam Deposition." 
Abstract of WO2004020686 
  
A hybrid beam deposition (HBD) system and methods 
according to the present invention utilizes a unique 
combination of pulsed laser deposition (PLD) and 
equipment and techniques that provide a radical 
oxygen rf-plasma stream to increase the flux density of 
available reactive oxygen at a deposition substrate for 
the effective synthesis of metal oxide thin films. The 
HBD system and methods of the present invention 
further integrate molecular beam epitaxy (MBE) 
and/or chemical vapor deposition (CVD) techniques 
and equipment in combination with the PLD 
equipment and technique and the radical oxygen rf-
plasma stream to provide elemental source materials 
for the synthesis of undoped and/or doped metal oxide 
thin films as well as the synthesis of undoped and/or 
doped metal-based oxide alloy thin films. 
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because it required an ultra-high vacuum chamber.  
While MBE employed molecules for the deposition process, MOCVD used 
metal organic chemical vapour. Figure 5-3 depicts an example of the deposition 
process of MOCVD.   
 
Figure 5-3: MOCVD Technology 
 
Source: Miura, "MOCVD Apparatus” JP2006005062. 
 
First, gases, which are metal organic materials, are sent to the small boxes (Figure. 
5-3). Combined with the gas in the box, semiconductor materials become metal 
organic chemical vapour. This vapour is then sent to the ultra-vacuumed room 
(coloured in Figure. 5-3), in which the substratum is set so that the vapour forms 
semiconductor layers on the substratum. MOCVD effectively controls layer 
thickness. It also allows the use of a bigger wafer so that economies of scale can be 
achieved. Therefore, it was believed that MOCVD would be a solution to the mass 
production problems of LPE. However, the production facility of MOCVD was as 
 
 
 
Abstract of JP2006005062 
PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED: To provide a 
MOCVD apparatus that can effectively and 
stably form a crystal on the front surface of a 
substrate, and that can obtain a semiconductor 
laser element having excellent characteristics 
with high-production efficiency.  
SOLUTION: The MOCVD apparatus includes a 
substrate supporting means (21) for supporting a 
substrate (22), and a first heating means (23) for 
heating the substrate in a chamber (37). 
Furthermore, the MOCVD apparatus includes a 
second heating means (28) for high-frequency 
heating, a hold room (30) that is connected and 
provided in the exterior of the side wall of a 
chamber to hold the second heating means (28), 
and a means (35A) for moving the second 
heating means between the interior of the 
chamber and the hold room (30). The pressure of 
the hold room interior can be controlled 
independently with the chamber.  
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expensive as MBE. Furthermore, MOCVD uses metal organic chemical vapour, 
which can endanger human life.  
 
 
Technological Change from LPE to MBE and MOCVD 
As the expectation about high volume product markets was greatly growing, 
it became much clearer that either MBE or MOCVD would be the dominant epitaxy 
technology.22 Many firms began to shift their R&D focus from LPE to either MBE 
or MOCVD. Figure 5-4 reveals the number of patents in LPE, MBE, and MOCVD 
from 1976 to 1995 with patent data registered in European Patent Office, 
demonstrating that the cumulative number of patents in both MBE and MOCVD 
exceeded that of LPE in the mid-1980s. Clearly, the focus of R&D changed from 
LPE to MBE and MOCVD in the mid-1980s. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22 For instance, a technological review in 1985 suggested that MOCVD or MBE would be 
the dominant epitaxy technology soon. Mechatronics Henshūbu, Saisentan no 
Oputoerekutoronikusu, (the Optoelectronics Frontier), p.24. 
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Figure 5-4: The Number of Patents in LPE, MBE, and MOCVD 
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Source: Europe Patent Office. Using the Patent Database of the European Patent Office, this 
figure counts the number of patents in LPE, MBE, and MOCVD and calculates the 
cumulative numbers. 
 
 In the process of the technological change from LPE to MBE and MOCVD, 
the strategic behaviour of Japanese firms was clearly different from that of American 
firms. Japanese firms simultaneously made the same technological choices as their 
domestic rivals, while the U.S. firms made different choices.  
Figures 5-5 and 6 reveal the differences in technological choices among 
firms in the U.S. and Japan. These tables present: (1) the names of the firms 
involved in semiconductor laser R&D competition, (2) whether or not they 
conducted R&D in epitaxy technology, and (3) when they began and ended R&D in 
epitaxy technology. Concretely, they list all of the firms that obtained patents in 
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semiconductor lasers more than once from 1970 to 1980, and when they obtained 
their first and last patents in MBE and MOCVD. It is assumed that the firms listed in 
the tables began R&D in semiconductor lasers with LPE before they acquired 
patents in MBE or MOCVD. Additionally, if the firms did not obtain a patent in 
MBE or MOCVD, it is assumed that they did not participate in R&D competition in 
epitaxy technology.   
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Figure 5-5: Technological Choice of U.S. Firms 
1976   1977   1978   1979   1980   1981   1982   1983   1984   1985   1986   1987   1988   1989   1990   1991   1992   1993   1994   1995   1996   1997   1998   1999   2000   2001   2002   2003   2004   2005
Bell Laboratory       18
AT&T               14
Texas Instrument       17
Hughes      13
Xerox   2
IBM      12
Motorola      4
General Electric    3
Western Electric    4
3M        3
The followings did not obtain any patent in either MBE
or MOCVD.
Energy Conversion
National Semiconductor
Northen Electric
Exxon
International Standard Electric
RCA
Westinghouse Electric
Standard Tel & Cable
Perkin-Elmer
Rockwell
13
14
5
5
14
2
4
3
MBE
MOCVD
The line shows the first year and the last year that the firm obtained patent in MBE or MOCVD.
The number denotes the number of patents the firm obtained.
 Source: Europe Patent Office, Patent Database. ICARUS. 
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Figure 5-6: Technological Choice of Japanese Firms 
1976   1977   1978   1979   1980   1981   1982   1983   1984   1985   1986   1987   1988   1989   1990   1991   1992   1993   1994   1995   1996   1997   1998   1999   2000   2001   2002   2003   2004   2005
NEC    159
Sumitomo Electric    48
Fujitsu      131
Hitachi     95
KDD 1
Sharp    96
Canon    15
Matsushita Electric     79
Sony      41
Mitsubishi Electric    36
87
10
105
118
4
119
109
67
4
Toshiba    25
45
Sanyo   41
25
Oki Electric    17
31
MBE
MOCVD
The line shows the first year and the last year that the firm obtained patent in MBE or MOCVD.
The number denotes the number of patents the firm obtained.
 Source: Europe Patent Office, Patent Database. ICARUS. 
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These figures demonstrate two important points: the technological choice of 
the firms and the timing of start and exit. First, most Japanese firms began to patent 
in both MBE and MOCVD, while some American firms (e.g., RCA, Rockwell, and 
Energy Conversion) did not acquire any patents in MBE or MOCVD. Western 
Electric and 3M became involved only in MBE. KDD, a private telecommunication 
company, was the only Japanese firm that did not conduct R&D in MOCVD; and 
KDD apparently was not actively involved in MBE R&D either, since it obtained 
only one patent in MBE. Clearly, American firms’ pattern of technological choice 
was in complete contrast with that of Japanese firms. It is possible to assume that the 
firms that did not engage in R&D in either MBE or MOCVD did not target an 
economically important area of semiconductor laser. If the firms targeted high 
volume markets, it was necessary for them to develop epitaxy technology, which 
was indispensable for the mass production of semiconductor laser. This point is 
summarized in the following statement: 
 
 [5-1] Most Japanese firms simultaneously engaged in R&D competition in both 
MBE and MOCVD, while some American firms adopted neither MBE nor 
MOCVD.   
 
The second point is the timing of firms’ exits from R&D competition. It 
assumes that a firm stopped R&D and exited from R&D competition in the area if it 
did not acquire a patent in the area for a certain period.  These figures also indicate 
the period between the year of the first patent and that of the last patent, indicating 
the period in which the firms were participating in R&D competition in MBE and 
MOCVD. These reveal that many American firms began obtaining patents later than 
Japanese firms did, and they exited from competition earlier than Japanese firms did. 
This point is summarized in the following statement:  
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 [5-2] Japanese firms competed in MBE and MOCVD areas over relatively 
longer periods than the U.S. firms did.   
 
The findings of the fourth chapter partially explain the first point [5-1]. It 
discussed how the OMCS project provided participating firms with an incentive to 
invest in the technological area that the consortium targeted for development. The 
epitaxy technologies, MBE and MOCVD, were important R&D targets in the 
OMCS. It is, therefore, possible to assume that the consortium made Japanese firms’ 
technological choices homogeneous and its R&D start times simultaneous in those 
areas. One yet unanswered question is related to why [5-2] Japanese firms competed 
in MBE and MOCVD over relatively longer periods than the U.S. firms did.  
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5.3. Economic Context and Vertical Integration 
 
Examining the economic conditions in both Japan and the U.S. and the level 
of vertical integration of the competing firms, this section explores why Japanese 
firms competed in the same technological area with the same technological choices 
for a longer term than their counterparts in the U.S. did. Showing an industry 
undergoing tremendous change in both Japan and in the U.S., this section presents 
the following points. The first is that Japanese firms were in a favorable economic 
condition for R&D investment, while American electronics firms were declining 
from the mid 1970s.  The second is that the higher level of downward integration of 
Japanese firms provided greater incentive in both MBE and MOCVD than the U.S. 
firms. 
 
 
Growth and Decline of the Industry 
 As reviewed in the second chapter, the Bretton Woods cancellation and the 
oil shocks had a strong impact on economic growth. These two shocks made it 
difficult for Japanese firms to compete in price in the international market. Japan 
experienced its first post-war economic decline in industrial production. The key 
industries such as textiles and the steel and iron industry, which were labour and 
energy intensive, lost their competitiveness. The technology intensive industries 
obtained competitiveness and became key industries after these shocks. This 
structural economic change slowed economic growth, which had attained more than 
10 percent GDP growth in the 1960s.23 Even though Japan slowed its economic 
growth after the shocks, Japan attained annual growth rates no better than 4 to 6% in 
the 1970s and 1980s, which was for example, higher than that of the U.S. 
Through this structural change, the Japanese electronics industry became 
one of the most rapidly growing industrial sectors in Japan. Realising that it would 
                                                 
23 Maddison, Monitoring the World Economy, 1820-1992, calculated from p.183. 
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be necessary to shift their business to less energy-intensive production, Japanese 
manufacturing firms increased R&D and plant/equipment investments in technology 
intensive areas. In 1972, the R&D component of U.S. GDP was 2.32 %, while that 
of Japan was 1.86.24 In 1982, the same figure for the U.S. was 2.48, while that of 
Japan had increased to 2.38. Steadily increasing from 1972, the percentage in Japan 
reached 3.02 in 1996, while the U.S. reached 2.55 and has never reached 3 percent. 
R&D investment in microelectronics technology in the late 1970s and 1980s led to 
new growth industries in consumer electronics and computers, and to higher 
productivity in pre-established industries. Showing the transition of the Japanese 
manufacturing sector’s production price index for value added (1995=100)25, Figure 
5-7 shows that the electronics industry was steadily growing from the 1970s. The 
energy and labour intensive industries such as the textile and the steel and iron 
industry were stagnated through these periods. In contrast, the electronics industry 
achieved the highest growth in the 1970s and 1980s, compared to other 
manufacturing sectors. In this rapid growth, Japanese electronics firms released new 
products such as portable cassette players, videocassette recorders, and fax machines. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
24 Kagaku Gijutsu Chō Kagaku Gijutsu Seisaku Kenkyūsho (National Institute of Science 
and Technology Policy), Kagaku Gijutsu Shihyō: Nihon no Kagaku Gijutsu Katsudō no 
Taikeiteki Bunseki (Science and Technology Index: Systematic Analysis of Japan’s Science 
and Technology Activities), p.277. 
25 This index is the value added by factors of production in transforming inputs purchased 
from other producers into output. 
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Figure 5-7: Japanese Manufacturing Sector Production Price Index for Value 
Added (1995=100) 
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Source: Yano Tsunekita Kinenkai, Sūji de miru nihon no 100 nen: Nihon Kokuseizukai 
Chōki Tōkeiban, Calculated from Table 6-1, p.245. 
 
While the Japanese electronics industry was growing in the 1970s and 
1980s, American electronics firms were facing unfavourable conditions for R&D 
investments.26 The Bretton Woods cancellation and the oil shock hit the U.S. 
economy. In 1973, the U.S. economy was hit by recession, the worst since the 1930s. 
Examining American big businesses, especially the chemical and electronics 
                                                 
26 Examining the political economy in the U.S. consumer electronics industry, Curtis 
showed the decline of U.S. consumer electronics and the rise of foreign cartels. Curtis, The 
Fall of the U.S. Consumer Electronics Industry: An American Trade Tragedy. 
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industries, Alfred Chandler showed how they responded to the economic changes.27 
The increased production costs and the sharp rise in raw material costs reduced the 
profitability of the diversified businesses. Furthermore, competition against foreign 
rivals became fiercer in the 1980s. In the computer and office equipment industry, 
American firms such as IBM and Xerox held a significant market share both in the 
U.S. and abroad. However, rival firms such as Siemens and Fujitsu, NEC, and 
Hitachi were increasing their presence in the U.S. market.28  
American electronics firms faced fiercer competition than the computer and 
office equipment-manufacturing firms did. Japanese firms such as NEC, Hitachi, 
Toshiba, Mitsubishi, Matsushita, and Sony were increasing their presence in the 
global market. Table 5-3 shows the changes in world market share in 1960-1986 in 
computers, office equipment, electrical equipment and electronics, in which many 
firms that were involved in semiconductor laser R&D were classified. This table 
indicates that the U.S. firms were losing their share in the global market in these 
industries from the 1970s. The market share of U.S. electronics in the global market 
was dropping from 71% in 1960 to 27% in 1986, while that of Japan was rising from 
8% to 35%. Two U.S. companies among the top twelve in terms of worldwide sales 
of electrical equipment in 1970 not longer listed in 1986 were ITT and the RCA. 
Chandler noted, “by 1990, two more - Westinghouse as a victim of 
overdiversification and Western Electric as the result of the break-up of its parent, 
AT&T, in an antitrust suit - would not be among the top twelve.”29 
 
                                                 
27 Chandler and Daems, Managerial Hierarchies: Comparative Perspectives on the Rise of 
the Modern Industrial Enterprise; Chandler, "The Competitive Performance of U.S. 
Industrial Enterprises since the Second World War." 
28 On the overdiversification of the U.S. firms and their performance, see Ibid., pp.38-39. 
29 Ibid., p.38. 
  177 
 
 
Table 5-3: Changes in World Market Share in 1960-1986 
 Number of Firms in Top Twelve Percentage of Sales of Top Twelve 
Computers and Office 
Equipment 1960 1970 1975 1980 1986 1960 1970 1975 1980 1986 
United States 7 9 8 8 8 95 90 90 86 84 
Japan 0 1 1 2 2 0 3 3 7 10 
Italy 1 1 1 1 1 3 4 4 4 4 
United Kingdom 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 2 
France 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 
Electrical Equipment and Electronics 
Japan 2 3 3 3 4 8 17 18 21 35 
United States 6 5 5 5 3 71 59 49 44 27 
South Korea 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 13 
Netherlands 1 1 1 1 1 10 12 15 11 11 
Germany 2 2 2 1 1 10 12 15 11 10 
France 0 0 1 2 1 0 0 5 12 6 
United Kingdom 1 1 0 0 0 4 5 0 0 0 
 
Source: Adopted from Table 1: Changes in ‘world market share’ in major industries. Franko, "Global Corporate Competition; Who's Winning, 
Who's Losing, and the R&D Factor as One Reason Why", pp.451-453. 
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American electronics firms were trying to restructure their overdiversified 
business and focusing their business on profitable businesses. Chandler indicated 
that only those firms that unbundled unprofitable businesses could maintain their 
position in the worldwide markets.30 
For instance, the sales and operational profit of GE were seriously 
decreasing.31 Confronting foreign rivals and economic stagnation, only a handful of 
GE’s 350 business units held a leading position in their markets, which were lighting, 
power systems, and motors. The only businesses that were becoming profitable on a 
global market were plastics, gas turbines, and aircraft engines. Becoming Chairman 
and Chief Executive Officer of GE in 1981, John Francis “Jack” Welch Jr. tried to 
transform its business into more profitable and introduced a strategy that demanded 
each division should set out to be the number one or two in its market. In his book, 
he phrases it as “fix it, sell it, or close it”.32 Jack Welch relinquished unprofitable 
businesses, which were not or were regarded not to be the number one or two in the 
market. 
RCA, which was a consumer electronics manufacturer established in 1919 
by GE, became one of the largest companies in the world in the 1960s.33  Based on 
success in radio, TV, and the consumer electronics appliance manufacturing business, 
RCA diversified far beyond its original focus on electronics and communications 
from the mid 1950s. Taking steps toward becoming a conglomerate, the company 
acquired Hertz (rental cars), Banquet (frozen foods), Coronet (carpeting), Random 
House (publishing) and Gibson (greeting cards).34 RCA was becoming one of the 
largest companies in the world in the 1960s led by David Sarnoff, who became 
president of RCA in 1930. RCA, however, was plagued by financial problems from 
the mid 1960s due to the increased costs of material and production and the loose 
                                                 
30 Chandler, "The Competitive Performance of U.S. Industrial Enterprises since the Second 
World War", pp.38-39. 
31 On GE’s business and its restructuring, see Slater, Jack Welch and the GE Way: 
Management Insights and Leadership Secrets of the Legendary CEO. 
32 For “fix it, sell it, or close it” policy, see Welch, Jack: Straight from the Gut, pp.106-110. 
33 For an overview of RCA business history, see Sobel, RCA. 
34 Ibid., pp.184-198. 
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management of the diversified businesses. RCA posted a financial loss in 1966 and 
that trend continued to flow for the rest of the decade. RCA dissolved its businesses 
in 1986. GE merged with RCA and sold its consumer electronics business to a 
French electronic consumer manufacturer, Thomson SA. The entertainment division 
of RCA was sold to a German media company Bertelsmann AG. RCA’s R&D 
laboratories was transferred to SRI International (Stanford Research Institute 
International), which was a nonprofit research organisation performing client-
sponsored R&D for government agencies, commercial businesses, and private 
foundations. Chandler concluded, “Losses in consumer electronics resulted from 
U.S. companies’ over diversification, especially by the dominant firm, RCA.”35 
In these historical contexts, the U.S. firms that had been involved in 
semiconductor laser R&D took a different R&D strategy from Japanese firms. Many 
of the U.S. firms did not participate in epitaxy technology R&D competition. While 
Japanese electronics firms were growing, the U.S. electronics firms relinquished 
unprofitable business division and focused their managerial resources into areas in 
which their divisions had already emerged as profitable.  
 
 
Vertical Integration and R&D Strategy 
The level of vertical integration of the firms also influenced the R&D 
strategy of the firms. Analysis of the competing firms’ level of vertical integration 
reveals that Japanese firms involved in semiconductor laser R&D competition had 
more incentive to compete in the same technological area than their American rivals 
did. 
The point of departure of this section lies in the observation that Japanese 
firms were more vertically integrated than American firms. Tables 5-4 and 5-5 list 
the firms involved in semiconductor laser R&D and their final products. A black dot 
denotes that the firm produced or planned to produce a final product from the 1980s 
                                                 
35 Ibid., p.39. 
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through 1990. Showing whether the firms were manufacturing only semiconductor 
laser or whether they were involved in producing a final semiconductor laser 
product, these tables demonstrate the level of downward vertical integration of firms 
in the semiconductor laser business. Since there is no survey and business directory 
that covers all firms manufacturing semiconductor lasers in the world, this thesis 
uses three international surveys on semiconductor laser products conducted in 1984, 
1987, and 1991.36 It also uses corporate technical journals published by firms from 
1970-1990 as a complementary source. However, it must be noted that corporate 
technical journals can play only a supplemental role in comparing the level of 
vertical integration because not all of the listed firms publish their own technical 
journals. A black circle is marked, if the three surveys indicated that a firm 
manufactured the product. A white square denotes that R&D information on the 
product was released in corporate technical journals. If both the surveys and 
corporate journals showed that firms manufactured the product, then only a black 
circle is marked in the tables. 
 
                                                 
36 Arthur, "Optical Disc Storage & Document Image Processing Systems: A Guide and 
Directory 1991", pp.39-82. Hendley, "CD-Rom and Optical Publishing System", pp.140-142. 
Yano Keizai Kenkyūjyo (Yano Research Institute), Kakudai Suru Rēzā Sangyō no Shijō 
Jittai to Kongo no Juyō Tenbō, (Survey on Semiconductor Laser Market and Its Prospects), 
pp.10-16. 
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Table 5-4: Semiconductor Laser and Final Products of the U.S. Firms 1984, 1987 and 1991
37
 
 Final Products 
Firms Optical 
Fibre 
CD-ROM Rewritable WORM Document 
Image 
Processing 
Systems 38 
Compact 
Disc 
Laser Printer Research 
Instrument 
Others 
Technical Journal / Corporate History 
Bell 
□       □ 
AT & T Bell Laboratories Technical 
Journal 
Xerox       ●  Dealers of lightning 
RCA      □   RCA: A Historical Perspective 
IBM 
□ ● □ □ ●  ●  
IBM Journal of Research and 
Development 
GE 
     □  □ 
GEC Journal of Science and 
Technology/ GEC Journal of Research 
Hughes Aircraft         NA 
Motorola         Technical Disclosure Bulletin 
Perkin-Elmer         NA 
HP  □ ● □ ●  □ □ Hewlett-Packard Journal 
North American 
Rockwell 
        NA 
Westinghouse         NA 
                                                 
37 Regarding CD-ROM, Rewritable Disc, WORM (Write-Once-Read-Many), Optical Storage Subsystems, Jukeboxes, Document Image Processing 
Systems, data is collected from Arthur, "Optical Disc Storage & Document Image Processing Systems: A Guide and Directory 1991", pp.39-59. 
38 This colum includes 1.PC/Microcomputer, based DIP (Document Image Processing) Systems, 2. Workstation/Unix based Office DIP Systems, 3. 
Minicomputer & Mainframe based DIP Systems, 4. Special Purpose DIP Systems, 5. Large Format DIP Systems, and 6. Data Storage & Cold Systems. 
On these systems, see Arthur, "Optical Disc Storage & Document Image Processing Systems: A Guide and Directory 1991", pp.55-59. 
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Western Electric         NA 
Energy Conversion          NA 
Texas Instrument         NA 
International Standard 
Electric 
        NA 
Exxon         NA 
3M         A century of Innovation: 100  
Standard Cable         NA 
National 
Semiconductor  
        NA 
Source: Arthur, "Optical Disc Storage & Document Image Processing Systems: A Guide and Directory 1991", pp.39-82. Hendley, "CD-Rom and 
Optical Publishing System", pp.140-142. For Compact Disc, and Laser Printer/ Scanner, Yano Keizai Kenkyūjyo (Yano Research Institute), Kakudai 
Suru Rēzā Sangyō no Shijō Jittai to Kongo no Juyō Tenbō, (Survey on Semiconductor Laser Market and Its Prospects), pp.10-16. 
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Table 5-5: Semiconductor Laser and Final Products of Japanese Firms 1984, 1987 and 1991 
 Final Products 
Firms Optical 
Fibre 
CD-
ROM 
Rewritable WORM Document 
Image 
Processing 
Systems 
Compact 
Disc 
Laser Printer/ 
Scanner 
Research 
Instrument 
Others 
Technical Journal / Corporate History 
NEC  ● □ □ □ ● ●  NEC Technical Journal 
Hitachi  ● ● ● □ ●   Hitachi Hyōron 
KDD □        KDD Technical Journal 
Fujitsu  □ □ □   ●  Fujitsu Scientific and Technical Journal 
Mitsubishi  □ □ ●  ● ●  Mitsubishi Denki Gihō 
Toshiba  ● □ ● □ ●   Toshiba Gihō 
Matsushita 
(Panasonic) 
 ● ● ● □ ● ●  Matsushita Technical Journal 
Sharp  □ □ □  ●   Sharp Technical Journal 
Sony  ● ● ●  ●   Made in Japan, Akio Morita and Sony 
Sumitomo □        Sumitomo Electric Review 
Sanyo  ● □ □  ●   Sanyo Technical Review 
NTT 
□        
Electrical Communications Laboratories 
Technical Journal 
Rohm          Rohm Data Book 
Oki 
        
Progressive spirit: the 120-year history of Oki 
Electric 
Source: Arthur, "Optical Disc Storage & Document Image Processing Systems: A Guide and Directory 1991", pp.39-82. Hendley, "CD-Rom and 
Optical Publishing System", pp.140-142. For Compact Disc, and Laser Printer/ Scanner, Yano Keizai Kenkyūjyo (Yano Research Institute), Kakudai 
Suru Rēzā Sangyō no Shijō Jittai to Kongo no Juyō Tenbō, (Survey on Semiconductor Laser Market and Its Prospects), pp.10-16.   
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Table 5-5 reveals that many Japanese firms were manufacturing optical 
storage products (e.g., Compact Disc and CD-ROM). Table 5-4 indicates differences 
between the U.S. firms’ final product selections. Compared to Japanese firms, far 
fewer firms manufactured the final products. Japanese firms were more involved in 
various final products than the U.S. firms were. Many Japanese firms were involved 
in manufacturing multiple final products; however, in the U.S. only IBM, HP, and 
Xerox were involved in more than one area of the final products.  
The difference in the level of downward vertical integration affected the 
strategic technological choice of the competing firms. Japanese firms, which 
integrated downward process more than the U.S. firms, internalised both 
semiconductor laser manufacturing and final product assembly. In other words, 
Japanese firms had secure in-house demand for semiconductor lasers. They 
undertook complex negotiations on the specification and price of the semiconductor 
lasers not through market transaction but through organisational decision-making.39 
They could also negotiate on the timing and amount of semiconductor laser supply 
through their administrative hierarchy. Furthermore, the firms could strategically 
source semiconductor lasers of their own internally, even if their semiconductor 
lasers were slightly less competitive in price or quality than those of their rivals. 
Exploring the integrated circuit industry, Hashimoto pointed out that the vertically 
integrated Japanese firms were better positioned to invest in integrated circuit R&D 
because their in-house demand reduced the risk that they could not profit from their 
R&D.40 As Hashimoto indicated in the integrated circuit industry of Japan, the 
secure in-house demand for semiconductor laser was another important factor that 
allowed Japanese firms to invest in semiconductor laser R&D where many firms 
were competing with a similar technological choice.41  
                                                 
39 On hierarchical decision-making and market transaction, see Williamson, Markets and 
Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications: A Study in the Economics of Internal 
Organisation; Williamson, "The Economics of Organisation: The Transaction Cost 
Approach"; Coase, The Firm, the Market, and the Law; Coase, Winter, and Williamson. The 
Nature of the Firm: Origins, Evolution, and Development. 
40 Hashimoto, Nihon Keizai Ron (Japanese Economy), p.126. 
41 Examining technological choice in the U.S. and Japanese digital watch industries in the 
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Since the U.S. firms did not integrate the downstream manufacturing process 
much, they negotiated on the specification and price of semiconductor lasers through 
market transactions. The large and firm-specific investments could give rise to a 
hold-up problem. However, since both MBE and MOCVD were important core 
semiconductor laser technologies for the emerging high-volume markets, it was 
necessary to establish large scale manufacturing facilities. The low level of 
downward integration made it difficult for the U.S. firms to invest in MBE and 
MOCVD, when they were focusing their businesses on the profitable areas in the 
1970s and 1980s as presented above. The firms sought to select profitable smaller 
markets and assumed a product-differentiation strategy in order to avoid the hold up 
problem. If they could not do so, they exited from the competition. Bell, IBM, and 
Xerox, which integrated multiple final product manufacturing processes or planned 
to manufacture final products, were competing in both MBE and MOCVD for 
relatively longer periods than the other less integrated firms.  
 
                                                                                                                                         
1970s, Numagami pointed out that Japanese firms had a greater incentive to undertake 
parallel R&D projects than the U.S. firms did. Under the system of flexible market 
transaction, the firms could flexibly respond to technological change in the industry by 
changing their transaction partner on the one hand. On the other hand, under inflexible 
market transaction, which Japanese firms were facing, the firms tended to run parallel R&D 
projects so that they could respond to technological change of the industry through the 
administrative control. Numagami, "Flexibility Trap: A Case Analysis of U.S. and Japanese 
Technological Choice in the Digital Watch Industry." This argument suggests important 
points about the difference in technological choice between U.S. firms and Japanese firms. 
However, it does not fit well with the situation, which the semiconductor laser 
manufacturers were facing in the 1970s and 1980s. The argument assumes that there are 
several device manufacturers in the market that can supply different technologies so the 
firms could change their part suppliers. However, there were no device manufacturers in the 
market that could supply semiconductor lasers with either MBE or MOCVD. 
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5.4. Competition and Knowledge Spillover 
 
 The previous section discussed how Japanese firms could compete in the 
same technological areas with their rivals because they had a secure in-house 
demand for the semiconductor laser. The U.S. firms--many of which were less 
integrated--tended to differentiate their R&D. 
 This section discusses how the R&D strategies of the firms and the patterns 
of competition in the U.S. and Japan affected the nature of knowledge spillovers and 
how different trajectories of technological development emerged through different 
patterns of R&D competition and different institutional settings. 
 This section pays attention to two types of knowledge: domain-specific 
knowledge and lateral utilization knowledge.42 It assumes that the nature of 
knowledge spillover may vary depending on what types of knowledge are spilt. 
Then, it examines how different types of knowledge spillover emerged through the 
firms’ different R&D strategies and different institutional settings and how the 
nature of knowledge spillover resulted in the different trajectories of technological 
development in the U.S. and Japan. 
 
 
Competition and Knowledge Spillover in Japan 
Why did not Japanese firms differentiate their technological choice and 
target niche markets by exploiting the current semiconductor laser? One of the 
reasons was that it was necessary for the firms to satisfy growing in-house demand 
for semiconductor lasers. The corporate technical journals clearly indicate that the 
primary R&D goal was to provide semiconductor lasers to in-house assembly lines 
for final products.43 Since it was projected that the demand for optoelectronics 
                                                 
42 On the knowledge spillovers and these types of knowledge see 1.1. Knowledge Spillover 
and Technological Change in the first chapter. 
43 Much of the research in the corporate technical journal indicated that the firms were 
researching and developing the semiconductor laser primarily to satisfy their in house 
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products such as compact discs, laser printers, and POS scanners would be 
enormously growing, it was necessary for the firms to have a stable and secure 
semiconductor laser supply, as these were the most important devices for these 
products. The interviewees noted,  
 
“Because the semiconductor laser was one of the most 
important devices, we believed that it was necessary to source it 
internally in order have a secure and reliable laser supply. If we 
were behind rivals in R&D for the key device, it would be a 
serious disadvantage for the firm.” [Interviewee: B] 
 
“Because the semiconductor laser was the key component, we 
believed that it was indispensable to source it internally, even if it 
would be not profitable in the short term.” [Interviewee: K] 
 
“In-house users played very important roles. We sourced 
internally other components and designed the system 
configuration of final products. So,even if we could not currently 
develop the best semiconductor laser, we could possibly cover 
the poor quality by modifying other components and changing 
the system configuration of the final product. Therefore, even if 
we could not currently develop the best semiconductor laser, we 
hoped that we would win R&D competition in next generation 
semiconductor laser technology, and we kept investing in 
semiconductor laser R&D.” [Interviewee: H] 
 
Second, lateral utilization knowledge spillover, which was needed to apply 
the semiconductor laser for the new untapped markets, was limited among Japanese 
                                                                                                                                         
demand. For example, Kondō et al., "Konpakuto Dhisuku Purēyāyō MPL-2 gata Hikari 
Pikkuappu (MLP-2 Optical Pick Up for Compact Disc Player) ", p.742; Aiki et al., "Laser 
Diodes for Optical Information Processing Systems", p.45. 
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firms, while Japanese firms obtained domain-specific knowledge spillover from 
rival firms because they were competing in the same technological areas with a 
similar technological choice. Japanese firms were competing in the same 
technological areas for longer than U.S. firms. Since a number of firms were 
competing in the same technological area for a certain amount of time, the 
aggregated amount of R&D investment in the area became larger. The increase in 
R&D investment enhanced the possibility of successful R&D results.  
Furthermore, this pattern of technological choice of the firms affected the 
knowledge spillover. Many Japanese firms were undertaking parallel R&D in MBE 
and MOCVD from the beginning of the 1980s. Competition among the firms 
making the same technological choice induced domain-specific knowledge spillover 
more than lateral utilization knowledge spillover because the firms were competing 
in the same technological areas with similar technological choice. 
Reverse engineering and patent publication were important sources of the 
knowledge spillover.  Reverse engineering is an important method for a firm to learn 
from its competitors, especially when the technology is composed of complex sub-
technologies. It is a good source for domain-specific knowledge in particular 
because it involves taking apart an object to determine how it works, for the purpose 
of duplicating or enhancing the object. Corporate engineers of Japanese firms that 
were engaged in semiconductor laser R&D purchased competitors’ semiconductor 
lasers, tested their quality, disassembled them, and examined the structure and the 
mechanisms as a means of enhancing their own semiconductor lasers.44 The 
responses to the interview questions (5) “How did you approach technological 
knowledge created by other organisations?” and (6) “Did you have any particular 
organisation in which you paid attention to their research?” provide some insight 
into the nature of the spillover effect in Japan. Examples include the following: 
 
“We bought every semiconductor laser provided by the other firms 
                                                 
44 For instance, see Mamine, "Handōtai Rēzā Kaihatsu no Ayumi, (History of the 
Development of Semiconductor Laser)", p.70. 
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and did reverse engineering for them.” [Interviewee: K] 
 
“We did reverse engineering for semiconductor lasers on the 
market. But we tested only semiconductor lasers from Japanese 
firms because U.S. made semiconductor lasers were customized for 
special needs.” [Interviewee: H] 
 
“The semiconductor lasers from the U.S. and European firms were 
out of our sight because the performance of their semiconductor 
lasers was not high enough for our needs.” [Interviewee: G] 
 
These suggest that reverse engineering became an important source of domain-
specific knowledge spillover because the firms were competing in the same product 
market with similar technological choices. 
 The previous literature on the U.S. and Japanese patent systems has 
discussed how far the Japanese patent system played an important role in the 
knowledge flow.45 The individual countries had several differences in their patent 
systems from those of other developed countries, although the developed countries 
are attempting to standardize patent systems. Much of the previous literature on the 
Japanese patent system indicated that Japanese firms had a higher tendency to patent 
their R&D outcome compared to U.S. firms. It concluded that the institutional 
features of the Japanese patent system induced innovators to disclose technological 
information sooner than under the U.S. patent system and promoted technological 
diffusion and technological progress. Ordover pointed out several institutional 
features in the Japanese patent system including the “first-to-file” rule, pre-grant 
disclosure, pre-grant opposition, and licensing and royalties.46 One of the biggest 
                                                 
45 Aoki and Prusa, "Product Development and the Timing of Information Disclosure under 
U.S. and Japanese Patent Systems"; McDaniel, "Legal Features of the Japanese Patent 
System and Impacts on Technology Diffusion"; Ordover, "A Patent for Both Diffusion and 
Exclusion." 
46 Ordover, "A Patent for Both Diffusion and Exclusion." 
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institutional differences in the patent system between the U.S. and Japan is the file 
principle. The Japan Patent Office employed the “first-to-file” principle, which has 
been employed by most countries in the world (except for the U.S., Canada, and the 
Philippines). In this system, a patent is granted to the first person filing an 
application for the patent. Therefore, the firms have an incentive to apply for a 
patent for their R&D output, even though it discloses technological information. The 
U.S. and Canada employed the “first-to-invent” rule, which grants the patent to the 
person who first invented the item. As will be described in the following section, it 
is a rational strategy for firms not to patent a strategically important R&D outcome 
in order not to disclose it to the public to increase the appropriability of the R&D 
under the “first-to-invent” system.  
 The previous literature has revealed that patent information plays an 
important role in monitoring rival firms’ R&D and learning from rivals.47 As the 
previous literature on the patent system projected, Japanese firms increased the 
number of patents in semiconductor laser technology as shown in the first chapter. 
The increased number of patents in semiconductor laser technology from the firms 
competing in the same technological areas with similar technological choice 
provided a great source to induce domain-specific knowledge spillovers to Japanese 
firms. 
The patent citation of Japanese firms implies this knowledge flow. Table 5-6 
shows the patent citations that Japanese firms obtained for their own patents and 
show the transition of knowledge flow from the 1970s and 1980s.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
47 Gotō, Inobēshon to Nihon Keizai, (Innovation and Japanese Economy),p.41 and pp.146-
147. 
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Table 5-6: Patent Citation by Japanese Firms 
 1970-1979 1980-1989 
Number of Patents 164 3490 
Number of Cited U.S. firms' Patents 62 (61.4%) 1609 (34.2%) 
Number of Cited Japanese firms’ Patents 21 (20.8%) 2477 (52.7%) 
Other 18 (17.8%) 613 (13%) 
Source: Derwent Innovations Index. The Derwent Innovation Index was used to identify all 
of the patents that U.S. firms and Japanese firms obtained in these time periods. Then, it was 
used to check the citations that individual patents obtained up to 2006. Lastly, the cited and 
citing patent’s assignee was investigated to show the citation linkage.  
 
The table shows the number of cited patents that Japanese firms received in the 
1970s and the 1980s. First, this table shows that Japanese firms cited U.S. firms’ 
patents (61.4%) more than Japanese patents (20.8%) in the 1970s. This reflects two 
facts. The first is that American firms such as Bell and IBM were leading research 
organisations in semiconductor laser R&D in the 1970s. Japanese firms followed 
and learnt from these U.S. leading firms in the 1970s. The second is that Japanese 
firms could learn from the U.S. firms in the 1970s because all American and 
Japanese firms were competing for the same technological target. However, 
Japanese firms cited their firms’ patents more than the U.S. firms’ patents in the 
1980s. This suggests that Japanese firms obtained technological spillovers from 
Japanese rival firms more than from U.S. firms in the 1980s. It is the result of the 
pattern of competition whereby Japanese firms were competing in the same 
technological area through the 1970s and 1980s, while the U.S. firms were 
differentiating their R&D targets from the 1980s.  
 The research network of Japanese firms also played an important role in 
determining the nature of knowledge spillovers. As much of the previous literature 
indicated, the nature of the research network can significantly affect a firm’s R&D 
activity and the trajectory of technological development.48 A research network can 
                                                 
48 Podolny and Stuart, "A Role-Based Ecology of Technological Change"; Merton, 
"Priorities in Scientific Discovery: A Chapter in the Sociology of Science"; Bijker, Hughes, 
and Pinch, The Social Construction of Technological Systems: New Directions in the 
Sociology and History of Technology. Latour, Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists 
and Engineers through Society; Latour, Woolgar, and Salk, Laboratory Life: The 
Construction of Scientific Facts. 
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function as an important institutional conduit through which one may be able to 
access complementary knowledge. As shown in the third chapter, formal inter-
organisational networks were fairly limited in Japan, compared to those of the U.S. 
and Europe. The inter-organisational collaboration was much smaller in Japan than 
in the U.S. and Europe.  
Moreover, all of the participating firms in the collaborative research were 
electronics or telecommunication enterprises competing in the same product markets 
with a similar technological choice. As shown in Figure 3-6 in the third chapter, the 
only firms participating in formal inter-organisational collaboration were NTT, 
Fujitsu, and Hitachi, all of which were electronics and telecommunication firms 
competing in the same technological areas. This suggests that it was rare for 
Japanese firms to access complementary knowledge through a research network. 
The more the firms competed in the same technological areas with the same 
technological choice, the more the knowledge stock regarding epitaxy technologies 
was accumulated, which brought increasing returns to the firms’ R&D in those areas. 
Through competition among the firms targeting the same R&D goals with similar 
technological choice, Japanese firms solved the technological problems of MBE and 
MOCVD. The AIST reported that Japanese firms were leading in epitaxy technology 
around the world. Because epitaxy technology was important for mass production of 
the semiconductor laser, Japanese firms became competitive particularly in high 
volume consumer electronic semiconductor laser-related products such as optical 
information storage products, which were the biggest market in the optoelectronics 
industry.49 
As described above, many firms such as Hitachi, Toshiba, Mitsubishi 
Electric, Matsushita, NEC, Fujitsu, Sony, Sharp, and Sanyo were competing to 
develop reliable and long-lifespan lasers for high volume growing optical 
information storage market using MBE or MOCVD. First, developing a reliable 
laser, named VSIS, using LPE, which was the status quo epitaxy technology, Sharp 
                                                 
49 Forrest et al., JTEC Panel on Optoelectronics in Japan and the United States Final Report, 
pp.6-9. 
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gained a 70% market share for its 780 nano meter semiconductor laser, which was 
mainly for compact discs and dominated the laser in the beginning of the 1980s.50 
The first compact disc released in 1982 by Sony used the VSIS laser. The second 
biggest producer was Mitsubishi Electric at that time. Starting R&D in MOCVD 
from the end of the 1970s, Sony developed a reliable MOCVD and began pilot 
production of semiconductor lasers using MOCVD in 1984.51 With the MOCVD, 
Sony’s semiconductor laser gained a significant market share from 1984. After the 
epitaxy technology for mass production was fully developed, many Japanese firms 
were still competing in the high volume market. In November 1993, newspaper 
reported that a Japanese electric and chemical component manufacturer, Nichia 
Chemical industries, Co. Ltd, had invented a blue colour laser, which was regarded 
as a big technological breakthrough for information technology.52 Through 
competition in the same technological areas among many firms, technological 
breakthroughs in semiconductor lasers for the high volume market emerged one 
after another in Japan. The firms were competing to develop a shorter wavelength 
laser, which could allow high volume information storage, and holding a significant 
market share in this sector, as the JTEC report indicated.53 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
50 Wood and Brown, "Commercializing Nascent Technology: The Case of Laser Diodes at 
Sony", pp.178-179. 
51 Ibid. 
52 On Nichia Chemical Industries and its blue laser, see Fujii, "Nichia Chemical Industries 
Co.,Ltd.: How Can a Growing Firm Sustain its Strategic Position? " 
53 Forrest et al., JTEC Panel on Optoelectronics in Japan and the United States Final Report, 
pp.6-9. 
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Competition and Knowledge Spillover in the U.S. 
 While domain-specific knowledge spillover was enhanced among Japanese 
firms, lateral utilization knowledge spillover emerged in the U.S. Although various 
factors can affect the knowledge spillover, this section directs its attention to the 
patent system, the research networks, and the venture businesses in the U.S. and 
discusses how these affected the nature of technological knowledge spillovers. 
 First, comparing the U.S. and Japanese patent systems, the previous literature 
concluded that the institutional features of the Japanese patent system induced 
innovators to disclose technological information sooner than under the U.S. patent 
system and promoted technological diffusion and technological progress.54 The 
patent system in the U.S. and Canada was different from the Japanese patent system. 
The U.S. and Canada employed the “first-to-invent” rule, which grants the patent to 
the person who first invented the item, while Japan and other countries (except for 
the Philippines) used the “first-to-file” rule. In the “first-to-invent” principle, an 
inventor who can demonstrate priority with dated and witnessed laboratory notes, 
disclosures, etc., and can diligently reduce it to practice will be able to patent an 
invention, even if someone has already filed claiming that invention. Compared to 
the first-file rule, the incentive to file is much less in this system because the first 
inventor, not the first filer, is rewarded so that the inventor’s time and money are not 
diluted. It is a rational strategy for firms not to patent a strategically important R&D 
outcome in order not to disclose it to the public to increase the appropriability of the 
R&D under the “first-to-invent” system. American and Canadian firms, therefore, 
had less incentive to patent their R&D outcome than did Japanese firms. From the 
conclusion of the previous literature, it is possible to premise that the technological 
knowledge spillover through patents was not developed in the U.S., compared to 
Japan. 
 Second, the semiconductor laser research network in the U.S. was much 
                                                 
54 Aoki and Prusa, "Product Development and the Timing of Information Disclosure under 
U.S. and Japanese Patent Systems"; McDaniel, "Legal Features of the Japanese Patent 
System and Impacts on Technology Diffusion"; Ordover, "A Patent for Both Diffusion and 
Exclusion." 
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more developed than that of Japan and Europe, as presented in the third chapter. The 
participating organisations were more diversified in terms of their technological and 
business background than the participants of the Japanese research network (Figure. 
3-6) The business background of the participating firms was diverse. For example, 
both Ford and General Motors were motor vehicle and car body manufacturers, and 
Mictron was specialising in the production of voltage magnetrons. Pioneering 
systems engineering, TRW was developing missile systems and spacecraft. This 
suggests that the U.S. firms, which were involved in semiconductor laser R&D, 
accessed more complimentary knowledge through the research network than 
Japanese firms could. 
 Third, venture business played an important role in determining the nature of 
knowledge spillovers. The monthly report of the Industrial Bank of Japan reported, 
“Small and middle size business ventures played a central role in the U.S. 
optoelectronics industry except for a few large scale telecommunications companies 
and optical fibre manufactures.”55 The JTEC reported:  
 
“Due to the vibrant entrepreneurial industry base that is an integral 
part of the U.S. economy and which is apparently nearly absent in 
Japan, numerous small companies have spun-off from their larger, 
parent companies.”56 
 
 “These small businesses, which generally specialize in the 
manufacture of photonic components, are rarely positioned to 
compete head-to-head with the larger, systems-oriented companies; 
instead, they tend to specialize by filling narrow niches. As 
companies become established, the niches expand with the 
manufacture of additional specialized, unique devices produced to 
                                                 
55 Nippon Kōgyō Ginkō (the Industrial Bank of Japan), "Hikari Sangyō no Shōrai Tenbō 
(the Prospects for the Optoelectronics Industry)", p.77. 
56 Forrest et al., JTEC Panel on Optoelectronics in Japan and the United States Final Report, 
p. xvii 
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fill the needs of particular subsets of customers.”57 
 
Many technology-intensive startups spun off from intellectual hubs, which were 
observed in the collaborative networks examined in the third chapter. For instance, 
Spectra Diode Labs, Inc was founded in 1983 as a joint venture between Xerox and 
Spectra Physics, Inc. Spectra Diode Labs developed and manufactured high-power 
solid-state semiconductor lasers. Lytel was founded by a star spin-off engineer from 
RCA, in New Jersey in 1986. Many ventures were involved in collaborative research 
with such intellectual hubs as RCA and the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign. 
The startups that spun off from the intellectual hubs were regarded as the source of 
knowledge spillovers.58 The venture firms tended to invest in applied semiconductor 
laser technology instead of the fundamental technology of the semiconductor laser, 
since they had spun off from the intellectual hubs to target niche and custom product 
markets.59 This suggests that lateral utilization knowledge spillover was enhanced in 
American firms more than domain-specific knowledge spillover.  
Numerous small startups such as Lasertron, Sensors Unlimited, and Ortel 
launched into business to manufacture highly specialized laser, modulator, or 
detector devices, all of which were niche markets (Table 5-7).60 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
57 Ibid, p.xvii. 
58 On the relationship between the technology-intensive venture business and the knowledge 
spillovers, see Dorfman, "Route 128: The Development of a Regional High Technology 
Economy"; Florida and Kenney, "Venture Capital, High Technology and Regional 
Development." 
59 Forrest et al., JTEC Panel on Optoelectronics in Japan and the United States Final Report,  
p.10. 
60 Ibid., p.7   
5. Competition, Knowledge Spillover, and Innovation 
 197 
Table 5-7: Example of Venture Business in Semiconductor Lasers 
Company  SIC Code Business Description 
Lasertron Industrial and commercial machinery and equipment, not 
elsewhere specified 
Ortel61 Printed circuit boards 
Sensors Unlimited62 Drawing and insulating of nonferrous wire 
Judson Technologies63 Search detection, navigation, guidance, aeronautical and 
nautical systems and instruments manufacturing 
Varian Associates64 Public relations services 
Spectra Diode Labs Manufacturing high power semiconductor laser65  
Mictron Inc Industrial and commercial machinery and equipment, not 
elsewhere specified 
Tektronix Inc Instruments for measuring and testing of electricity and 
electrical signals 
Source: Forrest et al., JTEC Panel on Optoelectronics in Japan and the United States Final 
Report, p.7. ICARUS66. 
 
The spin-off engineers played an important role in these venture business. The spin-
off engineers from big companies and the engineers’ mobility across firms are 
important sources of technology transfer and knowledge spillovers. Examining 
career patterns within the industrial, academic, and governmental sectors and their 
relation to the publication and patent productivity in the U.S., Dietz and Boseman 
                                                 
61 Ortel is now a division of Emcore established in 1984, which is a manufacturer of 
semiconductors and related devices. ICARUS. 
62 Sensors Unlimited is now one division of Optical and Space Systems in Goodrich 
Corporation, which was established in 1870 and whose business is aircraft parts and 
auxiliary equipment manufacturing. ICARUS. 
63 EG&G Judson is currently Judson Technologies, LLC, which was established in 2000 and 
whose business is search, detection, navigation, guidance, aeronautical and nautical systems 
and instruments manufacturing. ICARUS. 
64 In 1999, Varian Semiconductor Equipment Associates, Inc spun-off of Varian Associates. 
65 SIC Code is not available for Spectra Diode Labs in ICARUS. 
66 ICARUS is a database containing profiles of 1.4 million public and private U.S. 
companies and 175,000 public and private Canadian companies. An ICARUS report 
typically contains information such as contact information, details of sales and number of 
employers, activities (US SIC and NAICS). 
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showed that intersectoral changes in jobs through the career provided access to new 
social networks and scientific and technical human capital, which resulted in higher 
productivity.67 Much of the previous literature on technology intensive startups 
indicated that star spin-off engineers played a significant role in knowledge 
spillovers and industrial development in the technology intensive industry in Silicon 
Valley in California and Route 128 in Massachusetts.68 Unlike Silicon Valley and 
Route 128 there was no clear regional cluster in the semiconductor laser industry. 
However, it was widely observed that star engineers moved from one company to 
another in the semiconductor laser industry. For instance, Receiving a Ph.D in both 
Physics and Electrical Engineering from Caltech in 1936, an American physicist, 
Simon Ramo, who is now known as “the father of the Intercontinental ballistic 
missile (ICBM)” began his engineering career in microwave research at GE from 
1936 until 1946.69 He was hired by Hughes Aircraft in 1946. In 1953, Simon Ramo 
launched a venture business, Ramo-Wooldridge Electronic Corporation, with Dean 
W. Wooldridge, his colleague at Hughes Aircraft. Ramo-Wooldridge was involved in 
ICBM R&D with the U.S. Air Force. Ramo-Wooldridge merged with Thompson 
Products to become TRW70, which supported Gordon Gould’s laser research. This 
mobility permeated into the industry throughout the period of optoelectronics R&D. 
 This high mobility of star engineers in the U.S., which allowed firms to 
access complementary knowledge, was in complete contrast with that of Japan. As 
the previous literature on the Japanese labour market indicated, it was quite rare that 
for star engineers to transfer from one company to another in Japan in the 
semiconductor laser industry. Investigating the role played in the process of 
                                                 
67 Dietz and Bozeman, "Academic Careers, Patents, and Productivity: Industry Experience 
as Scientific and Technical Human Capital." 
68 Dorfman, "Route 128: The Development of a Regional High Technology Economy"; 
Koepp, Clusters of Creativity: Enduring Lessons on Innovation and Entrepreneurship from 
Silicon Valley and Europe's Silicon Fen,; Saxenian, Regional Advantage: Culture and 
Competition in Silicon Valley and Route 128. 
69 Robinson, United States Business History, 1602-1988: A Chronology. p.291. On Simon 
Ramo in detail, see his book, Ramo, The Business of Science: Winning and Losing in the 
High-Tech Age. 
70 For overview of TRW’s history, see Dyer, TRW: Pioneering Technology and Innovation 
Since 1900. 
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innovation by corporate “star” scientists. Furukawa and Gotō argued that the highly 
cited core scientists served as channels through which external knowledge flows to 
firms.71 
 Assuming that highly cited engineers were “stars”, this thesis identifies top 
engineers by looking at the number of academic papers and citations. Then it 
investigates the changes in their affiliations indicated in their academic papers in 
order to examine the mobility of top engineers. The analysis of the changes in the 
affiliation of the top engineers allows the investigation of top engineers’ mobility in 
the U.S. and Japan. This thesis uses two databases for this analysis; Web of Science 
and Scitation. Thomson Scientific covers approximately 6,125 journals and provides 
an online database, Web of Science, allowing identifying citation trends and highly 
cited engineers in semiconductor laser technology from 6,125 active journals in the 
natural sciences. However, it does not provide detailed affiliation information. 
Therefore, using another database, Scitation, the thesis attempts to identify the 
affiliation of the top fifty highly cited engineers. Because Scitation covers all of the 
important academic journals in applied physics and provides not only reference and 
citation information but also authors’ detailed affiliation information, it is possible to 
trace the mobility of engineers by investigating their affiliations. 
Calculated by the number of academic papers published from 1960 to 1990 
and the number of their citations until March of 2007, Table 5-8 show the top fifty 
highly cited engineers in semiconductor laser technology in the U.S. and Japan 
based institutions from 1960 to 1990. Examining their affiliations, this table shows 
the mobility of the highly cited engineers.72 If the engineer changed his/her 
affiliation once (e.g. from Bell Laboratory to UC Berkeley) from 1960 to 1990, this 
thesis counts two for its affiliation. If the engineer did not change his/her affiliation 
at all in this time period, the thesis counts one for its affiliation. This table clearly 
shows that the mobility of the highly cited engineers was higher in the U.S. than 
                                                 
71 Furukawa and Gotō, "The Role of Corporate Scientists in Innovation." 
72 See Appendix V for the full list of the top fifty engineers and their affiliations. 
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Japan.73 
 
Table 5-8: Mobility of Top Fifty Engineers 
 Engineers of U.S. Organisation Engineers of JPN Organisation 
Number of observation 50 50 
Average number of affiliations held 
by engineer 2.1 1.1 
Variance 1.69 0.09 
Median 2 1 
Maximum 5 2 
Source: Web of Science. Scitation. 
 
It must be noted that such academic paper citation does not necessarily capture all of 
the top engineers, since the publicising activity of engineers is highly dependent on 
his/her organisation’s policy. Some firms may encourage their engineers to publish 
R&D outcomes in academic journals. Other firms may prohibit their engineers from 
publishing R&D outcomes. Therefore, the author asked the interviewees whether 
they knew star engineers in the semiconductor laser area who changed their 
affiliation from 1960 to 1990. The following table lists the top four most frequently 
indicated U.S. star engineers by the interviewees. 
 
Table 5-9: U.S. Star Engineers 
Name Affiliations 
Botez, D UC Berkeley--- IBM--- RCA---TRW--- Univ of Wisconsin  
Dupuis, R.D. UINC--- Bell--- Rockwell--- Texas Instruments 
Tsang, W. T, UC Berkeley--- Bell 
Panish, M.B Oak Ridge National Lab--- AVCO--- Bell 
Source: Scitation. Interview. 
 
Won-Tien Tsang, who received a Ph.D in semiconductor laser technology in 1976 
                                                 
73 This finding is compartible with the findings on hypermobility of high-tech labor in 
California observed by Florida and Kenney. Florida and Kenney, The Breakthrough Illusion: 
Corporate America's Failure to Move from Innovation to Mass Production, pp.79-83. 
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from the University of California, Berkeley and devoted in his research at Bell 
Laboratory, was the only star engieer who did not change his affiliation during his 
professional career.  
Over the course of their careers, Morton B. Panish, Dan Botez, and Russell 
D. Dupuis changed their affiliations. Morton B. Panish began his engineering career 
at Oak Ridge National Laboratory in 1954.74  He moved to Research and Advanced 
Development Division of AVCO Corporation in 1957 and researched very high 
temperature chemistry. He moved to Bell Laboratory’s Materials Science Research 
Department in 1964 and developed the first semiconductor laser that worked at room 
temperature with Hayashi Izuo in 1970. Dan Botez, who received a Ph.D in 
semiconductor laser and LPE technology in 1976 from the University of California, 
Berkeley and became one of the highly cited engineers in semiconductor laser 
technology, began his engineering career at IBM in 1976.75 From 1977, he moved to 
RCA, David Sarnoff Research Centre, and developed novel types of semiconductor 
lasers, two of which became commercial products. In 1984, he spun off from RCA 
and founded Lytel Inc in New Jersey. In 1986, jointing TRW Inc, Botez continued 
his research in high-power semiconductor lasers. In 1998, he founded Alfalight in 
Madison, Wisconsin, whose business was to design and manufacture high-power 
semiconductor lasers for the industrial, defence, and telecommunication markets. 
Russell D. Dupuis, who was also one of the highly cited star engineers, received a 
Ph.D in 1973 from University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign under the guidance 
of Nick Holonyak, who was one of the most highly cited engineers in semiconductor 
laser technology.76 Transferring between several firms; AT&T Bell Laboratories, 
                                                 
74 The author contacted Dr. Morton B. Panish. He kindly sent me his Curricurum Vitae and 
professional highlights. The following descriptions about his career are based on the CV and 
professional highlights. 
75 The author contacted Professor Dan Botez. He also kindly sent me his Curricurum Vitae. 
The following descriptions about his career are based on the CV. 
76 Nick Holonyak, Russell Dean Dupuis, and George Craford were given the National Medal 
of Technology by Technology Administration, US Department of Commerce, which is the 
U.S. federal agency working to maximise technology’s contribution to America’s economic 
growth, in 2002 for contributions to the development and commercialisation of light-
emitting diode (LED) technology, with applications to digital displays, consumer electronics, 
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Rockwell International, and Texas Instruments, Dupuis proceeded to research 
semiconductor laser technology. 
All of the interviewees agreed that the mobility of engineers was quite 
limited in Japan. The following table lists the top four Japanese engineers who were 
not captured by Web of Science but were indicated as a “star” by the interviewees. 
 
Table 5-10: Japanese Star Engineers 
Name Affiliations 
Hayashi, I. Tokyo Univ--- Bell--- NEC--- OMCS--- Optoelectronics Technology Research 
Nishizawa, J Tohoku Univ 
Suematsu, Y Tokyo Institute of Technology 
Nannichi, Y NEC 
Source: Scitation. Interview.  
 
Nannichi Yasuo, Nishizawa Junichi, and Suematsu Yasuharu did not change their 
affiliations in the course of their engineering careers.77 
One exception was Hayashi Izuo. He began his professional career at the 
University of Tokyo Department of Science and Technology in 1946 and became a 
visiting scholar at MIT in 1963.78 He transferred to Bell Laboratory in 1964 and 
developed the first semiconductor laser that worked at room temperature in 1970, 
which was one of the important breakthroughs in this field. He moved to the Central 
Research Division of NEC from 1971 to 1982. He was appointed as technical 
director of the OMCS project from 1982-1987.  
                                                                                                                                         
automotive lighting, traffic signals, and general illumination. The following description on 
the career of Russell Dean Dupuis is based on the Biography of Russell D. Dupuis provided 
for the medal by Technology Administration. 
77 Nannichi Yasuo was invited to Brazil, Universidade Estadual de Campinas, to support the 
United Nation’s project to update information technology in Brazil and to construct optical 
fibres for long distance communication in 1977. He spent one year in Brazil. However, since 
he was on loan to Brazil and he was expected to come back to NEC, this one-year change is 
not included in this analysis. 
78 For his career, see, Itō, "Dai 1 kai Ōyō Butsuri Gakkai Gyōseki Jyushōsha Sōkai (the 
Profile of Japan Society of Applied Physics Prizewinners) ", pp.384-385. 
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 As previously stated, American firms adopted different technological choice 
in epitaxy technology, which was the strategically important technology regarding 
the semiconductor laser. It is possible to suppose that they could access lateral 
utilization knowledge spillover so that they could differentiate their R&D to target 
untapped product markets or customized niche markets. As they differentiated their 
semiconductor laser R&D, lateral utilization knowledge was more accumulated in 
the U.S. On the other hand, R&D investment in the fundamental semiconductor 
laser technology was scattered and dispersed in the U.S. due to the strategic 
behaviour of the less integrated semiconductor manufacturers. 
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5.5. Conclusion 
  
Examining epitaxy technology, which was the most fundamental technology 
in semiconductor lasers, this chapter explored how Japan gained competitiveness in 
high volume markets and how American firms held the lead in niche markets, asking 
these two research questions. How did Japanese firms come to compete in the same 
technological area with the same technological choice for a longer term than their 
counterparts in the U.S. did? How did this pattern of the strategic behaviour of the 
firms affect technological change in semiconductor lasers?  
 It discussed two points. First, it shows the economic conditions and the 
firms’ level of vertical integration, which determined their R&D incentive. The less 
vertically integrated American firms had a stronger incentive to differentiate their 
products and to position themselves in niche markets. In contrast, Japanese firms, 
which integrated the downward process, had less incentive to differentiate their 
product and to find a niche market because they had secure in-house demand for 
their semiconductor lasers. They could strategically adopt their in-house-made 
semiconductor lasers, even when rival firms achieved successful R&D. The 
organisational transaction facilitated asset-specific R&D investment. As a result, 
Japanese firms competed in the same technological area longer than their American 
counterparts. 
 Second, the competition patterns differed in the areas in which knowledge 
spillovers emerged. Numerous venture firms spun off from the parent firms and 
targeted niche markets in the U.S. Therefore, knowledge spillover emerged in the 
areas where semiconductor laser technology was applied and exploited to fill 
untapped markets. While the U.S. firms assumed an R&D differentiation strategy, 
Japanese firms targeted the same market with the same technological choice. 
Epitaxy technology, the most economically and strategically important 
semiconductor laser technology, was their R&D target. This pattern of competition 
of Japanese firms induced domain-specific knowledge spillover, which enhanced the 
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development of fundamental semiconductor laser technology instead of exploiting 
niche product markets, while it reduced the level of lateral utilization knowledge 
spillover and precluded the firms from differentiating their R&D to target niche 
markets. American firms differentiated their semiconductor laser R&D and tended to 
target untapped small markets. Based on the rich inter-organisational networks in 
semiconductor laser research, the firms could access complementary knowledge to 
differentiate their R&D and target niche markets. 
This chapter draws a somewhat ironic conclusion from the case of 
semiconductor laser epitaxy technology in the U.S and Japan. Since the U.S. firms 
were in a better position to learn how to apply the semiconductor lasers to untapped 
markets, they differentiated their R&D and targeted niche markets. As a 
consequence the R&D efforts were dispersed into different technological domains in 
the U.S. As a result, knowledge about epitaxy technology, which was the 
fundamental technology of semiconductor lasers, was not developed in the U.S. In 
other words, because the American firms were in a better position to learn how to 
apply the laser to new areas, they targeted untapped markets instead of competing to 
develop the core technology of semiconductor lasers for the high volume market. 
The highest volume market was eventually taken by Japanese firms.  
Pointing out that American firms were poor imitators, Nathan Rosenberg 
questioned why Japanese were so much better at imitation than the Americans.79 He 
pointed to effective solutions to the myriad small problems that are key to efficient 
mass production techniques as one of the important factors in the imitations made by 
Japanese industries. He argued that American engineers and scientists thinking about 
the innovation process focused excessively upon the upstream process. Comparing 
R&D activity in Japan and the U.S., Mansfield came to a similar conclusion, namely 
that there was a clear difference in R&D resource allocation between the U.S. firms 
and Japanese firms.80 The American firms devoted their R&D resources to improve 
product technologies more than process technologies. On the other hand, the 
                                                 
79 Rosenberg and Steinmueller, "Why are Americans Such Poor Imitators?" 
80 Mansfield, "Industrial R&D in Japan and the United States: A Comparative Study" 
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Japanese firms allocated their resources to process technologies rather than product 
technologies. 
The findings of this thesis imply that the developed research networks and 
the nature of knowledge spillover channelled U.S. firms to allocate their resources in 
a certain direction. It is reasonable to assume on the one hand  that if the firms could 
access complementary knowledge and obtain lateral utilization knowledge, they 
tended to allocate their resources to product technologies in order to apply their 
technology to a new product market. 
While the U.S. firms assumed an R&D differentiation strategy, Japanese 
firms targeted the same market with the same technological choice. Japanese firms, 
which had difficulty of accessing lateral utilization knowledge, focused their R&D 
efforts on epitaxy technology. The inter-organisational research network through 
which the firms could have accessed complementary knowledge to differentiate their 
R&D, was not developed in Japan. As a result, many Japanese firms were 
channelled to compete in developing epitaxy technology, which was the 
economically and strategically most important semiconductor laser technology. The 
pattern of competition of Japanese firms induced knowledge spillovers to accelerate 
the development of core semiconductor laser technology instead of exploiting niche 
product markets.  
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6. Conclusions and Implications 
 
Summarizing the arguments of this study, this chapter presents a discussion 
of the implications of the findings for (1) economic growth and R&D investment, 
(2) vertical integration and technological change, (3) competition and technological 
change, and (4) diseconomies of duplicated R&D. Last, it discusses some limitations 
of this study with a view to future research. 
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6.1. Summary of the Arguments 
 
This thesis has scrutinised the development of semiconductor laser 
technology from 1960 to 1990 and examined how the pattern of competitive 
advantage indicated by the JTEC report emerged.  
The first two chapters presented the research questions, methodology, and 
literature review. The first chapter revealed that the semiconductor laser became one 
of the most important electronic devices in the optoelectronics industry and that 
Japanese firms gained high competitiveness in semiconductor lasers. Reviewing 
previous arguments about the technological development of post-war Japan, the 
second chapter showed that the arguments about competition and technological 
change have been limited, although the literature does contain much discussion of 
the organisational setting of Japanese firms under the framework of the “Japanese 
management system.”  
The third chapter examined the state of aggregate knowledge in the industry. 
Analysis of doctoral theses and academic papers on the semiconductor laser revealed 
that physicists began semiconductor laser research in the 1950s. However, it was not 
until the 1970s that physicists regularly released their findings on the semiconductor 
laser. Although Japan accelerated its human capital accumulation beginning in the 
1970s, it was not the leading country in human capital accumulation in 
semiconductor laser technology. Co-authored academic papers indicate that inter-
organisational collaborative research was less common in Japan than in the U.S. and 
Europe. The findings presented in this chapter are summarized as follows. 
 
 [3-1] The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. were the two leading countries in human capital 
accumulation in semiconductor laser technology.   
 [3-2] Although Japan accelerated its human capital accumulation from the 1970s, 
it was not the leading country in human capital accumulation in semiconductor 
laser technology. 
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 [3-3] Inter-organisational collaboration in semiconductor laser technology was 
more developed in the U.S. than in Japan and Europe.  
 
Based on these findings, the third chapter concluded that the state of aggregate 
knowledge and human accumulation in the semiconductor laser in Japan was not 
necessarily superior to those in the U.S. and Europe. 
While the third chapter examined the human capital accumulations and the 
research networks in semiconductor laser technology, the fourth and fifth chapters 
focused on the industrialization of the semiconductor laser. The JTEC indicated that 
the research consortium launched in 1977 played an important role in the 
development of the optoelectronics industry in Japan. However, the JTEC report did 
not present clearly how the consortium contributed to this development.  Analysing 
the technological spillover effect among the participating firms and competition in 
the product market revealed the following points. 
 
 [4-1] Important technology was not produced in the consortium, compared to the 
in-house R&D of the participating firms. 
 [4-2] The consortium stimulated corporate private R&D in areas where the 
participating firms undertook joint R&D.   
 
The consortium provided important path dependency for technological and 
industrial development. It stimulated the participating firms’ in house R&D in the 
areas where they were involved in the joint research in the consortium. However, it 
was not the only reason for technological development and competitiveness in the 
industry.   
The fifth chapter examined how the firms competed under the conditions 
provided by the research consortium. It also scrutinised important technological 
changes that occurred with the emergence of new epitaxy technology (i.e., LPE, 
MBE, and MOCVD).  Concretely, by examining patents of epitaxy technology, this 
chapter presented the following points. 
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 [5-1] Most Japanese firms simultaneously engaged in R&D competition in both 
MBE and MOCVD, while some American firms adopted neither MBE nor 
MOCVD.   
 [5-2] Japanese firms competed in MBE and MOCVD over relatively longer 
periods than American firms did.   
 
Based on these findings, this chapter first examined the economic conditions 
and the level of vertical integration of competing firms in order to examine how 
Japanese firms competed in the same technological areas with the same 
technological choices for a longer term than their counterparts in the U.S. The 
differences in the level of downward vertical integration affected the expected 
returns from the firms’ R&D. The less integrated U.S. firms had a stronger incentive 
to differentiate their products and to position themselves in a niche market since they 
had to sell their products to the assembler through market transactions. In contrast, 
because of their downward integration, Japanese firms had less incentive to 
differentiate their product and to find a niche market since they had secure in-house 
demand for their semiconductor lasers. The integrated firms could strategically 
source the semiconductor laser internally. 
Differences in inter-organisational networks and technological choice 
between U.S. and Japanese firms brought about the different types of knowledge 
spillover. The competition among the firms that took the same technological choice 
and targeted the same product markets enhanced domain-specific knowledge 
spillover. The U.S. firms, which assumed an R&D differentiation strategy, brought 
about lateral utilization knowledge into the industry. 
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6.2. Contribution 
  
This study aims to make four contributions. The first lies in the sources used 
for this thesis. In addition to academic journals in applied physics, corporate 
technical journals, corporate annual reports, and interview data, some of the most 
important data in this study were patent and patent citation data. The number of 
studies examining technological change in Japan with patent and citation data has 
been recently growing. However, they use U.S. patent data to examine technological 
change of Japanese frims. The lack of a good patent database in the Japan Patent 
Office has been a big obstacle.  Therefore, much of the previous literature discussing 
technological innovation in Japan used either certain specifications of products or 
sales of certain products to explore technological change, since their primary focus 
was product market competition. However, product data does not necessarily reveal 
R&D competition, which usually precedes competition in the product market. Both 
patent data and patent citation data, provided by the Derwent Innovation Index in the 
British Library, has allowed systematic and consistent investigation of the timing of 
technological change and its impact. Since this research aimed to investigate R&D 
competition in semiconductor laser technology, patent data was a primary source. 
This study is the first attempt to examine technological change in R&D competition 
in Japan by using Japanese patent and patent citation data. One interesting finding 
was that the joint R&D in the OMCS, which has been recognized as successful and 
which became a prototype consortium for the U.S., was not successful compared to 
the in-house R&D of the participating firms. Supporting Katz’s argument about 
competition among the participants in the product market, this finding reveals a 
double-edged implication. On the one hand, if the participating firms were direct 
rivals in product markets, they will underinvest in joint research, which eventually 
dampens the performance of joint research. On the other hand, if the participating 
firms were rivals in product markets, the competition enhancing effects will be 
spread to their product markets. 
The second contribution is to the economics and business history literature 
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on technological development in Japan. A vast amount of literature has explored 
how Japanese firms gained technological competitiveness in the technology-
intensive industries beginning in the 1970s. The optoelectronics industry became an 
important sector in the national economy of Japan in the 1980s, and the 
semiconductor laser was the most important electrical device in the industry. 
However, a very few detailed study has been done on the development of the 
optoelectronics industry.1  
Third, this study aimed to bridge theoretical research on the economics of the 
technology-intensive industry and empirical research on the competitiveness of the 
technology-intensive industry in Japan. Much of the previous research about 
technological change in Japan focused on the unique organisational and institutional 
features of the “Japanese management system.” Organisational settings are 
important supply-side mechanisms pushing technological change to a certain pattern. 
However, it is important to examine the dynamic process by which the supply-side 
mechanism evolved through competition. This thesis aims to provide a better 
understanding of the nature of knowledge spillover and the trajectory of 
technological development. Introducing two different types of knowledge; current 
technology domain-specific knowledge and lateral utilization knowledge, it shows 
how different types of knowledge spillover emerged through research networks and 
firms’ technological choice in the U.S. and Japan. This study is one of the first 
attempts to examine the pattern of technological change in post-war Japan by 
directing its attention to knowledge spillover. 
 
                                                 
1 Saxonhouse and Miyazaki’s studies are two of the first studies on the optoelectronics 
industry. He surveyed the optoelectronics industry in Japan and provided the first important 
outline of the industry. Saxonhouse, "Optoelectronics in Japan: Some Economic 
Consideration." Miyazaki, Building Competence in the Firm: Lessons from Japanese and 
European Optoelectronics. 
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6.3. Discussions and Implications 
  
This section presents some discussions and implications induced by the 
argument of this thesis. First, it discusses the economic context in which the 
technological development of the semiconductor laser occurred. Then it presents 
implications about competition, vertical integration, spillover, and technological 
change. 
 
 
Economic Growth and R&D Investment 
 The economic context in which the firms were competing to develop 
semiconductor lasers must be noted. Japan attained high economic growth, called an 
“economic miracle,” from 1955. It became the second-largest capitalist country in 
GNP in 1968. This trajectory of high and rapid economic growth was halted by the 
significant increase in yen value resulting from the cancellation of the Bretton 
Woods system and the soaring oil price soar caused by the Fourth Arab-Israeli War 
in 1973. However, the Japanese economy grew until 1991. R&D investment in 
semiconductor laser technology was undertaken in the context of steady economic 
growth.  
 Compared to the Japanese economy, the growth of the U.S. and European 
economies were low. U.S. post-war prosperity ended in the early 1970s. Key 
industries such as the automobile and steel industries began to confront competition 
with foreign manufacturers in the domestic market. The U.S. economy suffered from 
soaring inflation and inactive economic growth throughout the 1970s, reaching the 
most severe recession since the Great Depression in 1982. Even though the real GDP 
began to grow and the unemployment rate began to drop in 1982, many key 
industries lost their competitiveness. The European economy attained steady growth 
from 1976 to 1979. However, Japan achieved a relatively higher rate growth. Table 
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6-1 shows GDP growth rate in Japan, the U.S. and European counties after 1973. 
 
Table 6-1: GDP Growth Rate 
 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
Japan 8 -1.2 3.1 4 4.4 5.3 5.5 2.8 2.8 3.1 
U.S. 7.1 -1.4 -0.6 2.6 2.4 3.2 2.7 -2.1 -1.5 1.9 
European 
Union 15 
countries2 6.2 0.4 0.1 4.8 3.9 4.6 3.8 0.8 1.9 -0.1 
Source: For the U.S. and European Union 15 countries, calculated from OECD Data 
obtained in Economic Social Data Service (ESDS)3.  GDP Growth Rate for Japan is taken 
from Japan Statistical Yearbook 2007. Key Statistics p.3. 
 
This table shows that Japan attained a higher rate of growth through the ten years 
after the oil crisis in 1973, compared to the U.S. and European countries. Since 
R&D investment in technology-intensive industry entails high uncertainty, firms 
tend to reduce their R&D in technology-intensive areas when they face financial 
difficulty. Therefore, it is possible to suppose that Japanese firms were experiencing 
a macro-economic environment that favoured R&D investment. While the spillover 
effect is an important source of technological development, it may reduce the R&D 
incentive of the firm. Because the R&D result of the firm might be used by its 
competitors, the post-innovation rents decrease when many firms compete in the 
same technological area. The existence of technological spillovers may reduce the 
degree of expected R&D returns, while it increases R&D productivity. However, 
since the economy was growing and the demand for the semiconductor laser was 
significantly increasing, the possibility that the firms could appropriate R&D results 
was high. When demand exceeds supply, it is possible for the rest of the firms to 
appropriate a certain amount of rents by meeting unsatisfied demands. Therefore, the 
growing economy and increasing demand enhanced the degree of expected returns 
                                                 
2 European Union 15 countries are Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Denmark, Republic of Ireland, United Kingdom, Greece, Portugal, Spain, 
Austria, Finland, and Sweden. 
3 ESDS International aims to promote and facilitate increased and more effective use of 
international datasets in resaerch, learning and teaching and provides a range of 
international databsets. 
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from R&D. Additionally, it must be noted that the pattern of R&D competition of 
Japanese firms was supported by the growing national economy. 
 Furthermore, much of the previous literature on post war Japanese firms 
indicated that Japanese firms took a longer-term strategy compared to the U.S. firms, 
which tended to be more conscious of short-term results than Japanese firms. For 
example, Kagono et al. found that U.S. managers were extremely sensitive about 
short-term results such as the stock price and the profit gained on each share 
compared to Japanese managers.4 One of the reasons for this pointed out by much of 
the previous literature lies in the difference in corporate governance between the U.S. 
and Japanese firms. Much of the previous literature on finance and corporate 
governance in post-war Japan indicated that the dominant fund raising method of 
post-war Japanese firms was indirect financing instead of direct financing from 
markets.5 As a result of indirect financing and cross-share holdings, Japanese 
managers were relatively free from the risk of a takeover bid. In contrast, U.S. firms 
had to be cautious about the possibility of a takeover bid. Kagono et al. indicated 
that U.S. firms had to steadily raise earnings on a quarterly basis in order to 
discourage takeover because U.S. firms were more based on direct financing.6 
Kagono et al. also pointed out that “The sensitivity toward stock prices and 
concomitant emphasis on short-term performance are attributable not only to the 
threat of takeover. Both are also encouraged by bonus systems, stock option plans, 
and intra-company control systems. In Japan, the stock option arrangement has not 
been broadly adopted, and with a high percentage of stable shareholders and 
government restrictions on ownership by foreign investors, there is much less threat 
of a takeover than in the United States.”7 These arguments are quite consistent with 
the findings that U.S. firms tended to focus their semiconductor laser business on 
                                                 
4 Kagono et al., Strategic vs. Evolutionary Management: A U.S.-Japan Comparison of 
Strategy and Organisation, p.153. 
5 For example, Okazaki, "Sengo Nihon no Kinyū Shisutemu (Finance System of post-war 
Japan)." Regarding to the main bank system and corporate governance, see Teranishi, "the 
Main Bank System." 
6 Kagono et al., Strategic vs. Evolutionary Management: A U.S.-Japan Comparison of 
Strategy and Organisation, p.155. 
7 Ibid., p.155. 
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untapped niche markets, which were more profitable, and Japanese firms competed 
in the same high volume areas, which were growing faster. 
 
 
Vertical Integration and Technological Change  
 A central argument of this thesis relates to the pattern of competition, 
spillover effects, and technological development. It contends that the level of 
vertical integration affected the pattern of competition, which brought a different 
pattern of knowledge spillover and technological development. This idea has 
implications for the previous literature on vertical integration and technological 
change. 
Much of the literature in economics and in economic and business history 
focuses on vertical integration and technological change. There is a clear debate 
concerning the relationship between the level of integration and technological 
development. 
Examining industrial development in the U.S. from 1870 to 1940, Alfred 
Chandler proposed that technological development was closely correlated to the 
degree of vertical integration.8 Vertically integrated firms were in the best position to 
develop innovation. Examining the British cotton industry, William Lazonick came 
to the same conclusions as Chandler. His argument maintained that economies of 
scale were essential to technological development and argued that less integrated 
firms could not compete effectively in many areas. 9 Florida and Kenney argued that 
firms with high levels of vertical integration could realise technological innovation 
and attain economic growth based on economies of scale, as long as coordination 
between R&D and manufacturing activities was well-operated; their argument also 
contended that the high level of vertical integration contributed to technological 
                                                 
8 Chandler, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business. 
9 Lazonick, Competitive Advantage on the Shop Floor; Lazonick, Business Organisation 
and the Myth of the Market Economy. 
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development.10  
Examining the 1970s developments in productive technology and consumer 
demand, Piore and Sabel challenged the paradigm of big enterprise and mass 
production. They argued that the less vertically integrated small European firms 
could produce technological development and economic growth based on skilled 
craftsmen and the flexible division of labour.11 Sabel and Zenith also contended that 
production through small flexible networks could be an alternative to mass 
production.12 
The case of technological development of semiconductor lasers has 
implications for these debates about vertical integration and technological change. 
First, it confirmed that the low level of vertical integration in the U.S. provided 
firms with an incentive to differentiate their products. In contrast, vertically 
integrated firms could continue to invest in the same technological area as their 
rivals longer than the less integrated firms could because they retained secure in-
house demand. These strategic R&D choices of competing firms aggregately 
affected the areas in which knowledge spillovers emerged. The spillover effects 
emerged in the U.S. in the areas where the firms exploited the untapped product 
market by utilizing the semiconductor laser. Therefore, knowledge spillover 
enriched the technological development of customized semiconductor laser 
applications in the U.S. In contrast, knowledge spillover enhanced fundamental 
semiconductor laser technology in Japan because the firms with high technological 
proximity were competing to develop a high-quality semiconductor laser for high 
volume markets and reduce production costs at the same time.  
These findings suggest that the level of vertical integration affects the areas 
where technological change occurs. The less integrated firms introduced 
technological innovation to differentiate their product for the market so that they 
                                                 
10 Florida and Kenney, The Breakthrough Illusion: Corporate America's Failure to Move 
from Innovation to Mass Production. 
11 Piore and Sabel, The Second Industrial Divide: Possibilities for Prosperity. 
12 Sabel and Zeitlin, "Historical Alternatives to Mass Production: Politics, Markets, and 
Technology in Nineteenth-Century Industrialization." 
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could achieve a sufficient level of expected returns from their R&D. Competition 
among the less integrated firms eventually promoted technological development 
mainly in the custom or niche market. Highly integrated firms competed in the same 
technological areas and produced technological change in high volume production 
areas. The findings of this thesis suggest that vertically integrated firms were well-
positioned for the technological development of core technology. Figuratively 
speaking, semiconductor laser technology was the trunk of a tree that had numerous 
branches. The branches were semiconductor laser application areas.13 The spillover 
effects in the U.S. emerged mainly to enrich the branches of the tree. Numerous new 
small branches emerged by exploiting the trunk. The spillover effects in Japan 
emerged to enrich the trunk more than creating new branches.  
This study’s findings suggest that the pattern of competition and spillover in 
the U.S. was not suitable to enhance technological development of the core 
technology from which many product markets could have spun off. The numerous 
startups that spun off from the intellectual hubs and produced a technological 
breakthrough in semiconductor laser technology may have been an illusion. 
Examining the U.S. technology-intensive industries, Florida and Kenney pointed out 
that American firms often failed to capitalise on technological breakthroughs.14 
Their argument showed that the U.S. firms often failed to connect R&D with 
production; thus, they could not industrialize the technological breakthroughs 
produced in R&D. The findings in this thesis partly support this argument. 
Immediately after a breakthrough emerged, startups spun off from the parent 
company in order to exploit and retain business in the small niche market. It was 
rational for the U.S. firms, which could access complementary knowledge to target 
untapped markets, to allocate its resource to target untapped markets, which were 
usually more profitable than the product markets in which many firms already 
competed.15 As a result, semiconductor laser technology was diffused in numerous 
                                                 
13 On the list of the application areas, see the first chapter, Introduction. 
14 Florida and Kenney, The Breakthrough Illusion: Corporate America's Failure to Move 
from Innovation to Mass Production. 
15 Discussing competition between a leading firm with an established product and its 
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small niche markets in the U.S. However, the development of core technologies such 
as epitaxy technology was retarded. 
Through the technological competition for high volume market among 
vertically integrated firms, Japanese firms induced domain specific knowledge 
spillover, which enhanced the trunk of the semiconductor laser technology tree. 
Although it would be rash to draw any definite conclusions from these points, they 
definitely need further examination; these findings may lead to new insights about 
vertical integration, spillover effects, and technological development.  
 
 
Competition and Technological Change 
The third implication involves policy, which is related to the relationship 
between competition and technological change. On the basis of his historical studies, 
Lazonick pointed out that governments should develop industrial policies to increase 
the market concentration ratio in their national economies so that competitive firms 
could be highly integrated.16 By contrast, Piore and Sabel contended that the 
government needed to promote competition and cooperation so that small firms 
could engage in technological development through the flexible division of labour. 
Porter also came to a different conclusion than Lazonick.17 Because he believed 
competition facilitated technological change, he insisted that the government frame a 
policy to promote competition.  
The findings in this study support part of Porter’s policy implication.  
                                                                                                                                         
challengers, Christensen argued that the leading firm could be left behind by a new 
technological revolution brought by its rivals because it had an incentive to allocate its 
resources to current established products. The strategic choice of U.S. firms in the 
optoelectronics industry suggests that the patterns of knowledge spillover and access to 
complementary knowledge influenced firms’ resource allocation and played important roles 
in long-term technological change and their competitive advantage. Christensen, The 
Innovator’s Dilemma: When New Technologies Cause Great Firms to Fail; Christensen and 
Bower, "Customer Power, Strategic Investment, and the Failure of Leading Firms." 
16 Lazonick, Business Organisation and the Myth of the Market Economy, p.302. 
17 Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations,pp.126-128. 
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Competition in the same technological area among the firms that internalised the 
downstream process accelerated technological development in the case of 
semiconductor laser technology; thus, firms quite possibly develop competitiveness 
through competition. This fact, however, does not necessarily imply that competition 
always contributes to technological development and industrial growth. If the less 
vertically integrated firms compete in the same technological area, it is possible that 
they will assume a product-differentiation strategy at an earlier stage than the 
vertically integrated firms will. The competing firms’ R&D strategies affect the 
areas in which spillover effects and technological development emerge. Therefore, it 
is necessary for policy makers to examine the firms’ level of vertical integration and 
the areas in which technological spillover would emerge. It is also important for 
policy makers to set target technological areas in which to attain technological 
development because a firm’s R&D strategy determines the areas in which 
technological development will emerge. If it is necessary to attain technological 
development in the core parent technology, from which many technological spinoffs 
would later emerge, it is rational to stimulate competition among vertically 
integrated firms. However, if the target is to enhance breakthroughs in the 
application areas, it would be rational to promote spinoffs from the intellectual hubs.  
Firms may strategically choose to participate in competition to access 
technological spillover and to gain competitiveness, instead of differentiating their 
products and avoiding competition. As Cohen and Levinthal argued, it is necessary 
for firms to be involved in R&D to absorb new knowledge created by other firms.18 
Participating in competition in the same technological areas as competitors plays an 
important role for firms in accumulating principal technological competence. When 
viewed from the importance of competition, this perspective is consistent with 
Hayek’s notion of competition.19 Hayek regarded competition as a discovery 
procedure and emphasised the efficiency of information transaction in a market 
                                                 
18 Cohen and Levinthal, "Absorptive Capacity: A New Perspective on Learning and 
Innovation"; Cohen and Levinthal, "Innovation and Learning: The Two Faces of R&D." 
19 Concerning his conceptualisation of knowledge, see Hayek, "Competition as a Discovery 
Procedure"; Hayek, "The Meaning of Competition." 
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economy. Knowledge of individual firms is limited. An individual firm does not own 
enough knowledge about the whole economy and does not necessarily know what 
the best technology is and what kind of product mix is suitable for the market. Each 
firm has distinct, limited knowledge. From Hayek’s perspective, competition is the 
process by which each firm pursues its business opportunities through its own 
knowledge. Through competition, firms gain knowledge about what is the most 
useful production system, which is the most satisfying product mix, and what kind 
of organisation is suitable for their business strategy. If many firms are competing in 
the same technological area for a certain period of time, this discovery procedure is 
enhanced. 
The case of technological development of the semiconductor laser suggests 
that firms whose level of vertical integration was high could keep investing in the 
competitive device market relatively longer than firms with low levels of vertical 
integration, and this enriched the discovery procedure of the firms and enhanced 
technological changes in the area. Many business management studies have 
contended that a firm should avoid competition by constructing barriers against its 
competitors.20 For example, Kim and Mauborgne stressed the necessity for firms to 
stay away from markets in which many competitors were intensively competing and 
to find untapped product markets, called “blue oceans”.21 They argued that firms 
should assume a “blue ocean strategy,” avoiding competition and seeking 
unexploited markets. They noted, “Blue ocean strategy challenges companies to 
break out of the red ocean of bloody competition by creating uncontested market 
space that makes the competition irrelevant.”22 Introducing the framework of 
industrial organisation into the competitive strategy of firms, Michael Porter argued 
that firms must take unique positioning in the product market to hold sustainable 
                                                 
20 For example, Porter, Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing Industries and 
Competitors; Porter, Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior 
Performance; Porter, "What Is Strategy?" 
21 Kim and Mauborgne, Blue Ocean Strategy: How to Create Uncontested Market Space 
and Make the Competition Irrelevant. 
22 Ibid., p.x. 
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competitive advantages.23 Directing his attention to Japanese firms, he also pointed 
out “few Japanese companies have strategies… Instead of choosing distinctive ways 
of competing, tailoring activities, and making trade-offs, Japanese companies tend to 
proliferate products and features, serve all market segments, sell through multiple 
channels, and emulate one another’s production approaches. Continuous operational 
improvement is confused with strategy.”24 
It was pointed out that Japanese firms’ profitability was quite low, even 
though sales and production were growing. For instance, the chair of the Japan 
Petrochemical Industry Association reported that the petrochemical industry of 
Japan began its operation in 1958, attained significant growth, and became the 
second largest after the U.S. in only ten years. However, because competition 
became excessive, the industry became “growth without profit.”25 Previous literature 
has observed fierce competition and growth without profit in various industries in 
post-war Japan.26 As Porter indicated, governmental and industrial reports suggested 
that it was necessary for firms to differentiate their business and not to be drowned 
in fierce competition.27 
However, this study suggests that it would be rational for a firm to participate 
in competition in order to accumulate technological competence when many firms 
were competing to develop the core technology, because important technological 
breakthroughs would result. In other words, it would be rational for firms to 
compete in the same area, as long as knowledge spillover brings increasing returns 
to firms’ R&D and the product market is expected to grow. If a firm retreated from 
competition in the early stage of technological development, it would be left behind 
                                                 
23 Porter, Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance, pp.41-44.  
Porter, "What Is Strategy?" 
24 Porter et al., Can Japan Compete?,p.91. 
25 Japan Petrochemical Industry Association, Sekiyu Kagaku Kōgyō 10 nenshi (10 year 
history of Japanese Petrochemical Indusry), preface. 
26 Regarding to fierce and “excessive” competition, see Itoh et al., “Industry Policy of Japan. 
Chapter 8. On “growth withour profit” in the petrochemical industry, see Shimizu, "Sangyō 
Seisaku to Kigyō Kōdō no Shakai Teki Ghōsei (The Interaction between the Industrial 
Policy and the Firms’ Strategy in the Petrocemical Industrry of Japan)." 
27 Japan Petrochemical Industry Association, Sekiyu Kagaku Kōgyō 10 nenshi (10 year 
history of Japanese Petrochemical Indusry). 
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in important technological breakthroughs. Moreover, a firm that avoided R&D 
competition and targeted the custom niche product markets could be left behind and 
lose its competitive advantage. In Kim and Mauborgne’s term, a firm that followed 
“blue ocean strategy” might be trapped and left behind by breakthroughs in the core 
technology provided by the competition, in which the firm failed to participate. 
 
 
Concentrated Resource Allocation and Diseconomies of Duplicated 
R&D 
This thesis has pointed out the economies of duplicated R&D investment, 
which produced domain-specific knowledge spillover effect to enhance 
semiconductor laser technology. Because of duplicated R&D in epitaxy technology--
strategically and economically the most important technology in semiconductor 
laser--Japanese firms could acquire domain-specific knowledge spillovers from their 
competitors.  
However, this strategy does not always produce spillover or bring favourable 
outcomes to the firms. For example, competition in the same technological area may 
cause excessive investment in R&D, beyond the level of socially desirable R&D 
investment.28 Additionally, duplicated R&D strategy may bring about two different 
effects in the environment where technological change is frequently changed.29 First, 
it might reduce the level of R&D competition. Indicating divergent strategies reduce 
the ability of oligopolistic firms to coordinate their strategy, Michael Porter 
maintained that strategic symmetry among the rivals decreases industry rivalry.30 
From this point of view, it is possible to suppose that firms chose the duplicated 
R&D strategy to band together with competitors in an effort to limit the level of 
                                                 
28 Dasgupta and Stiglitz have shown that the R&D investment of firms could result in 
excessive investment. Dasgupta and Stiglitz, "Industrial Structure and the Nature of 
Innovative Activity." 
29 In Abernathy’s account, this duplicated R&D strategy might play different roles until the 
dominant technology emerged. Abernathy, The Productivity Dilemma: Roadblock to 
Innovation in the Automobile Industry. 
30 Porter, "The Structure within Industries and Companies' Performance." 
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competition. Based on game theory, Chen and MacMillan discussed that it is rational 
for a firm to assume the same strategy as its competitors because doing so preserves 
the current market position and prevents devastating competition.31  
Also, if firms engaged in duplicated R&D investment and focused on a 
certain technological area, they might become vulnerable to radical environmental 
change. A clear dilemma exists between competition with high technological 
proximity, which is a source of domain-specific knowledge spillover effects, and 
vulnerability to radical environmental change. If firms make similar technological 
choices and compete in the same technological area, domain-specific knowledge 
spillovers in the industry--a source of increasing returns of technological 
development--will increase. If they make different technological choices and 
compete in different technological segments, the industry will be relatively less 
vulnerable to radical environmental change, while domain-specific knowledge 
spillovers in the industry will be scarce. Since R&D investments are irreversible and 
the absorptive capacity entails R&D path-dependency, it is possible to suppose that 
this pattern of strategic choice reduces flexibility in R&D strategy. The 
technological choice of firms entails path-dependency and can lock in the pattern of 
knowledge spillover in the industry.32 
Thus, it was risky for the Japanese semiconductor laser industry to have 
firms making similar technological choices and competing in the same technological 
areas. Japan was behind the U.S. and U.S.S.R. in human capital accumulation in 
semiconductor laser technology when the firms began semiconductor laser R&D. 
The fact that the firms made similar technological choices and competed in similar 
technological areas played an important role in focusing R&D resources of the firms 
into certain technological areas and in attaining catching up to the technological 
level of the advanced nations. As shown in the fourth chapter, the OMCS launched 
                                                 
31 Chen and MacMillan, "Nonresponse and Delayed Response to Competitive Moves: The 
Roles of Competitor Dependence and Action Irreversibility." 
32 Regarding increasing returns, lock in, and path dependency, see Arthur, Increasing 
Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy, Economics, Cognition, and Society; Arthur, 
"Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-in by Historical Events"; Katz and 
Shapiro, "Network Externalities, Competition and Compatibility." 
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by the government contributed to focus the R&D resources of firms into certain 
areas. Examining government sponsored collaborative research in Japan, 
Sakakibara’s argument suggested that it might be risky to run a large-scale 
government funded research consortium because the participating firms tended to 
take similar technological choice.33 However, while the duplicated R&D 
competition might have been risky, the concentrated resource allocation gained 
leverage to induce spillover effects and to overtake the U.S. in the short term. 
The final point is related to the timing of the duplicated R&D strategy. The 
findings of this thesis do not necessarily suggest that duplicated R&D competition 
always leads to high competitiveness of the industry. It depends on the phase of 
technological development and industrial development. 
Semiconductor laser technology was still nascent and not industrialized on a 
large scale when firms began to compete in epitaxy technology. Examining the U.S. 
automobile industry from 1896 to 1975, Abernathy argued that the appearance of 
dominant design in the technological system played an important role determining 
the ratio of product innovation and process innovation.34 The dominant design is a 
product design whose main components and mechanisms underlying fundamental 
characters do not vary from one model to another. In Abernathy’s account, when 
Japanese firms began duplicated R&D investments, a dominant design did not 
appear in semiconductor laser technology, since the most important technology for 
large-scale production had not yet been developed. Winning the R&D competition 
for the dominant design is desirable, since it enables firms to collect monopoly rents. 
And it is important for firms to invest in R&D in order to accumulate absorptive 
capacity in the important technological areas.35  Thus, it was rational that many 
firms were competing in important technological areas.  
However, if this pattern of competition was taken in technological areas 
                                                 
33 Sakakibara, "The Diversity of R&D Consortia and Firm Behavior: Evidence from 
Japanese Data", p.184 and 192. 
34 On the dominant technology, see Abernathy, The Productivity Dilemma: Roadblock to 
Innovation in the Automobile Industry. 
35 Cohen and Levinthal, "Absorptive Capacity: A New Perspective on Learning and 
Innovation"; Cohen and Levinthal, "Innovation and Learning: The Two Faces of R&D." 
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where the dominant design had already appeared, the returns from duplicated R&D 
and spillover effects would decrease. Figuratively speaking, a tree cannot grow 
higher once it reaches a certain height; at that point, it is necessary to nurture its 
branches and fruits. Thus, in a sense, Japanese firms undertook duplicated 
competition at the right time in the case of semiconductor laser technology. However, 
the pattern of competition among the startups spun off from the intellectual hubs 
might have resulted in greater market positions in high-volume product markets if 
undertaken in the later stage of technological development. These facts suggest that 
duplicated R&D is not necessarily always favourable to technological development, 
and the outcome of a certain pattern of competition may depend on the phase of 
technological development. 
Finally, the phase of industrial development also influences the economies of 
duplicated R&D competition. Some of the Japanese electronics firms were losing 
their competitiveness and Korean firms such as LG Electronics and Samsung 
Electric gained competitiveness based on cost advantages from the 1990s. 
Economies of scale play a significant role in the consumer electronics industry, 
especially in the manufacturing process of the consumer goods industry. Since R&D 
in a technology intensive industry needs a large amount of sunk costs, it is necessary 
to attain economies of scale in the manufacturing process to cover the large amount 
of direct costs. In terms of economies of scale, on the one hand, it was not rational 
that many firms should compete in the same area because production facilities were 
scattered in the industry and the production scale of individual firms became small. 
It was necessary to increase the concentration ratio of the industry to achieve higher 
level of economies of scale. On the other hand, the fact that many firms were 
competing in the same area stimulated domain-specific knowledge spillover effects, 
which could bring increasing returns to R&D. Therefore, the duplicated R&D 
competition on the one hand brought domain-specific knowledge spillover effects to 
the industry and eventually resulted in the development of semiconductor laser 
technology. On the other hand, it could dampen the economies of scale in production. 
Once the fundamental technologies are developed and the technology has become 
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fully commercialised, the diseconomies of duplicated R&D competition would 
became much greater. It is possible to surmise that the institutional settings and the 
strategic behaviours of the firms in Japan historically played an important role in the 
phase of the technological and industrial development of semiconductor laser 
technology and resulted in the technological competitiveness.36 
 
 
Limitations and Further Research 
 This section discusses some limitations of this study and provides some 
perspectives for future research. First, this study examined human capital 
accumulation through an analysis of doctoral theses on the semiconductor laser. It 
also discussed co-authored academic papers that focused on the semiconductor laser 
research network. The analysis of co-authored academic papers is a widely used 
method of exploring the research community network.37 But since co-authored 
academic papers capture only the formal research network, it is also necessary to 
examine the more informal research community network, which might play an 
important role in the knowledge spillovers.38 
 Second, this study used academic papers and patent data to examine 
technological change and knowledge spillover effects. It must be noted that this 
thesis examines only the explicit knowledge codified in the academic papers and 
patents. This codified technological knowledge is not, however, necessarily all 
                                                 
36 Introducing the concept of “national innovation system”, Nelson and Winter indicated that 
the institutional settings of a country had a strong impact on the pattern of innovation of 
firms. Nelson and Winter, An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change. Examining the 
development of synthetic dye technology, Murmann showed how technological capability of 
firms and national institutions coevolved. Murmann, Knowledge and Competitive 
Advantage: the Coevolution of Firms, Technology, and National Institutions. 
37 On the analysis of co-authored academic papers, see Smith, "The Trend toward Multiple 
Authorship in Psychology." 
38 Examining the “Transversely Excited Atmospheric Pressure CO2 Laser” research network, 
Collins discussed that it was difficult to capture the nature of much scientific knowledge, 
which entailed tacit and invisible knowledge, with conventional techniques such as analysis 
of co-authored paper and citation. Collins, "The TEA Set: Tacit Knowledge and Scientific 
Networks." 
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knowledge created in R&D. As it is said, “we can know more than we can tell”, 
knowledge can be unconscious, unexternalisable, and intransmittable, which is 
usually defined as tacit knowledge.39 Unlike explicit knowledge--which can be 
explicitly expressed and codified into figures, sentences, or formula expressions--
tacit knowledge is implicit and cannot easily be codified.40 It is necessary to 
examine knowledge that cannot be codified in the academic papers and patents in 
order to comprehend knowledge spillovers. Although it is not easy to access tacit 
knowledge by definition, more wide-ranging and deeper interviews would help 
reveal the real nature of R&D competition and technological spillover. 
Third, this study maintains that the level of vertical integration affected the 
pattern of R&D investments. However, it does not specify how differences in the 
level of vertical integration historically emerged in the U.S. Europe, and Japan. It is 
necessary to scrutinize the broader social context to examine how differences in the 
level of vertical integration emerged in the U.S., Europe, and Japan in order to 
reveal the whole picture of the development of the optoelectronics industry. 
 Lastly, this study discussed change and competition in the technological 
development of the semiconductor laser as a case study in which various social and 
economic factors came into play. The case study approach allows the 
disentanglement of the complex relationship between technological change and 
competition, and helps identify important factors such as level of vertical integration 
and spillover effects. However, scrutinizing only the semiconductor laser case does 
not reveal a general pattern of technological change driving Japanese technology-
intensive industry to gain competitiveness. Thus, the case study method has 
limitations. The next step from this study is to expand the scope of analysis. 
Specifically, technological change and competition in other technological areas (e.g., 
                                                 
39 The arguments about knowledge--what we know, what we do not know--have been deeply 
considered in various areas such as history of science, philosophy of science, and 
phenomenology. Reviewing the details of these arguments is far beyond the scope of this 
thesis. On tacit knowledge, see Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical 
Philosophy; Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension. 
40 On the distinction of explicit and implicit knowledge, see Nonaka and Takeuchi, The 
Knowledge-Creating Company: How Japanese Companies Create the Dynamics of 
Innovation, pp.8-11 and pp.83-90. 
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the long-wavelength semiconductor laser and the optical fibre in the optoelectronics 
industry) must be examined in order to present the whole picture of the development 
of the optoelectronics industry, which is one of the most important sectors of 
technology-intensive industry. 
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Appendix I: Number of Doctorates Awarded in Semiconductor Laser in the World  
(1) 1963-75 
 
 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 
Australia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Austria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Belarus 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 
Belgium 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Brazil 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Canada 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
China 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Czechoslovakia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Denmark 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Finland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
France 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 0 1 1 0 0 
Germany 0 0 0 2 0 1 2 1 2 2 2 3 5 
Greece 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
India 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 
Ireland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Israel 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Italy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Japan 0 0 0 1 2 4 0 0 3 0 2 2 3 
Korea 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Netherlands 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Norway 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Philippines 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Poland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Portugal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Russia and 
USSR 1 0 2 4 2 6 4 9 5 9 5 5 6 
Singapore 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Spain 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sweden 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Switzerland 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 0 0 0 1 1 2 
Tadzhikistan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Taiwan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
United Kingdom 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 2 1 3 
United States 0 0 5 4 7 2 4 4 5 4 4 5 5 
Yugoslavia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 2 0 8 11 12 18 14 17 17 20 17 20 25 
Source: Takahashi,  Bibliography of Doctoral Theses on Semiconductor Lasers II. 
 
 
  232 
 
Appendix I: Number of Doctorates Awarded in Semiconductor Laser in the World (2) 1976-1990 
 
 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Australia 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Austria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 
Belarus 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Belgium 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 3 1 2 
Brazil 0 1 1 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 
Canada 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 
China 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 1 6 4 
Czechoslovakia 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 3 
Denmark 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 2 1 3 1 2 0 4 
Finland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
France 1 1 1 4 1 0 3 5 2 4 4 12 13 8 19 
Germany 3 3 4 4 1 4 1 2 8 2 3 6 9 6 17 
Greece 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
India 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ireland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Israel 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 
Italy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Japan 3 7 3 5 7 9 9 8 13 7 10 13 10 21 13 
Korea 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 3 3 3 4 1 
Netherlands 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 2 
Norway 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Philippines 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Poland 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Portugal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Russia and USSR 8 1 4 4 4 5 10 5 6 5 7 4 6 10 4 
Singapore 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Spain 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sweden 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 3 1 2 
Switzerland 1 0 0 1 0 1 2 0 2 2 1 2 0 1 0 
Tadzhikistan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Taiwan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 
United Kingdom 1 2 1 4 0 3 1 4 1 8 8 6 14 7 8 
United States 7 5 7 7 9 11 8 6 7 14 23 19 17 26 36 
Yugoslavia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 26 20 23 31 26 39 37 36 46 54 67 74 87 96 123 
Sourer: Takahashi,  Bibliography of Doctoral Theses on Semiconductor Lasers II. 
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Appendix II: Institutions and Co-Publications  
 
Journal of Applied Physics 
Institutions Number of Co-Publications 
University of Illinois at Urban-Champaign (U.S.) 
Monsanto (U.S.) 
8 
Universidade Estadual de Campinas (Brazil) 
Hewlett-Packard (U.S.) 
1 
University of Rhode Island (Island) 
Siemens (Germany) 
1 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (US) 
Rockwell (U.S.) 
8 
Standard Telecommunication Laboratories (UK) 
University of Sheffield (UK) 
1 
Fujitsu (Japan) 
NTT (Japan) 
2 
National Central University (China) 
University of Arizona (US) 
1 
British Telecom (UK) 
University of Birmingham (UK) 
1 
TRW (US) 
Southern Methodist University (US) 
1 
Oregon Graduate Center (US) 
Bell Laboratories (US) 
1 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (US) 
Xerox (US) 
7 
British Telecom (UK) 
Standard Telecommunication (UK) 
1 
TRW (US) 
University of California Los Angeles (US) 
1 
TRW (US) 1 
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Digital Signal Corporation (US) 
Tel-Aviv University (Israel) 
Soreq Nuclear Research Center (Israel) 
1 
North Carolina State University (US) 
Aracor (US) 
1 
CNET (France) 
Bell (US) 
AT&T Bell (US) 
1 
Ben Gurion University of the Negev (Israel) 
Martin Marietta Laboratories (US) 
University of Delaware (US) 
1 
Source: Journal of Applied Physics, 1965-1985 
 
Journal of Applied Physics Letters 
Institutions Number of Co-Publications 
Ortel Corporation (US) 18 
California Institute of Technology (US)  
Rockwell International (US) 14 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (US)  
University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign (US) 11 
Xerox Palo Alto Research Center (US)  
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign (US)  7 
Monsanto Company (US)  
Fujitsu Laboratories Ltd (Japan) 3 
Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public Corporation (Japan)  
Corporate Solid State Laboratory, Varian Associates, 
Incorporated (US) 2 
University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign (US)  
Hewlett-Packard Laboratories (US) 1 
Universidade Estadual de Campinas (Brazil)  
University of Osaka Prefecture (Japan) 1 
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Tohoku University (Japan)  
University of Berne (Switzerland) 1 
Bell Laboratories (US)  
Max-Planck-Institut für Festkörperforschung (Germany) 1 
Rice University (US)  
Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (Switzerland) 1 
Philips (the Netherlands)   
Post Office Research Centre (UK) 1 
University of Birmingham (UK)  
Hughes Research Laboratories (US) 1 
California Institute of Technology (US)  
Imperial College (UK) 1 
Standard Telecommunications Laboratory (UK)  
Cambridge University (UK) 1 
Standard Telecommunications Laboratory (UK)  
Hitachi Ltd (Japan) 1 
California Institute of Technology (US)  
Electrotechnical Laboratory (Japan) 1 
Nippon Institute of Technology (Japan)  
Institut für Halbleitertechnik und SFB 202, Rheinisch-
Westfalische Technische Hochschule Aachen (Germany) 1 
Max–Planck-Institut für Festkörperforschung (Germany)  
Institut für Festkörperphysik der T.U.Berlin (Germany)   
General Optronics Corporation (US) 1 
Naval Research Laboratory (US)  
Universität Stuttgart (Germany) 1 
AEG-Telefunken (Germany)  
Max–Planck-Institut für Festkörperforschung (Germany) 1 
Technische Universität Wien (Austria)  
Instituto de Optica (Spain) 1 
IBM Research Laboratory (US)  
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Imperial College (UK) 1 
Philips (the Netherlands)   
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (US) 1 
General Motors Research Laboratories (US)  
University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign (US) 1 
McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (US)  
Tel Aviv University (Israel) 1 
Soreq Nuclear Research Center (Israel)   
General Optronics Corporation (US) 1 
Rutgers University (US)  
Thomson–CSF (France) 1 
Centre National D'Etudes et Telecommunications (France)  
Kanazawa University (Japan) 1 
Tokyo Institute of Technology (Japan)  
Thomson-CSF (France) 1 
Centre Universitaire d'Orsay (France)  
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (US) 1 
Philips (the Netherlands)   
Naval Research Laboratory (US) 1 
Spectra Diode Laboratories (US)  
University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign (US) 1 
Xerox Palo Alto Research Center (US)  
Tektronix (US)  
Bell Communications Research (US) 1 
Hitachi Ltd (Japan)  
University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign (US) 1 
Ford Microelectronics Inc (US)  
Xerox Palo Alto Research Center (US)  
University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign (US) 1 
Mictron Inc (US)  
Xerox Palo Alto Research Center (US)  
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Bell Communications Research (US) 1 
Stanford University (US)  
Fujitsu Laboratories Ltd (Japan) 1 
Shizuoka University (Japan)  
Spectra Diode Laboratories (US) 1 
Xerox Palo Alto Research Center (US)  
Tohoku University (Japan)  1 
Semiconductor Research Institute (Japan)  
Source: Journal of Applied Physic Letters, 1962-1985 
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Appendix III: List of Interviewees 
 Interviews were conducted with corporate engineers and managers, and government officials with direct knowledge of 
manufacturing, manufacturing process engineering, and the OMCS project. The questioning first focused on a set of fixed 
questions after asking for a description of the interviewee’s job title and responsibilities.  The fixed questions were:  
(1) What was the most important technological breakthrough in semiconductor laser technology throughout the 1970s and 
1980s?  
(2) How do you think the Japanese semiconductor laser came to be competitive?  
(3) What did you and your colleagues think about the OMCS project when it was launched?  
(4) What did you and your colleagues think about epitaxy technologies?  
(5) How did you approach technological knowledge created by other organisations? 
 (6) Did you have any particular organisation you paid attention to their research? 
(7) Who were the star scientists in semiconductor laser throughout the 1970s and 1980s?   
 
The interviewees who participated in the consortium were asked another set of fixed questions.  The questions involved 
(1) the relationship between the in-house R&D and the joint R&D in the OMCS project; (2) who was sent to the OMCS project; 
and (3) to what extent the engineers from the different participating firms cooperated in the OMCS project.  After addressing 
these points, more detailed and individual points were addressed. 
Interviewees were first selected by looking at such journals as Oyo Butsuri (Journal of Applied Physic of Japan) and 
Elekutronikusu (Electronics). The author directly contacted them, mainly by email and by letter.  Second, the author contacted 
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Interviewee A, B, and H through the Hitotsubashi University network. Third, some were recommended by other interviewees.  
The response rate was quite high.  Except for one refusal, which involved a schedule conflict, no one refused to be interviewed.  
 
Interviewee Organisation in 1979 Position in 
1979 
Current Organisation Current Position Participated / 
Not 
Date Time Place 
A Hitachi Engineer Cube IT (R&D Consulting 
Firm) 
President Not 09/09/04 11:30-
15:00 
Tokyo 
B Sanyo Electric Engineer Sanyo Electric General Manager Not 25/10/05 13:30-
15:30 
Osaka 
C Sanyo Electric Engineer Sanyo Electric Manager Not 25/10/05 13:30-
15:30 
Osaka 
D MITI General 
Manager 
National Institute of Advanced 
Industrial Science and 
Technology, Grid Technology 
Research Center 
Emeritus 
Advisor 
Director 26/10/05 14:00-
17:30 
Tokyo 
E MITI Manager Optoelectronic Industry and 
Technology Development 
Association 
Director Manager 27/10/05 10:00-
12:00 
Tokyo 
F Fujitsu Engineer Optoelectronic Industry and 
Technology Development 
Association 
Deputy General 
Manager/ Senior 
Staff 
Engineer 27/10/05 10:00-
12:00 
Tokyo 
G Toshiba Manager Tokai University Professor Not 27/10/05 15:30- Shizuoka 
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21:30 
H Matsushita Electric Engineer Matsushita Electric General Manager Not 28/10/05 10:00-
13:30 
Tokyo 
I Matsushita Electric Engineer Kōchi University of 
Technology 
Professor Engineer 31/10/05 12:30-
14:30 
 
Kochi 
J Matsushita Electric Engineer Matsushita Electric  Manager Engineer 01/11/05 11:30-
12:30 
Kyoto 
K Sony Engineer The University of Tokyo Project Professor Not 02/11/2005 10:30-
12:30 
Tokyo 
L Sharp Engineer Fuji Photo Film Divisional 
Manager 
Not 13/02/06 10:00-
12:00 
Kanagawa 
M Fujitsu Engineer National Institute of Advanced 
Industrial Science and 
Technology 
Senior Advisor Engineer 15/02/06 10:00-
12:00 
 
Ibaraki 
N Toshiba Engineer Tōhoku University Professor Research 
Leader 
16/02/06 14:00-
16:00 
Tokyo 
O NEC General 
Manger 
Toyama New Industry 
Organisation 
Director Advisor 17/02/06 14:00-
16:00 
Tokyo 
P Mitsubishi Electric Engineer Kanazawa Institute of 
Technology 
Professor Research 
Leader 
21/02/06 11:00-
13:30 
Ishikawa 
Q NTT Engineer Osaka University Professor Not 22/02/06 15:00-
17:00 
Tokyo 
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R NTT Engineer Keiō University Professor Not 01/09/2006 15:00-
17:00 
Kanagawa 
S Oki Electric Engineer Fuji Photo Film Senior Research 
Scientist 
Engineer 04/09/2006 14:00-
15:30 
Kanagawa 
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Appendix IV: Consortium Expenditure in U.S. Dollars 
 
Table 4-1: OMCS and Large Scale Projects 
 
Real R&D Expense 
(Million U.S. Dollar) 
Project Term 
(Year) 
Number of 
Participating Firms 
Annual R&D Expense per 
Participant  (Million U.S. Dollar) 
OMCS 
170 7 14 1.736 
Sample 30    
Average 155.531 8.167 18.6 1.017 
Median 128.836 8 15 1.071 
Source: Kawatetsu Tekuno Risāchi, (Kawatetsu Technology Research). "Kokka Purojekuto 
no Unei/ Kanri Jōkyō Bunseki Chōsa Hōkokusho II, (Evaluation Report on Operation and 
Management of National Projects).".  R&D Expense is 2005 U.S. dollar value.  The 
exchange rate is 2005 average rate: 1 US Dollar = 110.12445 Japanese Yen. 
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Appendix V: Top Fifty Engineers and their Affiliations 
 
 
Top Countries in Semiconductor Laser Technology 
Country Record Counted Share of 1391 Record Counted (%) 
Japan 431 30.9849 
The U.S. 367 26.3839 
The U.K. 104 7.4766 
U.S.S.R. 92 6.6139 
France 68 4.8886 
Federal Republic Germany 41 2.9475 
Source: Web of Science. “Record Counted” means that Japan obtained 431 papers that were 
cited at least once. Calculated by the number of academic papers published from 1960 to 
1990 and the number of their citations until 2006, this table presents the distribution of 
highly cited engineers. From 1960 to 1990, Web of Science captures 1391 records, which 
are based on the number of papers and citations, and shows that both Japan and the U.S. 
were two leading countries in terms of the number of highly cited engineers. 
 
 
The Top Fifty Highly Cited U.S. Based Engineers 1960-1990 
 
Engineer Record Counted Affiliation 
Scifres, DR 32 Univ of Illinois Urbana Champaign--- Xerox--- Spectra Diode  
Yariv, A 29 Bell--- Caltech 
Striefer, W 25 
Stanford Univ--- Univ of Rochester---- Xerox---- Univ of New 
Mexico---- Spectra Diode 
Welch, DF 21 Cornell Univ ----Spectra Diode 
Wang, S 16 UC Berkeley 
Cross, PS 14 
Institut für Angewandte Festkörperphysik der Fraunhofer-
Gesellschaft--- Bell--- HP--- Spectra Diode 
Katz, J 14 Caltech 
Olsson, NA 12 Bell 
Burnham, RD 11 
Univ of Illinois Urbana-Champaign--- Xerox--- Spectra Diode--- 
Xerox--- Amoco Research Center  
Margalit, S 11 Technion–Israel Institute of Technology Israel --- Caltech 
Agrawal, GP 8 
Indian Institute of Technology--- Ecole Polytechnique--- City College 
of City Univ of New York--- Bell--- Univ Rochester 
Kapon, E 8 Tel Aviv Univ--- Caltech--- Bell  
Tang, Cl 8 Cornell Univ 
Whinnery JR 8 UC Berkeley 
Goldberg, L 7 Naval Research Laboratory  
Lau KY 7 Bell--- Hughes--- Caltech --- Ortel--- Columbia Univ 
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Fuhr, PL 6 NASA 
Harnagel, GL 6 Xerox--- Spectra Diode 
Haus, HA 6 MIT 
Sakamoto, M 6 Spectra Diode 
Bowers, JE 5 Univ of Minnesota--- Stanford Univ --- Bell 
Chen, YC 5 Exxon --- GTE Laboratories--- Perkin–Elmer 
Chow, WW 5 Univ of Arizona--- Univ of New Mexico--- Hughes 
Hall, DG 5 Univ of Tennessee--- McDonnell Douglas--- Univ of Rochester 
Henry, CH 5 Bell 
Paoli, TL 5 Stanford Univ--- Bell--- Xerox 
Patonay, G 5 Emory Univ  
Salzman, J 5 
NASA--- Tel Aviv Univ--- Caltech--- Bell---Technion—Israel Institute 
of Technology 
Vahala, K 5 Caltech 
Berger, J 4 HP--- Spectra Diode 
Byer, RL 4 Stanford Univ--- Bell--- Xerox 
Chen, KL 4 UC Berkeley 
Dienes, A 4 Caltech--- Bell --- UC Berkeley---  UC Davis  
Endriz, JG 4 Stanford Univ--- RCA--- Spectra Diode 
Ezekiel, S 4 MIT 
Hsin, W 4 UC Berkeley 
Lee, TP 4 Bell 
Lindsey, C 4 Caltech --- Univ of Hawaii 
TWU, Y 4 UC Berkeley--- Bell 
Vanderziel, JP 4 Bell 
Weller, JF 4 Naval Research Laboratory 
Yang, JJ 4 TRW 
Abshire, JB 3 NASA 
Beach, R 3 Columbia Univ--- Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 
Begley, DL 3 
Univ of Missouri-Rolla--- McDonnell Douglas--- Bell---Univ of 
Illinois at Urbana–Champaign 
Holonyak, N 3 Univ Illinois Urbana Champaign 
Cella, T 3 Bell 
Chun, MK 3 General Electric--- Naval Research Laboratory 
Defreez, RK 3 Oregon Graduate Center  
Dutta, NK 3 Cornell Univ--- Bell 
Source: Web of Science. Scitation. 
 
 
 
Top Fifty Highly Cited Japan Based Engineers 1960-1990 
 
Engineer 
Record Cou
nted Affiliation 
Kimura, T 22 NTT 
Yamamoto, Y 22 NTT 
Saruwatari, M 19 NTT  
Ikeda, M 17 NTT 
Mukai, T 17 NTT 
Imasaka, T 14 Kyushu Univ 
Ishibashi N 14 Kyushu Univ 
Otsuka K 12 NTT 
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Kobayashi, K 11 NEC 
Kobayashi, S 11 NTT 
Mito, I 11 NEC 
Saito, S  11 NTT 
Imanaka, K 10 Oki --- Omuron 
Ohtsu, M 10 Tokyo Institute of Technology 
Inoue, K 10 NTT 
Kawano, K 9 NTT 
Mitomi, O 9 NTT 
Mukai, S 9 Electrotechnical Laboratory 
Nakazawa, M 9 Tokyo Institute of Technology--- NTT 
Tsuchida, H 9 Electrotechnical Laboratory 
Kikuchi, K 8 Univ of Tokyo 
Ogura, M 8 Electrotechnical Laboratory---AIST  
Sakakibara, Y 8 Mitsubishi Electric 
Susaki, W 8 Mitsubishi Electric 
Yamamoto, S 8 KDD 
Itoh, H 7 Electrotechnical Laboratory 
Kakimoto, S 7 Mitsubishi Electric 
Kawaguchi, H 7 NTT 
Machida, S 7 NTT 
Shimura, M 7 Omron 
Sugie, T 7 NTT 
Suzuki, K 7 NTT 
Suzuki, T 7 Niigata Univ 
Asatani, K 6 NTT 
Imamoto, H 6 Electrotechnical Laboratory--- Omron 
Ito, R 6 Hitachi 
Mitsuhashi, Y 6 Electrotechnical Laboratory 
Mochizuki, K 6 KDD 
Nakajima, Y 6 Mitsubishi Electric 
Nakayama, T 6 Polytechnic Institute of Brooklyn--- Mitsubishi Electric 
Sato, F 6 Omron 
Suzuki, M 6 Tokyo Inst Polytech 
Takada, A 6 NTT 
Wakabayashi, H 6 KDD 
Watanabe, M 6 Electrotechnical Laboratory 
Yajima, H 6 Electrotechnical Laboratory 
Fujii, H 5 NEC 
Hashimoto, M 5 Tokyo Inst Technology 
Iwamura, H 5 NTT 
Kawata, S 5 NEC 
Kimura, Y 5 NTT 
Source: Web of Science. Scitation. 
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Appendix VI:  Laser and Semiconductor Laser 
 
Two Natures of Light: Waves and Particles 
Light has two natures; waves and particles.  Light simultaneously exhibits 
these two natures.  Physicists found the former aspect first and found the latter 
aspect later.  Both of these aspects are important natures for laser technology.  This 
section briefly explains these natures. 
Light has been one of the challenging topics in physics from Euclid.  Euclid 
studied how mirror reflected light in water.  He was thinking light refraction.  He put 
a ring in a jar.  One could not see the ring when one saw diagonally the jar.  One 
could see it only from just above.  However, if one filled the jar with water, one 
could see the ring from the diagonal.  This was the first experiment regarding light 
in physics.  From AC two century, physicists began to study various aspects of light 
such as refraction, diffraction, and velocity. 
In the late nineteen-century, a Scottish physicist brought a breakthrough in 
the research of light.  Based on Faraday’s law of induction, James Clerk Maxwell 
developed a set of equations expressing the basic laws of electricity and magnetism 
and presented in 1864.1  He indicated that light was an electromagnetic disturbance 
in the form of wave propagated through the electromagnetic field according to 
electromagnetic laws.  In short, he revealed that light is a visible electric wave.  
Figure 1 represents the characteristics of light in terms of electric wave.   
 
Figure 1: Light as Electric Wave 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Hirata, Wakaru Handōtai Rēzā No Kiso to Ōyō, (Handbook of Semiconductor Laser, Basics and 
Application), p.14. 
 
Amplitude (a), wavelength (λ), phase (p), and velocity of light (c) are four factors, 
which one can feel when we see light.  Amplitude is related with light strength.  The 
higher amplitude light, the brighter we see.  Wavelength is related with colour of 
light.  If light has longer wavelength, the colour becomes blue.  Shorter wavelength 
                                                 
1 Maxwell, A Dynamical Theory of the Electromagnetic Field.  
λ 
p 
a 
c 
a Amplitude 
Light Strength = 
2
a  
λ Wavelength 1nm ～1mm (Visible Ray 0.4 ～ 0.7
μm) 
p Phase 0～2π (rad) or 0～360 [deg] 
c Velocity of 
Light smC /103
8×=  
v Frequency λ/CV = , Vpiω 2=  
ω =Angular frequency 
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light becomes red.  Phase corresponds with the colour of interference.  Why we see 
different colours in light reflected in water is because natural light has different 
phases.  As described above, Maxwell indicated that light was visible electric wave.  
When electricity vibrates, electric wave occurs.  Frequency is an indicator of the 
number of electric vibrations in one second.  Light is a wavelength that vibrates five 
hundred billion times per second.  The visibility of light depends on wavelength.  
Figure 2 shows the relationship between wavelength and classification of electric 
wave. 
 
Figure 2: Wavelength and Light 
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Frequency
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Visible Rays Ultraviolet Rays X Rays Gamma Rays
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Source: Mizuno, Oputoerekutoronikusu no Hanashi, (Optoelectronics Handbook), p.16. 
 
 About forty years after Maxwell’s theory, German physicists revealed the 
other nature of light.  In 1900, a German physicist, Max Karl Ernst Planck, 
presented that light had elementary units (hv), which could not be separated into a 
smaller unit.2  This finding suggested that light had a nature as particle.  Since this 
Planck’s new theory was revolutionary, it took five years to recognize the scientific 
importance of this new theory.  In 1905 based on Plank’s theory, Albert Einstein 
published “On a Heuristic Viewpoint Concerning the Production and Transformation 
of Light” and clearly revealed the second nature of light that had not been found.  
Einstein presented that light was particle flying at the speed of light (c).  This thesis 
proposed the idea of “light quanta”, currently called photons, and showed 
photoelectric effect.  He also introduced the concept of population inversion.3  This 
                                                 
2 This “h” is called Planck’s constant and “v” is the frequency of the radiation.   
3 On population inversion, see Figure 7 and 8. 
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was one of the most important findings in opening up the current quantum physics. 
 Maxwell found that light was an electric wave in 1867.  Einstein indicated 
that light was a kind of particles in 1905.  The findings showed that light had two 
aspects; wave and particle. These findings provided indispensable theoretical 
background for the invention of laser. 
 
 
Features of Laser Light 
Laser has unique characteristics, which natural light does not have.  It has 
four distinctive characteristics, directivity, coherency, energy density, and mono-
wavelength (Table 1).4  Because of these four characteristics, laser is widely used in 
various areas.   
 
Table 1: Four Characters of Laser Light 
 Natural Light Laser Light Application Examples 
Directivity 
 
 
 
Optical 
Communication 
Laser Scanner 
Optical Disc 
Laser Rader 
Coherency 
 
 
 
Holography 
Measurement 
 
Energy 
Density 
 
 
 
Laser Processing 
Laser Weld 
Laser Scalpel 
Laser Weapon 
 
Wavelength 
 
Light is separated by 
spectrometer according to its 
wavelengths. 
 
 
 
Spectroscopic 
Analysis 
Source: Tanikoshi, Lēsār no Hanashi,(Handbook of Laser), p 39.  
 
The first point is directivity.  Laser light goes straight for one direction, while 
natural light goes to several directions.  The second point is about coherency.  While 
                                                 
4 Tanikoshi, Lēsār no Hanashi,(Handbook of Laser). 
Scattered  
Light Source 
Reflector 
Source 
Prism 
 
Red 
Green 
Purple 
 
   High Energy Density 
   Low Energy Density 
Condense Lens 
 
 
Wavelength and 
Phase are 
Coherent 
λ Various Lights 
Light Source 
Straight for one 
direction 
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the wavelength and phase of natural light are inconsistent, those of laser light are 
coherent.   The third point concerns energy density.  Because of its directivity, laser 
light can focus on a precise point.  As a result, it attains high energy density.  This 
characteristic enables laser light to use in material processing. The last point is its 
wavelength. While natural light includes various wavelengths, laser is mono-
wavelength light. 
Laser is used in various areas such as optical communication, material 
processing, and bombing.  Lasers are classified into five categories based on the 
medium used to amplify light; solid body laser, gas laser, liquid laser, chemical laser, 
and semiconductor laser.  Since different lasers vary their wavelength, input and 
output power, and manufacturing costs, they are widely used in various areas. 
Because semiconductor laser is compact and easy to operate, there are various 
application areas. For instance, it is used in compact disc player, digital videodisc 
player, barcode recorder, pointer, measurement, printer, and optical fibre. 
Semiconductor laser is also used for lightning for another laser. Both optical 
communication and optical storage, however, were the main application areas of 
semiconductor laser, even though there are many small application areas. There are 
two types of semiconductor lasers according to its wavelength of laser. Long 
wavelength semiconductor laser is used in optical communication. Short wavelength 
semiconductor laser is used in optical storage.  
 
 
Making Laser Beam 
This section briefly explains how laser technology uses these natures of light 
in order to produce light.  One can make light with many different ways such as 
striking a match, turning on the light and catching fireflies.  All of these ways use 
the same principle to make light.  As described, light is an electric wave.  Therefore, 
one can make light by vibrating electron.  Figure 3 shows two classic models.   
 
Figure 3: Two Classic Models of Light Radiation 
ElectronElectron
Light
Light
Dipole Radiation
Cyclotron
Radiation  
Source: Hirata, Wakaru Handōtai Rēzā No Kiso to Ōyō, (Handbook of Semiconductor Laser, Basics and 
Application), p.22. 
 
Dipole radiation makes light by vertically vibrating electron.  Cyclotron radiation 
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circularly vibrates electron and makes light.  One can make light by vibrating 
electron around five hundred trillion times per second. 
 Why does vibrated electrons make light?  Electrons stay either at N1 or at N2 .  
Electron at N1 has lower energy than that of N2.  Electrons do not stay in the middle 
of them.  Electrons at N1 are called the ground state.  Electrons at N2 are called the 
excited state.  The electrons radiate light, which is the energy gap between N1 and 
N2, when the electrons of N2 fall down to N1 (Figure 4).  
 
Figure 4: Natural Emission 
 
 
 This emitted light is natural light.  Its directivity and coherence, therefore, 
are scattered and various.  Almost of all the light in our daily life such as solar light, 
electric light, and candlelight, is natural emission light. 
There is another type of emission, called stimulated emission.  In stimulated 
emission, light stimulates N2 electron to fall down to N1 (Figure 5).  
 
Figure 5: Stimulated Emission 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The stimulated light has the same amplitude and wavelength as the light stimulating 
the electron.  This is a unique characteristic of stimulated emission.  Laser uses this 
unique nature of stimulated emission. 
 Stimulated emission does not occur in natural environment.  There are two 
requirements to make laser beam; (1) population inversion and (2) feedback.  
Population inversion is of fundamental importance for laser because stimulated 
emission occurs only in this special circumstance.  Figure 6 illustrates the state in 
which the number of electrons located at N1 is more than that of N2.  This state is 
called thermodynamic equilibrium.  In natural environment, electrons are always in 
thermodynamic equilibrium.   
 
 
 
Emitted Light 
Electron 
N2 
 
N1 
 
Stimulation (Heat or 
Light) 
Electron 
Emitted Light 
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Figure 6: Thermodynamic Equilibrium 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Hirata, Wakaru Handōtai Rēzā No Kiso to Ōyō, (Handbook of Semiconductor Laser, 
Basics and Application), p.31. 
 
Stimulated emission does not occur in this circumstance.  It is indispensable to 
increase the number of the electrons in hither energy orbit (N2) for attaining 
stimulated emission.  This state in which the number of the electrons at N2 exceeds 
half of all electrons is called population inversion.   
 
Figure 7: Population Inversion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Hirata, Wakaru Handōtai Rēzā No Kiso to Ōyō, (Handbook of Semiconductor Laser, 
Basics and Application), p.32. 
 
In natural environment, the number of the electrons located in lower energy orbit 
(N1) exceeds that of the electron in higher energy orbit (N2).  When Einstein 
proposed the mechanism of population inversion in 1905, it was believed that 
population inversion could not be attained.  However, it became proven that 
population inversion could be attained by strongly activating material.  For instance, 
exposing material to strong light or strongly discharging electricity causes 
population inversion.  It is necessary to give artificially high energy to atom.  For 
example, Maiman used xenon flashlight to achieve population inversion for his ruby 
laser in 1960.5  When the number of the higher electrons exceeds half of the all 
electrons, stimulated emission occurs.  In population inversion, the light emitted 
                                                 
5 Xenon is one kind of electric filament type light bulbs.  Xenon has higher output than other 
filament type bulbs such as krypton bulb and halogen bulb have.   
Electron 
N1 
N2 
Electron 
N1 
N2 
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from the stimulated electron stimulates other electron.    It causes the emission of 
another photon of the same energy.  In other words, the secondly stimulated 
electrons emit the light that has the exactly same wavelength.  This phenomenon is 
called “stimulated emission.”  When this stimulated emission happens repeatedly, 
the light becomes stronger.  This is the basic mechanism of laser light. 
 
Figure 8: Stimulated Emission Radiation  
 
 
 The second requirement to make laser beam is feedback.  The device for 
laser must have a feedback structure to amplify stimulated emission.  The feedback 
is attained with two parallel mirrors, called Fabry-Perot.  Stimulated emission is 
amplified and concentrated between those two mirrors.  Then, laser beam comes out 
from one of the mirrors, which the beam penetrates (Figure 9).   
 
Figure 9: Feedback Structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Hirata, Wakaru Handōtai Rēzā No Kiso to Ōyō, (Handbook of Semiconductor Laser, 
Basics and Application), p.33. 
 
What kinds of devices are needed to amplify laser beam?  Laser device is 
consisted of three key elements.  The first is the laser medium to generated light.  
The second is the power supply to deliver energy to the medium needed to stimulate 
electrons to emit light. The third is the mirrors to concentrate the light to stimulate 
the emission of laser radiation.  All three elements can take various forms.  Figure 
10 shows the basic three elements of ruby laser and He-Ne laser, which have simpler 
structure than semiconductor laser.  First, flashlight radiates pulse light. The pulse 
light excites atoms in the medium material.  Then, laser beam goes out from the 
cavity.  
 
 
 
 
Mirror (100% Reflection) 
Laser Beam 
Mirror (90 % Reflection) 
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Figure 10: Ruby Laser and He-Ne Laser  
 
 
Source: Hecht, The Laser Guidebook , p. 4 
 
How does the mechanism produce laser beam in a lightning device?  Figure 
11, 12 and 13 show the basic mechanisms of amplifying laser beam in Ruby laser.  
First, flashlight radiates pulse light.  It excites atoms in the medium material. 
 
Figure 11: Mechanism of Ruby Laser 1 
 
Source: Yano Keizai Kenkyūjyo, (Yano Research Institute). Kakudai Suru Rēzā Sangyō no 
Shijō Jittai to Kongo no Juyō Tenbō, (Survey on Semiconductor Laser Market and Its 
Prospects), p.19. 
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The excited atoms emit photons in order to keep energy balance.  Since the 
wavelength and phase of this emitted light are inconsistent, this light is natural 
emission light.  Since the photons move at random, many of them go out from the 
material.  Some of the photons stimulate atoms to emit photons more.  This effect is 
called stimulated emission.  In this special situation, the atoms emit the stimulated 
emission light whose wavelength and phase are consistent.  
Figure 12: Mechanism of Ruby Laser 2 
 
Source: Yano Keizai Kenkyūjyo, (Yano Research Institute). Kakudai Suru Rēzā Sangyō no 
Shijō Jittai to Kongo no Juyō Tenbō, (Survey on Semiconductor Laser Market and Its 
Prospects), p.19. 
 
It is necessary to amplify this stimulated emission light to produce laser beam.  The 
light can be amplified by setting one mirror against the other half mirror to reflect 
the light.  By the reflection between two mirrors, the number of excited atoms 
increases.  This process is called light pumping.  As a result, the stimulated emission 
light becomes stronger.  And the stimulated emission light goes out as laser light 
through a small hole of the half mirror whose reflective rate and transmission rate 
are 50% respectively.    
 
Figure 13: Mechanism of Ruby Laser 3 
 
 
Source: Yano Keizai Kenkyūjyo, (Yano Research Institute). Kakudai Suru Rēzā Sangyō no 
Shijō Jittai to Kongo no Juyō Tenbō, (Survey on Semiconductor Laser Market and Its 
Prospects), p.19. 
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Semiconductor Laser 
 What is the mechanism of semiconductor laser?  Semiconductor laser is a 
tiny electronics device mainly used in optical fibre and optical information storage.  
Figure 15 depicts an actual sized semiconductor laser.  Its height is around one 
centimetre.  The diameter of the packaged semiconductor laser is around 5 
millimetres.  
Figure 14 illustrates the basic structure of semiconductor laser.  
Semiconductor laser has the same basic structure as other lasers such as ruby laser 
and He-Ne laser described above.  It has the same three key elements; the laser 
medium, the power supply and the mirrors.  Semiconductor laser uses 
semiconductor as the laser medium.  It consists of two outer semiconductor layers 
separated by a middle layer, called p-n junction.  The middle layer is called an active 
layer.  The two outer semiconductor layers are called a cladding layer. This structure 
is packaged in the circular package as illustrated in Figure 15.   
 
 
Figure 14: Semiconductor Laser 
P Type Semiconductor
P-N Junction
N Type Semiconductor
Power Supply Laser Beam
MirrorMirror
 
Source: Hirata, Wakaru Handōtai Rēzā No Kiso to Ōyō, (Handbook of Semiconductor Laser, 
Basics and Application), p.34. 
 
Semiconductor laser literally uses semiconductor materials such as silicon, 
germanium, or selenium as the laser medium to generate laser beam.  The basic 
mechanism to radiate laser beam is the same as the other lasers.  Figure 15 
exemplifies the mechanism of semiconductor laser amplification.   
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 Figure 15: Semiconductor Laser 
 
 
Source: Andō, Kōji. Hikari to Hikari no Kiroku; Hikari Hen, (Light and Optical Memory), 
p.185. 
 
Semiconductor has three technological characteristics.  
(1) Semiconductors have medium electric resistance rate between conductor and non-
conductor at room temperature.  ( 3101 −× ～ 10101× Ωcm) 
(2) While semiconductor’s resistance rate becomes infinite at the extreme low 
temperature, it becomes low resistance rate in inverse proportion to the temperature 
goes up. 
(3) When semiconductor has impurities or when it is exposed to light, its resistance rate 
varies. 
Various materials can be used to produce semiconductors.  For instance, not only 
single material such as silicon (Si) and germanium (Ge), but also compound such as GaAs 
and GaP can be semiconductor material.  According to its materials, semiconductors vary its 
intrinsic resistance. 
 Different semiconductor materials amplify at different wavelengths when 
they are used for laser amplification. Figure 16 shows some examples of 
semiconductor materials and their wavelength. 
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Figure 16: Semiconductor Materials and Wavelengths 
 
Source: Suzaki, "Kitai Fukuramu Handōtai Rēzā no Gijutsu Kakushin (Technological 
Innovation of Semiconductor Laser)", p.278. 
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